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Essentially, all models are wrong,
but some are useful.
Box and Draper (1987)
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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I study the interaction between Credit Derivatives and Fixed Income
Markets, both corporate and sovereign, from di¤erent perspectives. In the case of
corporate, I study arbitrage, price discovery and nancial integration. In the case of
sovereign, I focus on the European Monetary Union (EMU) sovereign bond market and
analyze the potential arrival of a common risk free rate for the EMU and the advantages
derived from it.
First, we analyze long-run and statistical arbitrage opportunities in credit deriva-
tives markets using strategies combining Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and Asset Swaps
(ASPs). We present a new statistical arbitrage test which has lower Type I error and
selects arbitrage opportunities with lower downside risk than existing alternatives. This
test allows us to study for arbitrage opportunities in the appropriate way by focusing
our analysis on the cases in which long positions in CDSs and ASPs are needed. Using
four di¤erent databases from 2005 to 2009, we nd long-run and statistical arbitrage
opportunities before the current crisis in 27% and 29% of the cases, respectively. During
the crisis, they decrease to 9% and 17%, respectively. Specically, CDS spreads are too
low in comparison with asset swap spreads. This fact puts into question the e¢ ciency
of this segment of the CDS market. After considering funding and trading costs, we
nd SA opportunities in 16% of the cases before the crisis but never during the crisis.
Thus, once the crisis started, noticeable deviations from the parity relation appeared
although the increase in funding costs makes the apparent arbitrage opportunities non
protable. Finally, we nd that arbitrage opportunities are more frequent in low rated
xbonds.
Second, we analyze whether liquidity a¤ects the price discovery process in credit
derivatives markets and we nd that it does. Specically, we focus on the credit deriva-
tives markets in the context of the subprime crisis. We ll a gap in the price discovery
literature in credit markets, because no analysis of the price discovery process between
ASPs or bonds and CDSs has been carried out up to now. The goal of the price disco-
very model is to analyze the dynamics and interaction between CDS and ASP or bond
spreads in an equilibrium non-arbitrage model. Thus, this paper contributes to the
price discovery literature by considering another facet of the credit markets (ASPs) and
by adapting Garbade and Silver (1983) model to this segment of credit markets. We
rst present an agent-based theoretical price discovery model for the ASP, bond and
CDS markets that allows for simultaneous agent participation in di¤erent markets. We
then empirically test this model and obtain that the CDS market leads the ASP market
in the price discovery process before the crisis (the high liquid scenario). This result
changes with the appearance of the subprime crisis. Thus, during the crisis (the low
liquid scenario) the ASP leads price discovery. We obtain similar results when we relate
the CDS and bond markets. The di¤erence in the relative liquidity between CDS and
ASP/bond markets helps to explain these results. We also extend our analysis to test
the suggestion that ASP spreads are a more accurate measure of credit risk than bond
spreads. Our results indicate that ASP spreads consistently lead bond spreads up to
the point that according to Garbade and Silver (1983) terms, we nd that the bond
spread is a pure satelliteof the ASP spread.
Third, we analyze the internal (intra-market) and external (inter-market) integra-
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tion of three European corporate credit markets (corporate bonds, asset swap packages
and corporate credit default swaps) in the context of the current nancial crisis. For this
aim, we use a DCC-GARCH model for each markets innovations which are obtained
after subtracting from the credit spreads the e¤ect of the fundamentals of the under-
lying entities. Our measure of internal market integration is based on the average DCCs
between an individual (rm-specic) credit spread innovation, and the corresponding
average market credit spread innovations. Similarly, our measure of external market
integration is based on the average DCCs between the two individual credit spreads
innovations of the same rm but in di¤erent markets. The higher the innovationscor-
relation, the stronger is the market integration. We nd that credit spread changes are
largely driven by rm-specic innovations and to a lesser extent by changes in funda-
mentals. Internal market integration increases during the crisis for CDSs but decreases
for bonds and ASPs. External market integration decreases during the crisis between
the CDS and the other two markets. Both facts suggest that the CDS market tends to
follow its own way to a considerable extent in times of nancial distress. The degree
of internal and external integration is signicantly a¤ected by liquidity and global risk
factors.
Finally, we study the impact of a hypothetical common European Monetary Union
(EMU) sovereign bond yielding a common European Monetary Union risk free rate. The
possibility of a common European bond has attracted the interest of the nancial press
and is receiving increased attention from policy makers. However, there is no published
quantication of a common risk free rate, nor a detailed comparison with other possible
alternatives is available. This paper addresses both questions and presents a tentative
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estimate of this common risk free for the European Monetary Union countries from 2004
to 2009 using variables motivated by a theoretical portfolio selection model. First, we
analyze the determinants of EMU sovereign yield spreads and nd signicant e¤ects of
the credit quality, macro, correlation, liquidity and interaction variables. Robustness
tests with di¤erent data frequencies, benchmarks, liquidity and risk variables, cross
section regressions, balanced panels and maturities conrm the initial results. Motivated
by these results, we present a tentative estimate of the common risk free rate which will
be free, at least to some extent, from the e¤ect of the risk factors (credit, liquidity,
macro, correlation) that inuence the yield of individual sovereign bonds. Finally, we
nd tentative evidence in favour of the hypothesis that a common bond and a common
risk free rate in the EMU could produce substantial savings in borrowing costs for all
the countries involved. Of course, there are many institutional design features that must
be resolved (seniority, amount relative to total debt issues, guarantee fund, etc.) before
such a common bond can be launched. But our paper provides a rst insight into one
central issue.
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RESUMEN
En esta tesis estudio la interacción entre los mercados, tanto a nivel corporativo
como soberano, de Derivados de Crédito y Renta Fija desde distintas perspectivas.
Para el caso corporativo se realiza un análisis de arbitraje, liderazgo en la formación
de precios e integración nanciera en los mercados anteriormente mencionados. Para
el caso soberano el estudio se centra en el mercado de bonos soberanos de la Unión
Monetaria Europea (EMU) y se analiza el impacto que la posible llegada de un tipo de
interés libre de riesgo común para todos los países de la EMU tendría sobre sus costes
nancieros, así como las consecuencias que de ello se podrían derivar.
En primer lugar, analizamos las oportunidades de arbitraje en el largo plazo y
arbitraje estadístico en los mercados de derivados de crédito usando estrategias que
combinan Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) y Asset Swaps (ASPs). Para ello presentamos
un nuevo test de arbitraje estadístico que tiene menor error Tipo I y selecciona las opor-
tunidades de arbitraje con un menor riesgo de pérdida que las alternativas existentes.
Dicho test nos permite estudiar las oportunidades de arbitraje, centrando nuestro análi-
sis sólo en los casos en los que se necesitan posiciones largas en CDSs y ASPs. Usando
cuatro bases de datos diferentes que comprenden el periodo que se extiende de 2005 a
2009, encontramos oportunidades de arbitraje en el largo plazo y arbitraje estadístico
en un 27% y 29% de los casos, respectivamente, antes de la reciente crisis. Durante
la crisis, el porcentaje de oportunidades de arbitraje desciende al 9% y 17%, respecti-
vamente. Especícamente, estos resultados reejan que las primas de crédito del CDS
son demasiado bajas en comparación con las primas de crédito del ASP. Este resultado
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arroja dudas sobre la eciencia del mercado de CDSs. Tras la inclusión de costes de
nanciación y de transacción, encontramos oportunidades de arbitraje estadístico en un
16% de los casos antes de la crisis pero en ningún caso durante la crisis. Por tanto, tras
el comienzo de la crisis aparecieron desviaciones notables de la relación de equivalencia o
paridad entre las primas de crédito de los CDSs y ASPs aunque el aumento de los costes
de nanciación convierte en no beneciosas las aparentes oportunidades de arbitraje.
Por último, encontramos que las oportunidades de arbitraje son más frecuentes entre
los bonos con bajo rating.
En segundo lugar, analizamos si la liquidez afecta al proceso de liderazgo en la
formación de precios (LFP en adelante) en los mercados de derivados de crédito y
encontramos que sí lo hace. Concretamente, nos centramos en los mercados de derivados
de crédito en el contexto de la actual crisis nanciera. Gracias a este análisis cubrimos
un vacío en la literatura de LFP en los mercados de derivados de crédito dado que
ningún análisis del proceso de LFP entre los ASPs o bonos y CDSs ha sido desarrollado
hasta la fecha. El objetivo del modelo de LFP consiste en el análisis de la dinámica
e interacción entre las primas de crédito de los CDS y ASP o bonos en un modelo de
equilibrio basado en la relación de no arbitraje. Por tanto, este estudio contribuye a la
literatura de LFP considerando una nueva vertiente de los mercados de crédito (ASPs)
y adaptando el modelo de Garbade y Silver (1983) a este segmento de los mercados
de crédito. En primer lugar presentamos un modelo teórico de LFP basado en agentes
para los mercados de ASPs, bonos y CDSs que permite la participación simultánea de
los agentes en distintos mercados. Posteriormente, contrastamos teóricamente dicho
modelo y obtenemos que antes de la crisis (escenario de alta liquidez) el mercado de
xv
CDSs lidera al mercado de ASPs en el proceso de LFP. Este resultado cambia tras la
aparición de la actual crisis de forma que durante dicha crisis (escenario de baja liquidez)
el mercado de ASPs lidera el proceso de LFP. Resultados similares se obtienen cuando
comparamos el mercado de CDSs y el mercado de bonos. La diferencia en la liquidez
relativa entre los mercados de CDSs y ASPs/bonos nos ayuda a explicar e interpretar
estos resultados. Extendemos nuestro análisis para contrastar la teoría de que la prima
de crédito del ASP es una medida de riesgo de crédito más adecuada que la prima de
crédito del bono. Nuestros resultados indican que la prima de crédito del ASP lidera,
de forma consistente, a la prima de crédito de los bonos hasta el punto que siguiendo la
terminología de Garbade y Silver (1983) obtenemos que la prima de crédito del bono es
un satélite purode la del ASP.
En tercer lugar, analizamos la integración interna (dentro de un mercado) y externa
(entre mercados) de tres mercados europeos de crédito a nivel corporativo (bonos, asset
swap packages y credit default swaps corporativos) en el contexto de la actual crisis
nanciera. Para tal n, empleamos un modelo DCC-GARCH para las innovaciones de
cada mercado que a su vez se obtienen tras extraer de las primas de crédito el efecto de los
fundamentales de las entidades subyacentes. Nuestra medida de la integración interna
del mercado se basa en la media de los DCCs existentes entre la innovación de una prima
de crédito individual (especíca de la empresa) y las innovaciones correspondientes a la
prima de crédito media del mercado. De igual forma, nuestra medida de la integración
externa del mercado se basa en la media de los DCCs existentes entre las innovaciones
de dos primas de crédito individuales de la misma empresa pero correspondientes a
distintos mercados. De esta forma, cuanto mayor es la correlación de las innovaciones,
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mayor es la integración de los mercados. Nuestros resultados muestran que los cambios
en las primas de crédito se deben en gran medida a innovaciones especícas de las
empresas y en un menor grado a cambios en los fundamentales. La integración interna
del mercado aumenta durante la crisis para el caso del mercado de CDSs pero decae
para el caso de los bonos y ASPs. La integración externa del mercado entre el mercado
de CDSs y los otros dos mercados disminuye durante la crisis. Estos hechos sugieren que
el mercado de CDSs tiende a seguir su propio camino de forma considerable en épocas
de crisis nanciera. El grado de integración interna y externa se ve afectado de forma
signicativa por factores de liquidez y riesgo global.
Finalmente, estudiamos el impacto de un hipotético bono soberano común en la
Unión Monetaria Europea (UME) que a su vez daría lugar a un tipo de interés libre
riesgo común en la Unión Monetaria Europea. Un posible bono común europeo ha
atraído el interés de la prensa nanciera y está recibiendo una atención creciente de los
reguladores. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha no se dispone de ninguna cuanticación de este
tipo de interés libre de riesgo común al igual que no se ha realizado una comparación
detallada con otras posibles alternativas. Este estudio trata ambas cuestiones y presenta
una estimación de este tipo de interés libre de riesgo común para los países de la UME
durante el periodo de 2004 a 2009 usando variables que vienen motivadas de un modelo
teórico de selección de cartera. Así, en primer lugar analizamos los determinantes de
los diferenciales de las rentabilidades de los bonos soberanos en la UME y encontramos
un efecto signicativo de las variables referentes a la calidad crediticia, situación macro,
correlación, liquidez y términos interacción. Estos resultados se ven conrmados gracias
a distintos tests de robustez en los que se emplean otras frecuencias en los datos, distintos
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bonos de referencia (benchmarks), otras alternativas para las variables relacionadas con
el riesgo y la liquidez, regresiones de sección cruzada, paneles balanceados y diferentes
vencimientos. A partir de estos resultados, presentamos una estimación del tipo de
interés libre de riesgo que estaría libre, al menos hasta cierto punto, del efecto de
factores de riesgo (crédito, liquidez, macro, correlación) que inuyen sobre el diferencial
de los bonos soberanos individuales. Por último, encontramos evidencia a favor de la
hipótesis de que un bono común y por tanto de un tipo de interés común en la UME
propiciaría ahorros substanciales referentes al coste de nanciación de la deuda para
todos los países involucrados. Por supuesto, existen muchos aspectos relacionados con
el diseño institucional que deberían resolverse (prioridad relativa a otros bonos, cantidad
relativa al total de la emisión, fondo de garantía, etc.) antes de que dicho bono común
empezara su andadura. Sin embargo, nuestro estudio ofrece una primera aproximación
a una cuestión fundamental.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, I study the interaction between Credit Derivatives and Fixed Income
Markets, both corporate and sovereign, from di¤erent perspectives. In the case of
corporate, I study arbitrage, price discovery and nancial integration. In the case of
sovereign, I focus on the European Monetary Union (EMU) sovereign bond market and
analyze the potential arrival of a common risk free rate for the EMU and the advantages
derived from it.
In Chapter 2 we analyze the existence of arbitrage opportunities in credit derivatives
markets using self-nancing strategies combining Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and
Asset Swaps Packages (ASPs). More concretely, we analyze the mispricings between
CDSs and ASPs. Credit Default Swaps are insurance contracts which provide protection
in exchange for the CDS spread while the Asset Swaps are compounded by a bond and
an IRS which swaps the bond coupon into Euribor plus the asset swap spread. The
underlying idea is that both the CDS and the ASP spreads are prices for the same credit
risk and for this reason there should be an equivalence relation between both spreads to
avoid arbitrage opportunities. The analysis of arbitrage opportunities is based on two
di¤erent perspectives, the long run arbitrage and the statistical arbitrage perspective.
The rst perspective is based on the cointegration methodology and analyzes if
both spreads are equivalent in the long run. This perspective has also been employed to
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analyze the no-arbitrage relationship between bonds and CDSs in Blanco, Brennan and
Marsh (2005) or Zhu (2006) among others. We use ASP instead of bond spreads given
that they allow a more precise analysis parity relation between CDS and bond spreads.
The cointegration analysis is based on the assumption that bonds and ASPs can be
shorted. However, this option is not always feasible and so we extend the analysis of
arbitrage opportunities by focusing in the cases in which long positions in CDSs and
ASPs are needed. To develop this extension we use the statistical arbitrage methodology.
The second perspective is then based on the statistical arbitrage test. The statistical
arbitrage analysis is designed to exploit persistent anomalies and was rstly introduced
by Hogan, Jarrow, Teo and Warachka (2004) and later improved in Jarrow, Teo, Tse and
Warachka (2007). Both studies analyze statistical arbitrage opportunities in the stock
market. Statistical arbitrage represents a zero cost, self-nancing trading opportunity
that has positive expected cumulative trading prots with a declining variance and
a probability of loss that converges to zero. Hogan et al. (2004) and Jarrow et al.
(2007) are based on the stationary bootstrap methodology. However, we present a new
statistical arbitrage test based on the subsampling methodology introduced in Politis,
Romano and Wolf (1995) and (1997) and extended in Politis, Romano and Wolf (1999)
and (2001). Our test allows a more general structure in the residuals and which has
lower Type I error and selects arbitrage opportunities with lower downside risk than
existing alternatives.
Using four di¤erent data sources for CDS spreads covering the period from 2005 to
2009, long-run (cointegration) and statistical arbitrage analysis are performed. Before
the subprime crisis, we nd long-run and statistical arbitrage opportunities in 27% and
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29% of the cases, respectively. During the crisis, arbitrage opportunities decrease to
9% and 17%, respectively. Specically, CDS spreads are too low in comparison with
asset swap spreads. This fact puts into question the e¢ ciency of this segment of the
CDS market. Employing Hogan et al. (2004) or Jarrow et al. (2007) methodology we
nd statistical arbitrage opportunities in 49% and 24% of the cases before the crisis
and during the crisis, respectively. We nd that arbitrageurs engaging in arbitrage
opportunities detected by Jarrow et al. (2007) test (but not detected by our test) are
exposed to signicant downside risk that is even more extreme during the crisis period.
This is an economically relevant di¤erence between Jarrow et al. (2007) test and our test
besides its better statistical properties. We nd that our test is more conservative than
Jarrow et al. (2007) test and it rejects statistical arbitrage in some cases where there
exist risk and the other tests (Jarrow et al. (2007) and long-run) support the existence
of statistical arbitrage. After considering funding and trading costs, we nd statistical
arbitrage opportunities in 16% of the cases before the crisis but never during the crisis.
Arbitrage opportunities are more frequent in the case of relatively low rated bonds.
The ongoing nancial crisis and its possible consequences for the regulation of nancial
markets and for the investment strategies makes the study of the possible persistent
mispricing in credit derivatives markets a topic of salient relevance. Our results can be
interpreted as tentative evidence in favour of the hypothesis that before the crisis some
persistent mispricings can be found in this segment of the credit derivatives markets.
However once the crisis started, noticeable deviations from the parity relation appeared
although the increase in funding costs makes the apparent arbitrage opportunities non
protable.
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Some interesting economic and regulatory implications follow from these results. For
example, persistent mispricing in credit derivatives markets suggests potential
ine¢ ciencies in these markets. The existence of statistical arbitrage opportunities before
the crisis, even after adjusting by market frictions, puts into question the e¢ ciency of
this segment of the CDS market and highlights the interest of this analysis for nancial
regulators. Moreover, these results also sheds light on the risk and protability of the
strategy which is commonly known as trading the basisand which has been employed
by some investors during the last years.1 Finally, one economic implication derived from
our new test is that the arbitrageurs engaging in arbitrage opportunities detected by
the previous tests but not detected by ours will be exposed to signicant downside risk.
This risk is even more extreme during the crisis period. Traders using our test will not
take into account those apparent (but risky) arbitrage opportunities. Thus, there is
an economically relevant di¤erence between the previous tests and our test besides its
better statistical properties (our test has lower Type I error).
The primary focus of Chapter 3 is to examine the role that liquidity plays in the
price discovery mechanism of credit derivatives markets in the context of the subprime
crisis. As Yan and Zivot (2007) state, an e¢ cient price discovery process is characterized
by the fast adjustment of market prices from the old equilibrium to the new equilibrium
with the arrival of new information. The new equilibrium is achieved by means of the
interactions of buyers and sellers. Thus, the nancial instrument prices that contributes
more and newer information to the price discovery process should be the one with the
highest number of informed market participants. We analyze it based on an agent-based
1Basis trades exploit the di¤erent pricing of ASP/bond and CDS on the same underlying company
and they have been a popular investment strategy during the last years.
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theoretical model for the asset swap package (ASP) or bond and CDS markets in the
spirit of Garbade and Silver (1983) estimated in an econometric framework associated
with the work of Gonzalo and Granger (1995).
Although there is no a formal theoretical model to understand the price discovery
process in credit derivatives markets there are some applications based on Hasbrouck
(1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) methodologies that analyze the e¢ ciency of
both CDS and bond markets in terms of price discovery. Norden and Weber (2004),
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) or Zhu (2006) among others obtain that the CDS
market reects the information more accurately and quickly than the bond market.
Other analyses of price discovery based on bonds and CDS such as Ammer and Cai
(2007) and Dötz (2007) nd that the bond market also make net contributions to price
discovery.
We ll a gap in the price discovery literature in credit markets, because, as far as
we know, no analysis of the price discovery process between ASPs or bonds and CDSs
has been carried out up to now. Moreover, there is no an empirical analysis that relates
the ASP and bond markets. The goal of the price discovery model that we present
is to analyze the dynamics and interaction between CDS and ASP or bond spreads in
an equilibrium non-arbitrage model. Garbade and Silver (1983) posit a formal agent-
based theoretical model to analyze the process of price discovery and show empirically
that this process is led by the markets where the number of participants is higher, in
their case the futures market in comparison with the spot market. We adapt Garbade
and Silver (1983) model to credit markets and extend it to reect, as realistically as
possible, the behaviour of market participants in the corresponding market place. Thus,
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we consider ve di¤erent types of market participants instead of three as Garbade and
Silver (1983). Each agent that participates in the market place can be classied into
one of the following groups: (i) Arbitrageurs who try to exploit possible discrepancies
among CDS and ASP prices. (ii) Agents that only take positions in the asset swap
market such as insurance rms or pension funds that invest in bonds or asset swaps as a
buy and holdstrategy. (iii) Agents that only participate in the CDS market either as
protection sellers or buyers such as the CDO issuers. Some examples of these agents are
hedge funds that benet from CDSs leverage e¤ect. (iv) Agents that participate in both
nancial markets as market makers or as nancial intermediaries who manage portfolios
for di¤erent customers or simply as investors in credit markets. (v) Agents that use the
CDS market to hedge their positions in corporate debt contrary to the individuals in
group iii) who do not have any underlying bond or ASP. Garbade and Silver (1983)
assume that the only individuals that operate in both markets are the arbitrageurs. We
o¤er a more general model that includes participants that operate in both markets (iii)
and hedgers (v) and so, both markets are not only linked by arbitrageurs as in GS but
by the two additional groups of individuals.
Once we have dened the demand scheduled for the di¤erent market participants
we set the clearing market conditions and nd the equilibrium prices. We use Figuerola-
Ferretti and Gonzalo (2009) methodology to match the theoretical model and the econo-
metric framework. The equilibrium prices can be dened in rst di¤erences according to
a VECM such that by means of the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) permanent-transitory
decomposition we obtain the price discovery metrics. The metrics represent the relative
contribution of a given markets relative to the other in terms of price discovery. They
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represent a liquidity measure and are dened in terms of the relative number of parti-
cipants in a given market, i. e. the number of agents operating in one market relative
to the number of participants in another market. Assuming that in a given market the
highest the overall number of market participants, the highest the number of informed
agents and given that the overall number of market participants is a measure of mar-
ket liquidity, we state that liquidity is the common element in price discovery analyses
that determines which market reveals information more e¢ ciently. This measure can
be easily related with other commonly employed liquidity measures like the number
of contracts or traded volume in a given market relative to the other. Our empirical
application conrms the theoretical models insights.
Cointegration is tested for and where found, we undertake the VECM analysis
yielding a price discovery metric consistent with the Gonzalo and Granger (1995)
methodology. The empirical results nd that the CDS market is more e¢ cient than
the ASP market in regards to price discovery in 87.5% of the cases which are studied
before the crisis (the high liquid scenario). Interestingly, this result is very sensitive to
the appearance of the subprime crisis. Thus, we nd that during the subprime crisis
(the low liquid scenario) the ASP spreads reect credit risk more e¢ ciently in 71.9% of
the cases. We obtain similar results when we relate the CDS and bond markets. The
di¤erence in the relative liquidity between CDS and ASP/bond markets helps to explain
these results. We also extend our analysis to test the suggestion that ASP spreads are
a more accurate measure of credit risk than bond spreads. Our results indicate that
ASP spreads consistently lead bond spreads up to the point that according to GS (1983)
terms, we nd that the bond spread is a pure satelliteof the ASP spread.
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The paper contributes to the price discovery literature by considering another facet
of the credit markets (Asset Swap Packages) and by adapting Garbade and Silver (1983)
model to this segment of credit markets. This model reveals the importance of liquidity
to the price discovery process in addition to the role of arbitrageurs in reducing devia-
tions from long-run equilibrium. Moreover the results presented yield thought provoking
ramications for the measurement of credit risk in times of nancial distress. Actually,
we hypothesize that the presence of a cheapest-to-deliver option, a liquidity premium
or counterparty risk among other aspects in CDS spreads may cloud the role of these
spreads as reliable credit risk measure and may di¢ cult inferences from CDS spreads to
monitor credit risk during periods of nancial distress. For this reason, it seems more
convenient to use the ASP spread as an alternative or as a complement to the CDS
spread, rather than the bond spread which is favoured in the literature, in turbulent
times.
In summary, the main economic and nancial implications are the following. First,
during the crisis the ASP market reveals credit risk more e¢ ciently that the CDS mar-
ket. Reasons explaining this nding include the cheapest-to-deliver option embedded
in the CDS spread, the liquidity premium and the counterparty risk in CDSs. The key
implication of this result is that inferences on the creditworthiness of a given rm based
solely in CDS spreads in periods of high market turbulence and low liquidity are bound
to be misleading. Second, the ASP spread leads the price discovery process of credit
risk more e¢ ciently than the bond spread, before and during the crisis. For this reason,
it is more appropriate to use the ASP spread as an alternative or as a complement to
the CDS spread as a measure of credit risk rather than the bond spread. However, most
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of the existing literature has focused primarily on the bond and CDS spreads ignoring
the role of the ASP spread as a credit risk indicator. Third, our theoretical model and
empirical results highlight the importance of the agents that operate in both markets in
order to provide stability to the credit markets. The arbitrageurs also play a special role
in these markets given that their demands are dened in terms of a long-run equivalence
or adjustment which could reduce deviations from the equilibrium prices.
In Chapter 4 we analyze the internal and external integration of three European
corporate credit markets (Corporate Bonds, Asset Swap Packages and Corporate Credit
Default Swaps) in the context of the current nancial crisis based on the information on
credit risk for fty rms using the prices in CDS, ASP and Bonds from November 2005
to September 2008. Unlike a number of previous studies, we do not restrict ourselves
to few particular aggregate market indexes. The reason for taking a broader perspec-
tive is to provide an insight into the integration process of nancial markets at the
micro level rather than simply a narrower integration within or among overall markets.
In this chapter we dene market integration in terms of the correlation structures esti-
mated between two credit spreads innovations obtained after subtracting from the credit
spreads the e¤ect of the fundamentals of the underlying entities. The reason for using
the innovations as in Acharya et al. (2007) according to the Acharya and Johnsons
(2007) econometric methodology is that changes in fundamentals should have a¤ected
in a similar way all credit spreads in xed-income markets. The innovations are com-
puted using a non-linear equation derived from a structural model of credit risk such as
Merton (1974). To capture the characteristics of time-varying correlations we employ
the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC-GARCH) model of Engle and Sheppard
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(2001) and Engle (2002), which is particularly well suited to examine correlation dy-
namics among assets. The DCC models have been employed to study the integration
or co-movement among di¤erent nancial markets and among di¤erent economic areas.
The higher the innovations correlation, the stronger is the market integration. We test
both the internal or intra-market integration (within a given market) and the exter-
nal or inter-market integration (between two given markets). Our measure of internal
market integration is based on the average DCCs between an individual (rm-specic)
credit spread innovation, and the corresponding average market credit spread innova-
tions. Similarly, our measure of external market integration is based on the average
DCCs between the two individual credit spreads innovations of the same rm but in
di¤erent markets.
In related research, Acharya and Schaefer (2006) and Acharya et al. (2007) analyze
the existence of correlation risk in credit markets during the Ford and GM downgrades
episode in May 2005. Coudert and Gex (2008) study the variations in the correlation
between CDS premium around the same episode using di¤erent measures such as the
DCC-GARCH model. Both analyses nd a signicant increase in CDS premium co-
movements or correlations (internal market integration) during the previous episode.
The current nancial crisis represents an illiquid scenario even more severe than the
one analyzed by Coudert and Gex (2008) to extend the analysis to other credit markets
(ASP and bond markets) and test the correlation dynamics among credit markets.
Our main ndings in this chapter are as follows. Credit spread changes are largely
driven by rm-specic innovations and to a much lesser extent by changes in fundamen-
tals. Internal market integration increases during the crisis for CDSs but decreases for
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Bonds and ASPs. External market integration decreases during the crisis between the
CDS and the other two markets. Reasons justifying these results are the concentration
of some players in the CDS market, the extinctionof a portion of individuals opera-
ting in various markets, the heterogeneity and the disperse distribution of the remaining
market players in ASP and Bond markets, and the drastic change in liquidity in the
CDS market. These results suggest that the CDS market tends to follow its own way
to a considerable extent in times of nancial distress. This nding combined with the
fact of the relatively low liquidity of CDS market in comparison with Bonds and ASP
casts some doubts on the representativeness of market prices quoted in this market.
The degree of internal and external integration is signicantly a¤ected by liquidity and
global risk factors.
These results have a number of important economic implications. For example, they
suggest that a substantial portion of the changes in corporate credit risk is not related
with changes in economic fundamentals and may not be diversiable. This has clear
implications for portfolio choice and the cost of corporate debt capital. Furthermore
and given the fact of the relatively low liquidity of CDS market in comparison with
Bonds and ASP, our results cast some doubts on the representativeness of market prices
quoted in the CDS market.
In Chapter 5 we deal with some of the e¤ects of a hypothetical common European
Monetary Union (EMU) sovereign bond yielding a common European Monetary Union
risk free rate. Thus, we present a tentative estimate of this new nancial variable: the
common risk free rate of interest for the EMU members. We show how to estimate it
for a given set of countries and discuss its uses for monetary policy management and
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its implication for nancial marketsintegration.
The possibility of a common European bond has attracted the interest of the nan-
cial press and is receiving increased attention from policy makers. There are potential
wider benets for the Eurozone as well as specic benets for market agents such as
issuers, dealers, and investors. A large common bond issue could have benets even for
countries with low credit risk (Germany, France), as it could rival Americans treasuries
market for liquidity. Moreover a single issuer would make EMU bonds more attractive
to investors in large foreign-exchange reserves (China, Japan) and enhance the euros
standing as a reserve currency, as well as lowering borrowing costs for all countries that
took part in it. On the other hand, some arguments against it have been raised focu-
sing on the possible increase in moral hazard as well as the technical and institutional
di¢ culties of managing a common bond issuance. However, as far as we know, there is
no published quantication of a common risk free rate, nor a detailed comparison with
other possible alternatives is available. This paper addresses both questions.
A common risk free rate could be used as a benchmark for measuring the benets
from nancial market integration in the EMU. We conjecture and provide some evidence
that our estimate of this rate would be close to what a common EMU-based single bond
would yield for a specied maturity. We can then compare actual rates o¤ered by the
di¤erent EMU countries with sovereign bonds with this common rate. This allows us to
compute the savings in terms of nancing costs per year for the di¤erent EMU members.
Of course, there are many institutional design features that must be resolved (seniority,
amount relative to total debt issues, guarantee fund, etc.) before such a common bond
can be launched. But our paper provides a rst insight into one central issue.
12
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Since the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU henceforth) the topic
of the determinants of the sovereign bondsyield spreads within the EMU has been the
subject of intense and increasing research. Researchers have tried to nd out which are
the factors that explain the di¤erences between sovereign yields in the EMU countries,
but so far no clear consensus has emerged. Codogno, Favero and Misale (2003) nd
that for most EMU countries only international risk factors have explanatory power.
Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2004) report that EMU government bond spreads are
related to common factors whereas they do not nd evidence for a signicant impact
of macroeconomic or liquidity related variables. Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht
(2006) report that global risk factors as well as idiosyncratic macroeconomic factors
a¤ect yield spreads, whereas liquidity plays a marginal role. Favero, Pagano and Von
Thadden (2008) nd that one aggregate risk factor is consistently priced, that liquidity
di¤erentials are priced for a subset of countries, and that the interaction of liquidity
di¤erentials with the risk factor is consistently priced. In all these papers the benchmark
for comparing the yield spreads is based on the German 10-year bund or German zero
coupon curves. Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009), however, use as benchmark the
Euro-swap curve and show that the bulk of yield spread is explained by di¤erences
in credit quality as measured by the CDS, whereas liquidity plays a nontrivial role
especially for low credit risk countries and in times of high market uncertainty. Thus,
rst of all and motivated by a simple theoretical portfolio selection model, we analyze
the determinants of EMU sovereign yield spreads during the period which spans from
2004 and 2009 by tting an unbalanced panel model. The yield spreads are dened as
the di¤erence between a given sovereign bond yield and the benchmark reference yield
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which is constructed as a weighted average of the total gross debt at nominal value
issued by the general governments of the di¤erent EMU members.2 We nd signicant
e¤ects of the credit quality, macro, correlation, and liquidity variables. Robustness tests
with di¤erent data frequencies, benchmarks, liquidity and risk variables, cross section
regressions, balanced panels and maturities conrm the initial results.
Secondly, motivated by these results we try to answer the following question: What
should be the yield of a common Euro zone bond, free, at least to some extent, from the
e¤ect of the risk factors (credit, liquidity, macro, correlation) that inuence the yield of
individual sovereign bonds? We consider that a given country X should be required to
pay a compensation to the actual issuer (lets assume that the issuer is the ECB or other
EMU-wide agency) to be allowed to share a given issue of the EMU-based single bonds.
We argue that this compensation should be the Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread on
Xs sovereign bonds such that we dene the Hedge Yield of the sovereign debt of
a country as the di¤erence of actual yield and the corresponding CDS spread. The
benets for country X in using the common bond (instead of the sovereign bond) will
be the enhanced rating and liquidity the common bond would provide plus additional
premiums for country Xs macro fundamentals. Based on these hedged yields we present
an estimation of this hypothetical common risk free rate and show that average savings
in borrowing costs for all EMU countries are positive irrespective of the maturity of the
2The selection of the appropriate benchmark reference, however, has not received extensive attention
in the literature. Analysts who take this view accept that the appropriate criterion for benchmark status
is that this is the security against which others are priced, and they simply assume that the security
with lowest yield takes that role. A plausible alternative, however, is to interpret benchmark to mean
the most liquid security. Dunne, Moore and Portes (2002) consider in detail the meaning of the term
benchmark bond. They suggest looking for benchmark portfolios rather than a single benchmark
security. This may be particularly appropriate in this partially integrated market and it is the approach
we take in this paper.
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common risk free rate measure employed.
Summing up, the most salient economic implication in this chapter is the estimation
of the possible savings in borrowing costs arising from the issuance of common bonds in
the EMU. We nd that the average savings in borrowing costs are positive irrespective
of the country and maturity. Our estimations suggest that the average annual savings
for the EMU in the period that spans from September 2005 to February 2009 might be
around e19.52 billion with the Common Risk Free Rate. Moreover, the average annual
savings for the EMU obtained from the Euro-denominated sovereign bonds issued during
the sample period (2004 2009) and with a maturity equal or lower than 11 years at the
issuance date are roughly e1.1 billion. Contrary to the idea that a common bond would
generate an implicit debt guarantee by some countries in favour of others, our results
show tentative evidence in favour of the hypothesis that a common bond in the EMU
could produce substantial savings in borrowing costs for all the countries involved.
As a last remark, this thesis was elaborated in a way that any of the following four
chapters can be read independently. In this sense, Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 present com-
plete researches that, although based on the interactions or relationships between the
di¤erent credit markets under study, consider di¤erent contexts and lead to independent
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
ARE THERE ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN CREDIT
DERIVATIVES MARKETS? A NEW TEST AND AN
APPLICATION TO THE CASE OF CDS AND ASPS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes potential arbitrage opportunities arising from a cash-
and-carry strategy in which the arbitrageur trades two self-nancing portfolios based in
credit derivatives. The rst portfolio contains a long position in a Credit Default Swap
(CDS) while the second contains a long position in an Asset Swap Package (ASP) funded
at Euribor. Note that this second portfolio is equivalent to a synthetic short position
in a CDS. For this reason, there should be an equivalence relation between the payo¤s
of both portfolios, which are given by the CDS premium and the asset swap spread,
respectively. If for a given pair of payments the equivalence does not hold, there exists
an arbitrage opportunity. The existence of arbitrage opportunities is studied from two
di¤erent perspectives. The rst perspective analyzes possible long-run (cointegration)
arbitrage opportunities while the second one tests the existence of statistical arbitrage
opportunities.
Other arbitrage strategies in xed income markets such as swap spread arbitrage,
yield curve arbitrage, mortgage arbitrage, volatility arbitrage and capital structure ar-
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bitrage are addressed in Duarte, Longsta¤, and Yu (2007). They nd that all the ve
previous strategies yield positive excess returns which are positively skewed. On the
basis of these results, they suggest that there could be more economic substance to
xed income arbitrage than simply picking up nickels in front of a steamroller. Capi-
tal structure arbitrage is usually based on strategies trading equity instruments against
CDSs. Yu (2005), Bajlum and Larsen (2007), and Cserna and Imbierowicz (2008) nd
signicant positive capital structure arbitrage returns.
The existence of long-run arbitrage opportunities is analyzed using the cointegration
test proposed by Engle and Granger (1987). Given that both credit derivatives price
credit risk, we expect them to be closely linked in the long-run. Blanco, Brennan,
and Marsh (2005) analyze this equivalence relation for CDS and bond spreads and nd
support, in general, for the parity relation as a long-run equilibrium condition. Zhu
(2006), in a similar study, nds similar results and also analyzes the determinants of the
basis, dened as the di¤erence between the CDS and bond spreads. He nds that both
spreads respond di¤erently to credit conditions such as rating events. De Wit (2006)
analyzes the basis calculated as the di¤erence between par ASP and CDS spreads and
applies a cointegration test to show that the basis is usually stationary. In fact, ASP
spreads should be a more accurate measure of credit risk than bond spreads. This idea
is supported by De Wit (2006), Felsenheimer (2004), Francis, Kakodkar, and Martin
(2003), and in the next chapter of this thesis.
Statistical arbitrage represents a zero cost, self-nancing trading opportunity that
has positive expected cumulative trading prots with a declining time-averaged variance
and a probability of loss that converges to zero. The statistical arbitrage analysis is
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designed to exploit persistent anomalies and was rstly introduced by Hogan, Jarrow,
Teo, and Warachka (2004) (HJTW henceforth) and later improved in Jarrow, Teo,
Tse, and Warachka (2007) (JTTW henceforth). They test statistical arbitrage on stock
markets. HJTW analyzes momentum and value trading strategies while JTTW extends
the analysis to stock liquidity and industry momentum strategies. Both studies nd
that these strategies generate statistical arbitrage opportunities even after adjusting for
market frictions such as transaction costs, margin requirements, liquidity bu¤ers for the
marking-to-market of short-sales and borrowing rates, although momentum and value
strategies o¤er the most protable trading opportunities.
HJTW and JTTW tests are based on the behavior of the increment in cumulative
trading prots associated with the corresponding strategies. In both studies, innova-
tions are assumed to be weakly dependent and stationary. Therefore, JTTW use a
stationary bootstrap methodology to compute the test statistics empirical distribution.
Stationarity is a very convenient assumption but also a restrictive one when modeling
nancial time series. Just as it is also restrictive to treat the errors in any empirical
econometric work as homoskedastic. The rst contribution of this chapter is to present
a new test that allows for nonstationarity in incremental trading prots series and also
for nonnormal, autocorrelated, heteroskedastic and possibly nonstationary innovations.
This new test is based on the subsampling methodology introduced in Politis, Romano,
and Wolf (1995) and (1997) and extended in Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999a, 1999b)
and (2001). This technique is based on asymptotic inference and provides an asympto-
tically valid test under weak assumptions. Extensive simulation exercises suggest that
our test has lower Type I error (false positive) and chooses arbitrage opportunities with
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lower downside risk than existing alternatives. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge,
ours is the rst study that applies the statistical arbitrage methodology to analyze the
relation between two credit derivatives (CDSs and ASPs) whose spreads, or prices for
credit risk, should be similar.1 The use of asset swap spreads should allow a more pre-
cise analysis of the parity relation between CDS and bond spreads. This is our second
contribution.
Our third contribution relates to the appropriate way of testing for arbitrage oppor-
tunities. Usually arbitrage analysis is based on the assumption that nancial
instruments (in our case bonds and ASPs) can be shorted. Nevertheless, according
to Schonbucher (2003) and Mengle (2007) shorting a corporate bond or ASP is not
always a feasible option. Therefore, we focus our analysis to testing the cases in which
long positions in CDSs and ASPs are needed. Moreover, we extend the study to test
the strategies that are based on bonds or ASPs short-sales. To take into account the
e¤ects of the ongoing nancial crisis, we analyze two di¤erent subperiods which cover
the periods before and during the subprime crisis. It should be emphasized that our
test is only applied when there is trading activity and liquid enough prices. The results
suggest that arbitrage opportunities decreased substantially during the crisis because
of the considerable increase in funding costs traders faced in this period. This is our
fourth contribution.
Using four di¤erent CDS databases (GFI, CMA, Reuters, and J.P. Morgan) and
a sample of 55 cases, corresponding to the same number of bonds, which span from
November 2005 to August 2007, we nd 15 long-run arbitrage opportunities with the
1Yu (2006) uses the HJTW procedure to detect statistical arbitrage in monthly capital structure
arbitrage returns generated with CDS and stock price data.
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cointegration test. Using the methodology of HJTW and JTTW, 27 statistical arbi-
trage opportunities are found. The new test nds 16 statistical arbitrage opportunities.
Employing a sample of 46 cases which covers the crisis period and spans from August
2007 to June 2009, we nd four long-run arbitrage opportunities and eight statistical
arbitrage opportunities with the new test. Employing HJTW and JTTW methodology,
we nd 11 statistical arbitrage opportunities. We nd that arbitrageurs engaging in
arbitrage opportunities detected by JTTWs test (but not detected by our test) are
exposed to signicant downside risk that is even more extreme during the crisis period.
Thus, there is an economically relevant di¤erence between JTTWs test and our test
besides its better statistical properties. After considering funding and trading costs, we
nd nine statistical arbitrage opportunities during the rst subperiod but none during
the crisis. As far as we know, ours is the rst paper showing formally the e¤ect of the
increased funding costs in arbitrage opportunities in credit markets, due to the credit
squeeze of the recent nancial crisis. Moreover, we nd that arbitrage opportunities are
more frequent in the case of bonds with relatively low issuer rating. Therefore, there
seems to be one salient factor that determines the existence of statistical arbitrage: the
issuers relative credit risk. This is our fth contribution.
The chapter is divided into eight sections. Section 2 denes the cash-and-carry
arbitrage strategy. Section 3 presents the long-run arbitrage test. In Section 4 we
address the concept of statistical arbitrage and its application. In Section 5 we introduce
the new test. Section 6 describes the data. Section 7 presents the results for long-run
arbitrage and statistical arbitrage analyses. Section 8 includes robustness tests and
extensions and Section 9 concludes the chapter.
21
CHAPTER 2. ARE THERE ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN CREDIT
DERIVATIVES MARKETS?
2.2 Cash-and-carry arbitrage strategy
2.2.1 Credit default swaps
A CDS is as a traded insurance contract which provides protection against
credit risk until the occurrence of a credit event or the maturity date of the contract,
whichever is rst, in exchange for periodic premium payments (the CDS premium or
CDS spread) and/or an upfront payment. We analyze the case in which the CDSs trade
on a full running format (i.e. no upfront). It means that the CDS contract that we
employ is unfunded and so, investors do not make an upfront payment (ignoring dealer
margins and transaction costs). Thus, the traded CDS premium is an at-market annuity
premium rate
_
s such that the market value of the CDS is zero at origination. In the
event of default, CDSs are settled in one of two ways: by physical settlement or by cash
settlement.
The British BankersAssociation estimates that CDSs accounted for 33% of the
market share of credit derivatives in 2006. According to the ISDA statistics, the CDS
market exploded over the past decade from a notional amount outstanding of $8.42
trillion at the end of 2004 to more than $45 trillion in mid-2007 and more than $62
trillion at the end of 2007. However, the notional amount outstanding decreased to
$38.6 trillion at the end of 2008. Most CDSs are quoted for a benchmark time-to-
maturity of ve years but since CDSs are traded Over the Counter (OTC) any maturity
is possible. The spread is quoted in annual terms but standard premium payments are
settled in quarterly terms with an actual/360day count convention.
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2.2.2 Asset swap packages
An ASP contains a defaultable coupon bond with coupon
 
c and an interest rate
swap (IRS) that swaps the bonds coupon into Euribor plus the asset swap spread rate
sA: The spread is chosen such that the value of the whole package is the par value of the
defaultable bond. Thus, an upfront payment must be added to the bonds price at the
investment period to ensure that the value of the whole package is the bond face value.
The upfront payment represents the net present value of the swap. The asset swaps
xed leg
 
c

represents the buyers periodic xed rate payments, while its oating leg
(Euribor + sA) represents the sellers potential payment.2 According to Schonbucher
(2003), it is even easier to trade an ASP than the underlying defaultable bond alone.
2.2.3 Cash-and-carry strategy
A combined long position in a CDS (buy protection) and an ASP is hedged
against bonds default risk and should therefore trade close to the price of an equivalent
default free bond. This is the intuition behind the cash-and-carry arbitrage pricing of
CDSs. From cash-and-carry strategies, we construct two equivalent portfolios which
should produce the same payments and then analyze the existence of possible arbitrage
opportunities.
Portfolio I:
 Long position in a CDS with an annual full running premium equals to _s which
is paid quarterly.
2According to the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC), oating-rate
payment intervals in a IRS need not coincide with xed-rate payment intervals, although they often
do. Thus, the ASP investors could make the xed rate payments dates to coincide with the defaultable
bonds coupon payments dates while the oating payments, Euribor plus asset swap spread, could be
made quarterly.
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Portfolio II:
 Long position in an ASP whose cost is equal to the bonds par value. The investor
pays to the counterparty the bonds coupon at the coupon dates in exchange for
receiving every quarter the 3-month Euribor rate (E3m) plus the asset swap spread
(sA). The quarterly payment dates coincide with the CDS premium payment
dates.
 Loan (principal equals to the bonds face value) at 3-month Euribor. Interest
payment dates coincide with both CDS premium and ASP oating leg payment
dates.
We rst assume that the investor can borrow money at Euribor at for the entire
duration of the trade and after, we relax this assumption and estimate the critical level
of average funding costs which delimits the existence/absence of statistical arbitrage.
Portfolio II is equivalent to a synthetic short position in a CDS and so, there should
be an equivalence relation between CDS and asset swap spreads. Otherwise, arbitrage
opportunities could appear.
As CDSs are OTC instruments, we assume that the investor can buy a CDS contract
whose maturity coincides with the bonds maturity and whose premium payments timing
is agreed by the parties.3 Thus, we take advantage of the range of CDSs maturities to
t a CDS curve using a Piecewise Cubic Hermite Interpolating Polynomial (PCHIP)
algorithm that permits us to match ASP and CDS maturities. This method is also used
in Levin, Perli, and Zakrajek (2005).
3As the bonds maturity date approaches, the use of CDSs with a 5 years constant maturity would
lead to an overhedging, given that the maturity dates of CDSs and asset swaps do not coincide. The
consequence is that the investor will pay a CDS spread above the one needed to be fully hedged.
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At origination the cost of both portfolios is zero, and so the net payo¤ is also
zero. CDS premium is paid quarterly and the rst payment takes place a quarter
after origination. At this date and at every subsequent quarter, the investor pays the
CDS premium (
_
st), receives the oating leg payment of the ASP (E3m;t + sAt ) and
pays the interest associated with the loan (E3m;t). The net payment is equal to the
di¤erence between ASP and CDS spreads (sAt  
_
st) converted into quarterly terms using
an actual/360day count convention. The previous di¤erence is known as the basis.4
This payment is repeated every quarter up to maturity or default, whichever comes rst.
The existence of funding costs (F ) would transform the net payment into (sAt  
_
st F ):
At the coupon payment dates, the investor receives the coupon (
_
c) from the un-
derlying bond and delivers it to the asset swap counterparty as the xed leg payment.
Thus, net payo¤ at the coupon payment date is zero.
At the bonds maturity, the investor receives the bonds face value plus the nal
coupon payment. The coupon is delivered to the ASP counterparty as the IRS xed leg
payment while the bonds face value is employed to refund the loans principal. From
the IRS oating leg, the investor receives 3-month Euribor rate plus the ASP spread.
The former is employed to pay the loans interest. Finally, the investor must pay the
CDS spread, which is the price for credit risk protection. Then, the net payo¤ is also
equal to the basis.
In case of default, at a given date  ; the investor recovers a portion of the bond
face value R(); and through the protection bought in the CDS, the investor receives
the di¤erence between the bond face value and the recovery rate (FV   R()). The
4Note that the bond-CDS basis is often calculated as the di¤erence between the CDS and bond
spreads. The strategys net payment is equivalent to the opposite of the bond-CDS basis.
25
CHAPTER 2. ARE THERE ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN CREDIT
DERIVATIVES MARKETS?
investor employs the amount equal to the bond face value FV to refund the loan. The
net payment at default is then composed by: (i) the value of the IRS included in the
ASP which remains alive after default and must be serviced or unwound at market
value; (ii) the payment of the CDS accrued premium from the last payment date to the
credit event; (iii) the payment of the loan accrued interest from the last payment date to
the credit event; (iv) the value of the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option which appears
because in the event of a default, not only the underlying bond but a given number of
bonds, some of them cheaper than the underlying, can be delivered. The strategy net
payments are equal to the basis, sAt  
_
st; except in case of default.5
This strategy is known as trading the basis. Basis trades exploit the di¤erent pricing
of ASP/bond and CDS on the same underlying company. According to Elizalde, Doctor,
and Saltuk (2009), the basis trades based on long positions in ASPs/bonds and CDSs
have been a popular investment strategy during the last years. In fact, they represent
one of the closest trading techniques in the credit market to an arbitrage free trade
given that the investor is not exposed to risk but still receives the di¤erence between
the ASP and CDS spreads.
An adequate arbitrages analysis under the cointegration methodology is based on
the assumption that short positions in the asset swap market are possible to guarantee
that the equivalence relation holds. Nevertheless, shorting a corporate bond or an
ASP with a required maturity, even years, is unfeasible.6 It implies that traders might
5 In practice the asset swap spread plus Libor tends to be greater than the bond coupon and in the
event of a default, the investor will usually continue to receive a small annual income from the trade.
Other potential assumption, for simplicity, could be to assume that the asset swap is a perfect asset
swapand the future cash ows disappear upon default.
6The short sale of bonds or ASPs could be done via a repurchase agreement (repo) but as Blanco,
Brennan, and Marsh (2005) explain, it is impossible to borrow a bond via a repo. The reason is that
repo market for corporate bonds is illiquid and even if it were possible to short a bond via a repo, the
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not be able to exploit deviations in the equivalence relation when the CDS premium
is higher than the asset swap spread and so, ASP short sales are necessary. This
asymmetry could a¤ect the dynamic adjustment of credit spreads. A cointegration test
as the one employed in Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) cannot isolate strategies
in which an ASP short sale is involved because it is based on both types of deviations
from the equivalence relation. However, a statistical arbitrage test permits us to study
unilaterally the existence of statistical arbitrage whenever long positions in ASPs are
needed. Hence, due to the complications associated with ASPs or bonds short sales and
due to the potential high costs of going short in ASPs, we focus on long positions.
We employ a long-run investment strategy to detect the existence of possible persis-
tent anomalies instead of punctual deviations between credit spreads. For this reason,
the same self-nancing strategy based on the same individual bond should be repeated
across time, maintaining all the terms and conditions. Thus, the payment on a given
date is added to the cumulative trading prots from the rst investment date to the
day before, which were invested or borrowed at the risk-free rate a day ago.
We employ CDSs with a notional equal to e500,000 and assume that the strategy
stops if the total investment in a given bond exceeds 25% of the bonds issued amount,
if there are two downgrades which place the rm in BBB- rating category, or if the total
expected future losses exceed e25,000.7 Once the strategys investments stop, future
tenor of the agreement would be short. Schonbucher (2003) states that this limitation could be solved
by issuing credit-linked notes linked to the corresponding bond and selling them to the investors in the
asset swap market. This alternative presents other limitations given that the issuance of credit-linked
notes takes time and implies high xed costs.
7The CDS typical notional amount is e10-20 million for investment grade credits and e1-5 million
for high yield credits and the standard bonds face value is e1,000. Successive repetitions of this strategy
might imply high demand of a given bond that could exceed the issued amount. For this reason, we
employ CDSs with a notional equal to e500,000. This notional is high enough to deal with xed costs
and is of adequate size to guarantee that a substantial number of investments can be made.
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payments are fully known because both CDS and asset swap spreads are set at the
investment date. Moreover, we assume that the market segmentation does not a¤ect
the arbitrageur, who has no restriction on participating in the CDSs market.
The cumulative trading prots obtained at every period are discounted up to the
initial date. Thus, we obtain the increment in the discounted cumulative trading prots
at a given date t; v(t); as the di¤erence between the discounted cumulative trading
prots at t and at t  1.8
2.3 Long-run arbitrage
The cointegration test proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) has been widely
used to study the long-term relation among nonstationary nancial series. The most
common example where this test is used is the spot price at t and the forward (futures)
contract at time t  k, which expires at time t, see Brenner and Kroner (1995). Blanco,
Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Forte and Peña (2009), Norden and Weber (2004), and
Zhu (2006) analyze and, in general, nd support for the existence of an equivalence
relation between bond and CDS markets in the long-run by means of a cointegration
test.9 The cointegration methodology is also a popular tool among practitioners such
as hedge fund managers [see Alexander, Giblin, and Weddington (2001) or Alexander
and Dimitriu (2004)].
The arbitrage based equivalence of CDSs premiums and asset swaps spreads implies
8 It should be mentioned that a simpler methodology to test for arbitrage would implement a buy-
and-hold strategy that ends after ve years. However and given that a standard arbitrage opportunity
is a special case of statistical arbitrage our procedure will detect any simpler arbitrage opportunities.
9These papers use di¤erent bonds with di¤erent maturities to construct a synthetic 5-year bond
spread to be compared with the 5-year CDS spread. This synthetic bond is not traded in nancial
markets and cannot be used for arbitrage strategies.
28
CHAPTER 2. ARE THERE ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN CREDIT
DERIVATIVES MARKETS?
that credit risk tends to be priced equally in both credit markets in the long-run. By
means of the cointegration methodology, we test if a given pair of credit spreads shares a
common stochastic trend. As the companies included in our database are free from credit
events, the payments are dened as the di¤erence between both credit spreads. Thus,
the existence of long-run arbitrage opportunities will be tested through a cointegration
analysis based on the cash-and-carry strategy payments from Portfolio I (CDS spread)
and Portfolio II (ASP spread).
Firstly, we study the series stationarity applying the standard Dickey-Fuller unit
root test. Subsequently, the existence of a cointegration relation is tested based on the
following long-run relation:
sAt = + 
_
st (2.1)
Assuming that both series are integrated with order one, I(1), both markets should
price credit risk equally in the long-run and so, both spreads should be cointegrated
with a cointegrating vector [1; 1; c]. According to equation (2:1), it means that 
should be equal to one. Parameter  should be equal to zero to assure that no long-run
arbitrage exists, but as there could be transaction costs or other market frictions and
even misspecications, we do not impose this condition and  can be di¤erent from zero
and equal to a given constant c. This is equivalent to saying that the basis should be
stationary to support the absence of long-run arbitrage.
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2.4 Statistical arbitrage
2.4.1 Denition
Following JTTWs denition, statistical arbitrage is a zero initial cost, self-
nancing trading strategy with a cumulative discounted trading prots v(t) such that:
(i) v(0) = 0
(ii) lim
t!1E
P [v(t)] > 0
(iii) lim
t!1P (v(t) < 0) = 0; and
(iv) lim
t!1V ar[v(t) j v(t) < 0] = 0
Statistical arbitrage requires that the expected cumulative discounted prots, v(t),
are positive, the probability of loss converges to zero and the variance of the incremental
trading protsv(t) also converges to zero. The fourth condition suggests that investors
are only concerned about the variance of a potential decrease in wealth. Whenever the
incremental trading prots are nonnegative, their variability is not penalized. In other
words, and as JTTW state, this condition avoids penalizing positive prots deviations
from their expected values, given that investors benet from these deviations. A sta-
tistical arbitrage opportunity implies that the amount invested in the risk-free asset
becomes more important over time than the daily investments.
Although statistical arbitrage is dened over an innite time horizon, there is a nite
timepoint t, such that the probability of a loss is arbitrarily small, P (v(t) < 0) = ".
Standard arbitrage is a special case of statistical arbitrage with a zero cost trading
strategy that o¤ers the possibility of a gain with no possibility of a loss. Hence, the
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probability of a loss should be equal to zero at the timepoint t; P (v(t) < 0) = 0: Thus,
statistical arbitrage converges to standard arbitrage in the limit (as t tends to innity).
It is important to emphasize that albeit statistical arbitrage is a procedure suitable
for long run investment periods, investors can benet from statistical arbitrage in shorter
time horizons. For instance, Bondarenko (2003) apply statistical arbitrage methods to
index futures options data in the period from 1987 to 2000 where he nds that selling
unhedged put options one month before maturity would have resulted in high and
statistically signicant average excess returns. Investors with nite time horizon (in our
case ve years) view statistical arbitrage opportunities as remarkably attractive as they
o¤er positive expected discounted prots, variance that becomes arbitrary small, and
decreasing risk of a loss.
2.4.2 Implementation
The methodology for analyzing the existence of a statistical arbitrage opportu-
nity is based on HJTW, later improved in JTTW. This methodology is based on the
incremental discounted cumulative trading prots vi measured at equidistant time
points. Firstly, we employ a process denoted as the unconstrained mean (UM) model
where vi is assumed to evolve over time as:
vi = i
 + izi (2.2)
for i = 1; 2; :::; n where zi are the innovations such that z0 = 0 and so, both v(t0) and
v0 are zero. Parameters  and  indicate whether the expected trading prots and the
volatility, respectively, are decreasing or increasing over time and their intensity. Under
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the assumption that innovations zi are i.i.d. N(0; 1) random variables, the expectation
and variance of the discounted incremental trading prots in equation (2:2) are E[vi] =
i and V ar[vi] = 2i2:
The discounted cumulative trading prots generated by a given strategy are:
v(tn) =
n

i=1
vi
d N(
n

i=1
i; 2
n

i=1
i2) (2.3)
while the log likelihood function for the increments in equation (2:2) is:
logL(; 2; ;  j v) =  1
2
n

i=1
log(2i2)  1
22
n

i=1
1
i2
(vi   i)2 (2.4)
The parameters are estimated by maximizing the previous log likelihood function
from a nonlinear optimization method based on a Quasi-Newton-type algorithm.
The cash-and-carry strategy generates statistical arbitrage opportunities if incre-
mental trading prots satisfy simultaneously the following hypotheses:
H1:  > 0;
H2:  < 0 or  > 
H3:  > maxf  12 ; 1g:
The rst hypothesis is due to the second property of statistical arbitrage which re-
quires that the expectation of the discounted cumulative trading prots is positive. The
second hypothesis is obtained from the fourth property and ensures that the variance of
the incremental trading prots, given a potential drop in them, converges to zero. The
third hypothesis involves the trend in expected prots and the trend in volatility and
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its expression comes from the convergence of P (v(t) < 0) to zero. It ensures that any
potential decline in expected trading prots do not prevent convergence to arbitrage.
As in JTTW, a more restrictive version of model (2:2) is also employed in the
analysis. It is based on constant expected prots over time and it implies that the
parameter  is set to zero. This model is dened as the constrained mean (CM) model.
Under this assumption, the process for the evolution of the incremental trading prots
is:
vi = + i
zi (2.5)
And the required hypotheses to be satised for the existence of statistical arbitrage
opportunities are:
H1:  > 0;
H2:  < 0.
2.4.3 Hypothesis testing
Under the assumption that the trading prots evolve as a UM model, all the
following restrictions must be satised simultaneously to have a statistical arbitrage
opportunity:
R1 :  > 0 and
R2 :  < 0 or     > 0, and
R3 :    + 12 > 0 and
R4 :  + 1 > 0:
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Nevertheless, if the trading prots evolve as a CM model (5) the restrictions to be
satised simultaneously become:
R1 :  > 0 and
R2 :  < 0.
The existence of statistical arbitrage is thus based on an intersection of subhypo-
thesis. On the other hand, the absence of statistical arbitrage is based on a union
of four subhypotheses which are given by the complementary of the previous four hy-
potheses. We set the null hypothesis as the absence of statistical arbitrage and then,
the restrictions for the UM model become:
Rc1 :   0 or
Rc2 :   0 and      0, or
Rc3 :    + 12  0 or
Rc4 :  + 1  0:
While for the CM model the restrictions are:
Rc1 :   0 or
Rc2 :   0.
If one of the previous restrictions is satised, we conclude that no statistical arbi-
trage opportunities exist.
2.4.4 Statistical arbitrage tests
The results obtained by HJTW could be inuenced by the limitations of the
Bonferroni approach employed in the paper. Their test presents a low statistical power
to reject an incorrect null hypothesis in every case. In fact, the statistical power de-
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creases as the number of restrictions increases, leading to an unacceptable level of Type
II error. JTTW overcome these limitations by introducing the Min-t test methodo-
logy10 and employing the stationary bootstrap procedure proposed by Politis and Ro-
mano (1994), which allows for time dependence and stationary residuals, to estimate the
p-values. The assumption that the incremental trading prots innovations are normal
and uncorrelated seems very restrictive as A­ eck-Graves and McDonald (1989) and Lo
and MacKinlay (1988) reveal. For this reason, JTTW test the case in which the inno-
vations zi follow a stationary weakly dependent process. Thus, both HJTW and JTTW
impose a MA(1) process for zi to test if it could improve the statistical e¢ ciency of the
remaining parameter estimates and avoid inappropriate standard errors. Nevertheless,
JTTW show that allowing for this serial correlation does not change their conclusions
signicantly.
2.5 A new test of statistical arbitrage
This paper presents an enhancement with respect to JTTW methodology. The
reason is that assuming stationarity seems restrictive when modeling nancial time
series. Just as it is also restrictive to treat the errors in any empirical econometric
work as homoskedastic. We allow incremental trading prots series to be nonstatio-
nary and innovations zi to be nonnormal, autocorrelated, heteroskedastic and possibly
nonstationary. In this more general situation, the use of the stationary bootstrap is
10As the four restrictions Ri must be simultaneously satised to reject the null hypothesis of no
statistical arbitrage, the minimum of their associated t-statistics serves as a rejection criterion. Thus,
Min-t test considers separately the t-statistics associated with the four restrictions R1; R2; R3 and R4
and nds the minimum:
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not advisable for estimating the p-values for the Min-t statistics.11 Thus, we employ a
new test from the use of the subsampling method introduced in Politis, Romano, and
Wolf (1995) and (1997) and extended in Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999a, 1999b) and
(2001).12 We construct an asymptotically valid test for UM and CM models based on
test statistics which are formed from the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimators
in equation (2:4).
Let (x1; :::; xn) be a sample of n observations that are distributed in a sample space
S. The common unknown distribution generating the data is denoted by P , the null
hypothesis H0 asserts P 2 P0; and the alternative hypothesis H1 is P 2 P1, where
Pj  P for j = 0; 1; and P0 [P1 = P: Our purpose is to create an asymptotically valid
test based on a given test statistic for the case in which the null hypothesis translates
into a null hypothesis about a real-valued parameter i(P ). The test statistic is dened
as:
Ti;n= nti;n(X1;:::; Xn) = n(
^
i;n(X1;:::; Xn) i;0) for i = (1; 2; 3; 4) (2.6)
where n is a normalizing constant and, as in regular cases, we set n = n
1
2 ,
^
i;n =
^
i;n(X1;:::; Xn) is the estimator of i;n(Pi) 2 R, which is the parameter of interest,
11Stationary bootstrap is generally applicable for stationary weakly dependent time series. Subsam-
pling allows for a more general structure in the innovations. Thus, in Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1997),
it is shown that in the presence of heteroskedasticity in residuals, subsampling gives better results for
the right choice than moving blocks bootstrap methods. This choice is not a¤ected materially by
the degree of dependence in the residuals. Moreover, one should obtain better information about the
sampling distribution of the statistic using the subsampling methodology. The reason is that, while the
subsample statistics are always generated from the true model, bootstrap data come from an approx-
imation to the true model. Another advantage of subsampling is that it has been shown to be valid
under very weak assumptions.
12One could expect that both the increment in the discounted cumulative trading prots and the
innovations should be stationary. Nevertheless, our sample only spans two years and a unit root test
in this case usually has low power [see Shiller and Perron (1985)]. It should be noted however, that
subsampling methodology allows for a more general process both in prots and innovations and even
for nonstationarity in some cases.
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Pi denotes the underlying probability distribution of the ith statistic and i;0 is the
value of i;n under the null hypothesis. Each of the four statistics are dened from the
restrictions Rci in Subsection 4.3 which lead to four contrasts of hypothesis based on
real-valued parameters such that:
8>><>>:
H0 : i(P ) 6 i;0
H1 : i(P ) > i;0
for i = (1; 2; 3; 4) (2.7)
where i;0 is equal to zero in our analysis. The test is applied to the union of restrictions
Rci and so, the non rejection of one of the four null hypotheses automatically conrms
the absence of statistical arbitrage.
The distribution of the ith statistic Ti;n under Pi can be denoted by:
Gi;n(x;Pi) = ProbPifTi;n(X1;:::; Xn)  xg (2.8)
where Gi;n(:;Pi) converges in distribution at least for Pi 2 Pi;0; where Pi;0 denotes the
probability distribution under H0:
Because Pi is unknown, Gi;n(:;Pi) is unknown and the sampling distribution of Ti;n
is approximated by:
^
Gi;n;b(x) =
1
n  b+ 1
n b+1X
t=1
j f bti;n;b;t(X1;:::; Xn)  xg (2.9)
where j is an indicator function,  b = b 12 such that bn  ! 0 as n ! 1; n   b + 1
indicates the number of subsets of (X1;:::; Xn) and ti;n;b;t(X1;:::; Xn) is the statistic
evaluated at the block of data (Xt;:::; Xt+b 1) which is dened as:
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ti;n;b;t(X1;:::; Xn) =
^
i;n;b;t(Xt;:::; Xt+b 1) 
^
i;n;t (2.10)
where
^
i;n;b;tis the estimator of i;n(Pi) 2 R based on the subsample (Xt;:::; Xt+b 1) and
^
i;n;t is the estimator of i;n for the whole sample.
The only assumptions that will be needed to consistently estimate the cumulative
distribution function Gi;n(x; Pi) are the following:
(i) The estimator, properly normalized, has a limiting distribution.
(ii) For large n, the distribution function of the normalized estimator based on the
subsamples will be, on average, close to the distribution function of the normalized
estimator based on the entire sample.
Using this estimated sampling distribution, we can compute the critical value for
the test at least under the null hypothesis. It is obtained as the 1    quantile of
^
Gi;n;b(x):
gi;n;b(1  ) = inffx :
^
Gi;n;b(x) > 1  g (2.11)
Our purpose is to test if Tn is rejected at a level of signicance  depending on
whether the statistic exceeds the exact 1    quantile of the true sampling distribu-
tion Gn(x;P ); that is gn(1   ; P ). Of course, P is unknown and so is gn(1   ; P ):
However and according to Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999a), the asymptotic power of
the subsampling test against a sequence of contiguous alternatives fPng to P with P in
P0 is the same as the asymptotic power of this ctitious test against the same sequence
of alternatives. For this reason and given that there is no loss in e¢ ciency in terms of
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power, we test the statistic Tn against the 1   quantile under P0; g(1  ; P0):
The steps in which subsampling technique is applied in this study are as follows:
1. Once the parameters have been estimated by QML, we calculate the test statistic
for the whole sample:
Ti;n= n(
^
i;n(v1;:::;vn)  i;0) for i = (1; 2; 3; 4) (2.12)
and the estimated residuals z^i :13
z^i =
vi   ^i
^

^i
^

for i = 1; :::n (2.13)
2. We create subsamples of consecutive blocks of data with length b such that the
rst subsample of residuals is dened by (z^1; :::; z^b); and so on.
3. We generate n  b+ 1 successive subsamples of trading prots (vi ; :::;vi+b 1)
from the corresponding residuals (z^i; :::; z^i+b) for i = 1; :::; n   b: The trading
prots are calculated with the parameters under the null hypothesis such that
their values bind the restrictions. Thus, the parameter values are (; ; ; ) =
( 10 6; ^; 1; 0:5) for the UMmodel and (; ; ) = (0; ^; 0) for the CMmodel:14
vi = i
 + ^iz^i (2.14)
13We nd that the residuals follow ARMA processes and, in some cases, they even present het-
eroskedasticity. It conrms that it is very restrictive to impose a MA(1) process for zi.
14For the UM model, ve restrictions should be simultaneously satised to prove the existence of
statistical arbitrage. However, these ve restrictions involve three parameters and not all the restrictions
are necessarily binding. As HJTW suggest, a model within the null family and on the boundary of all
the inequality restrictions is not available. We employed other values of  such as -0.0001 or -10 8 to
have  in the equation, but results are similar in the three cases. The values of parameters  and  bind
the third restriction and we employ them due to their good properties in JTTW. Parameter
^
 does not
appear in the restrictions and we use the value of the QML estimator for  in the whole sample.
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4. We estimate n   b + 1 times by QML the parameters for the successive blocks
and for every block we calculate the statistic ti;n;b;t such that we have n   b + 1
statistics.
5. Finally we approximate the sampling distribution of Ti;n by means of the estimated
sampling distribution bGi;n;b(x) as in equation (2:9) and compute the critical val-
ues gi(1   ; P0) as in equation (2:11) under the null hypothesis. We reject the
null hypothesis at a degree of signicance of  if and only if Ti;n exceeds the
corresponding critical value gi(1  ; P0):
There is not a universal prescription for the choice of the optimal block size.
Moreover, Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999a) show that subsampling works quite well
even with a data-driven choice of block size. Block sizes should not be too large or small
but the e¤ect of di¤erent choices of b diminishes as the sample size increases.15
In the correct range of b, the condence intervals should be stablewhen considered
as a function of the block size. For this reason, we use the method dened by Politis,
Romano, and Wolf (1999a) as the Minimum Volatility Method to select the optimum
b :
1. Compute a subsampling quantile gn;b(1 ) for b = bsmall = n 410 to b = bbig = n 910 :
2. For each b compute a volatility index as the standard deviation of the quantiles
in a neighborhood of b, V I(gn;b k(1  ); gn;b(1  ); gn;b+k(1  )) with k = 2:
3. Pick the value b corresponding to the smallest volatility index and use gn;b(1 )
as the critical value of the test.
15For b too close to n all subsample statistics
^
i;n;b;t will be almost equal to
^
i;n; resulting in the
subsampling distribution being too tight and in undercoverage of subsampling condence intervals. For
b too small, the intervals can undercover or overcover depending on the state of nature.
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After estimating the optimal block size, we conrm, as expected, that there is not
a common optimum block size for every sample. In most cases, the optimum block size
is such that the ratio block size/sample size is between 0.15 and 0.5.16 Longer blocks
are needed to capture greater dependence in the innovations.
We now compare the new test with JTTWs looking at their Type I errors. Given
that the null hypothesis is no statistical arbitrage opportunities it seems advisable to
choose the test with lower false positive record (i.e. the most conservative). The
absence/existence of statistical arbitrage is based on three hypotheses, each of them
associated to di¤erent requirements, or equivalently, on four restrictions Rci (see Sub-
section 4.3). We study both tests using simulations of the series of the increment in the
discounted cumulative trading prots. These prots are simulated by setting parame-
ters ;  and  such that they hold one given restriction Rci ; which corresponds to the
complementary of one of the three hypotheses in Subsection 4.2, and do not hold the
remaining ones. The parameters employed to simulate the prots are close to the limits
of the existence/absence of statistical arbitrage to discriminate between both tests in
the most detailed way as possible.17 This allows us to have a further perspective of the
individual restrictions. We perform one hundred di¤erent simulations with a sample
size of 400 observations. This length is close to the average number of observations or
16We require that the selected block size, b; can also be obtained from the expression b = nx with
x < 1: It guarantees that the required assumption which states that b  ! 1 as n  ! 1 and b
n
 ! 0
as n  !1 is fullled.
17The restriction that holds is related with each of the three requirements needed for the exis-
tence/absence of statistical arbitrage. We rst compare both test using simulations where the rst
restriction, Rc1, holds and employing as parameters:  =  0:001;  = 1;  = 0:5 and  =  0:5: The
second comparison is based on the ability of the tests to detect the cases in which Rc2 holds and we
employ as parameters:  = 1;  = 1;  = 0:1 and  = 0:05. Finally, we evaluate the case in which
both Rc3 and R
c
4 hold according to the following parameters:  = 1;  = 1;  =  1:05 and  =  0:45.
Note that the last case involves two restrictions; the reason is that both of them are associated with the
requirement which states that the probability of loss converges to zero.
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investment days in the di¤erent cases analyzed in this paper. Moreover, as a test of
convergence, we simulate a series of prots with a sample length equal to 5,000, and
nd that the estimated coe¢ cients are exactly the same to the ones employed to do
the simulation. As we nd that the residuals are neither normal nor follow a MA(1)
process, which is the process imposed in JTTW methodology, we compare both test
after generating randomly the residuals according to three di¤erent processes: i:i:d:
normal residuals; the residuals follow an ARMA(1; 1) process with the AR and MA
coe¢ cients equal to 0.9 and 0.75, respectively; or the residuals follow an ARMA(1; 1)
process such that the coe¢ cients of the AR andMA parts are 0.5 and 0.75, respectively.
We nd that both tests are equally e¤ective when either restriction Rc1; which states
that the expected cumulative discounted prots are negative, or restrictions Rc3 and R
c
4,
which state that the probability of loss does not converge to zero, hold. When restriction
Rc2; which states that the variance of the incremental trading prots does not converge
to zero, hold, we nd that our test cannot reject the absence of statistical arbitrage at
any standard condence level. However, JTTWs test signals the existence of statistical
arbitrage at condence levels between 1% and 5%, depending on the residuals process,
when in fact there is no arbitrage opportunity. These results suggest that some arbitrage
opportunities detected by JTTWs test do not satisfy condition (iv) in page 13 (investors
only care about downside risk) whereas that condition is fully satised in all cases by
our test. This discrepancy between both tests may be due to the di¤erent information
about the sampling distribution and the dependence structure of the statistic that is
employed by the subsampling and the bootstrap methodologies. There is a salient
economic implication of this fact: traders relying in JTTWs test will sometimes try to
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prot from apparent arbitrage opportunities but will incur unknowingly in substantial
downside risk. Traders using our test will not take into account those apparent (but
risky) arbitrage opportunities.
2.6 Data
Our database contains daily data on Eurobonds and ASPs denominated in Euros
and issued by nonnancial companies that are collected from Reuters and on CDSs also
denominated in Euros and issued by the same nonnancial companies that are obtained
from four di¤erent databases: GFI, Reuters and Datastream, and J. P. Morgan.
We employ four di¤erent CDSs databases to have more robust results and to mi-
nimize the possibility that measurement errors could a¤ect our results. This variety of
sources also serves as a check of the reliability of our data. The rst source we employ
is GFI which is a major inter-dealer broker (IDB) specializing in the trading of credit
derivatives. GFI data contain single name CDSs market prices for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years
maturities. These prices correspond to actual trades, or rm bids and o¤ers where
capital is actually committed and so, they are not consensus or indications.18 Thus,
these prices are an accurate indication of where the CDS markets traded and closed for
a given day. For some companies and for maturities of two and four years, the data
availability is scarce and in these cases, whenever there exist data on CDSs real market
prices for the maturity of ve years, we employ mid-price quotes from a credit curve
also reported by GFI.19 GFI data have also been used by Hull, Predescu, and White
18Consensus and indicative data are trusted less now that the markets are so volatile. There exist
di¤erences of up to 100% between consensus prices from leading providers compared to actual trades on
GFI systems. The reason is that consensus is inherently slow and the prices originate from back o¢ ce
sta¤ that can be swayed by the positions they hold and they do not have a front o¢ ce view.
19The GFI FENICS R Credit curves are generated each hour for over 1900 reference entities. Data
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(2004), Predescu (2006), Saita (2006), Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007), Fulop and
Lescourret (2007), or Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2009) among others.
The second source is Reuters. Reuters takes CDS quotes each day from over 30
contributors around the world and o¤ers end of day data for single names CDSs. Be-
fore computing a daily composite spread, it applies a rigorous screening procedure to
eliminate outliers or doubtful data. According to Longsta¤, Mithal, and Neis (2005), as
the data include quotations from a variety of credit derivatives dealers, these quotations
should be representative of the entire credit derivatives market. Jankowitsch, Pullirsch,
and Veµza (2008), among others, employ CDSs data from Reuters.
The third source is CMA DataVision(TM) which is available from Datastream.
CMA DataVision is consensus data sourced from 30 buy-side rms, including major
global Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Asset Managers which o¤ers quoted CDS
prices (bid, ask and mid). Among the papers that employ CMA data we mention
Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007) and Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti
(2009).
Our fourth database, employed also in Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko, and Huang
(2002), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), and Chen, Cheng, and Liu (2008) among
others, contains mid-market data provided by J. P. Morgan which is one of the leading
players and most active traders in the CDS market.
points in each curve can be actual trades or mid prices calculated from the bid/o¤er quotes, and in
their absence GFI will calculate a running point level using the Hull and White methodology to ensure
a credit curve always exists for each reference entity. This curve is a good approximation for CDSs at
any maturity. The median of the absolute di¤erence in basis points between ve years CDS premiums
as dened from credit curve and the actual quotes or transaction prices for the period between April
2001 and May 2002, is equal to 1.16, 2.01 and 3.82 bps for AAA/AA, A and BBB ratings for a total of
2,659, 9,585 and 8,170 companies respectively. Moreover, market CDS spread could be di¤erent from
what we are assuming to be the true CDS spread by as much as 3.725 bps. on average.
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Given the four di¤erent data sources on CDSs spreads, we cross-check the data using
all the sources to conrm the validity of any CDS price. Due to liquidity restrictions
and to require that investments take place whenever there is trading activity, these
investments are restricted to dates when we observe 5-year CDS actual trades or rm
bids and o¤ers where capital is actually committed according to GFI data.20 The results
that we report in the paper are the ones obtained with GFI data.
For each bond there is information on both bid and ask prices, the swap spread, the
asset swap spread, the sector of the entity and its geographical location, the currency,
the seniority, the rating history (Fitch, S&P, and Moodys ratings), the issuance date
and the amount issued, the coupon and coupon dates, and the maturity. We use bonds
whose maturity at the investment dates is lower than ve years. Several bonds issued
by the same company are used whenever they satisfy all the required criteria. The
reason is that although CDS spreads quotes are referred to the issuer and not to an
individual bond, asset swap spreads are quoted for individual bonds. Due to liquidity
considerations, bonds with time to maturity equal to or less than twelve months in
the date corresponding to their last observation are excluded. Moreover, our sample
contains xed-rate senior unsecured Euro denominated bonds whose issued quantity
exceeds 300 millions of Euros. Other requirements imposed on bonds to be included in
the sample are: i) straight bonds , ii) neither callable nor convertible, iii) with rating
history available, iv) with constant coupons and with a xed frequency, v) without a
sinking fund, vi) without options, vii) without an odd frequency of coupon payments,
20Even when CDS quotes, from any of the data sources, are available at a given date, we do not
employ them unless we observe 5-year CDS data from GFI. Thus, these dates do not indicate missing
observations in a given source of data, but lack of trading activity.
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viii) no government bonds, and ix) no ination-indexed bonds. We also cross-check the
data on bonds with the equivalent data obtained from Datastream.
The data span from November 1st, 2005 to June 29th, 2009. However, we split
the data into two subperiods to take into account the possible e¤ects of the ongoing
nancial crisis. The rst subperiod covers the period from November 1st, 2005 to August
8th, 2007 while the second one spans from August 9th, 2007 to June 29th, 2009. Our
sample size is comparable to others in the literature on CDS and bond spreads, both
in terms of sample size and number of companies.21 The nal sample consists of 49
nonnancial companies and 64 bonds. In the rst subsample we employ 55 bonds and
41 companies while in the second one we use 46 bonds and 36 companies.22 Table
I presents information about all issuers, ASPs, bonds, and CDSs in the two di¤erent
periods under study. As shown in Panel B of Table I, there is a great deal of variation
in the amount issued and, in the rst period, in the sample size. This panel shows that
bonds traded, on average, above par in the rst period and below par in the second
one. Panels C1 and C2 include descriptive statistics for CDS, ASP, and bond spreads
for the rst and second subperiod, respectively. On average, the CDS spreads seem
to be lower (higher) and less (more) volatile than the ASP spreads before the crisis
(during the crisis). The last column in this panel also reveals that both CDSs and
21Longsta¤, Mithal, and Neis (2005) include 68 rms from March 2001 to October 2002, Blanco,
Brennan, and Marsh (2005) use 33 American and European companies from January 2001 to June
2002, Zhu (2006) use 24 investment grade companies from January 1999 to December 2002, and Forte
and Peña (2009) employ data for 20 companies from September 2001 to June 2003.
22Our initial sample was formed by 301 corporate bond issuers. We found a total of 135 Euro
denominated bonds that mature before June 2012 but only 85 of them include reliable information on
the CDS spreads and the asset swap spreads. Of these, 3 bonds have been discarded because the issued
amount does not exceed 300 million Euros, another 4 bonds were discarded because they were not
investment grade bonds during the whole sample period. The time to maturity was lower than twelve
months by August 2007 for 4 bonds that were discarded, another 3 bonds were discarded because their
asset swap spreads were persistently negative and, nally, 7 bonds were discarded because prices were
too far from par. Thus, although we consider all the bonds issued by nonnancial European companies
to be employed in our study, the nal number of bonds is 64 due to the imposed requirements.
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ASPs are usually highly correlated with few exceptions (Carrefour I, Siemens, Technip,
and Veolia Environ in Panel C1 and Carrefour II in Panel C2). Note that the average
correlation increased in the crisis period. Finally, Panel D presents descriptive statistics
for the basis for the rst and second subperiods, respectively. We observe that, before
the crisis, the average basis is negative for 17 of the 55 issues while it is negative for 20
of the 46 issues during the crisis. On average, the basis is lower and much more volatile
in the second period which suggests that arbitrage strategies become riskier during the
crisis. Panels E1 and E2 report the summary statistics of the CDS spreads for the
four databases during the rst and second subperiod, respectively. We nd that all
data sources are in agreement between them and the average of the relative di¤erences
between the CDS spreads of the four databases is similar before and after the crisis.
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the rating at the end of the first subperiod, which spans from November 2005 to
August 2007, and at the end of the second subperiod, which covers the subprime
crisis and spans from August 2007 to June 2009. Panel B provides descriptive
Panel C1 and Panel C2, corresponding to the first and second subperiod. Panel D
between ASP and CDS spreads, during the first and second subperiods. Panels
E1 and E2 report the descriptive statistics of the CDS spreads for the four different
databases in the first and second subperiod, respectively.
Issuer Rating Sector
Akzo Nobel A- / BBB+ Chemicals
Altadis BBB / - Beverages & Tobacco
Astrazeneca  - / AA- Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Auchan  - / A Retail - Department Stores
BASF  - / A+ Chemicals
Bayer  - / A- Chemicals
Belgacom  - / A+ Fixed-Line Telecommunication Svs.
BMW A+ / A Automobile
Bouygues BBB+ / BBB+ Construction
British AM Tob. BBB+ / BBB+ Beverages & Tobacco
Carrefour A / A Food & Drug Retailers
Casino G. P. BBB- / BBB- Food & Drug Retailers
Compass Group BBB+ / - Support Services
Edison BBB+ / BBB+ Public Utilities
Enel A- / A- Public Utilities
Energias de Portugal A- / A- Electricity
E.ON A+ / - Utilities
France Telecom A- / A- Fixed-Line Telecommunication Svs.
Iberdrola A / A- Petrol and Power
Kingfisher BBB- / BBB- General Retailers
Louis Vuitton BBB+ / BBB+ Other Textiles and Leather Goods
Philips  - / A- Electronic & Electrical Equipment
PPR BBB- / BBB- Retailers - Multi Department
Reed Elsevier A- / - Media & Entertainment
Renault BBB+ / - Automobiles
Repsol YPF BBB+ / BBB+ Petrol and Power
Reuters A- / - Publishing
Saint Gobain BBB+ / BBB+ Building and Construction Materials
Scania A- / - Machinery and Engineering
Schneider  - / A- Electrical Equipment
SES BBB / BBB Telecommunications
Siemens AA- / A+ Industrial
Sodexho BBB+ / - Business Support Services
Stora Enso BBB- / - Forest Product & Paper
Technip BBB / BBB Oil - Services
Telecom Italia BBB+ / BBB Public Utilities
Telefonica BBB+ / A- Technology and Telecommunications
Telekom Austria BBB+ / BBB+ Machinery, Transport and Technology
Teliasonera  - / A- Telecommunications
Tesco A / A- Food & Drug Retailers
Thales A- / A- Defence
Thyssenkrupp BBB+ / BBB- Industrial
Union Fenosa A- / A- Petrol and Power
Veolia Environ. BBB+ / - Water
Vinci BBB+ / - Other Construction
Vivendi BBB / - Subscription Entertainment Networks
Vodafone A- / - Wireless Telecomunications Svs.
Volkswagen A- / BBB+ Automobile
Volvo A- / BBB+ Machinery & Engineering
Table I: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
Panel A describes the rating and sector of the CDS and bond issuer. We report
descriptive statistics for ASP, bond and CDS spreads and splits into two panels,
information on the bonds during the first and second subperiods. Panel C includes
reports descriptive statistics for the basis, which is defined as the difference
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Amount issued
(millions of euros) Obs. Mean Price Obs. Mean Price
Akzo Nobel I 750 4.250 220 100.03 396 99.26
Akzo Nobel II 1,000 5.625 286 103.94 - -
Altadis 600 4.250 330 100.32 - -
Astrazeneca 750 4.625 - - 157 100.68
Auchan 600 3.000 - - 169 96.69
BASF 1,400 3.375 - - 290 97.44
Bayer 2,000 6.000 - - 347 104.55
Belgacom 775 4.125 - - 38 98.06
BMW 750 3.875 295 98.63 393 98.00
Bouygues I 750 4.625 197 101.40 260 99.79
Bouyges II 1,000 5.875 221 104.64 - -
British AM Tob. I 1,700 4.875 338 101.86 - -
British AM Tob. II 1,000 4.375 232 99.61 300 98.92
Carrefour I 1,100 4.375 221 100.22 324 100.24
Carrefour II 1,000 6.125 314 107.15 324 103.45
Casino G. P. I 400 4.750 148 99.98 304 98.34
Casino G. P. II 500 5.250 195 102.18 304 100.59
Casino G. P. III 700 6.000 - - 304 100.74
Compass Group 300 6.000 121 104.08 - -
Edison 700 5.125 339 103.43 338 101.31
Enel 750 4.125 91 99.22 206 100.23
Energias de Portugal I 1,000 6.400 184 107.40 258 102.17
Energias de Portugal II 747 5.875 162 106.80 251 103.41
E.ON 4,250 5.750 200 104.44 - -
France Telecom I 750 4.625 119 99.77 298 100.75
France Telecom II 1,000 4.375 100 98.48 298 99.49
France Telecom III 1,000 3.000 294 95.82 298 97.73
Iberdrola I 750 4.375 234 98.35 291 100.06
Iberdrola II 600 4.500 195 101.36 - -
Kingfisher 500 4.500 270 100.11 146 95.27
Louis Vuitton I 600 4.625 251 100.85 368 100.25
Louis Vuitton II 750 5.000 352 102.69 369 100.93
Philips 750 6.125 - - 237 104.46
PPR 800 5.250 289 102.71 339 98.71
Reed Elsevier 500 5.000 208 102.68 - -
Renault 1,000 6.125 249 104.53 - -
Repsol YPF 1,175 6.000 298 105.68 358 102.02
Reuters 500 4.625 229 101.23 - -
Saint Gobain I 1,000 4.750 316 101.46 - -
Saint Gobain II 1,100 4.250 261 99.03 384 97.11
Saint Gobain III 1,000 5.000 337 102.55 384 100.15
Scania 600 3.625 219 97.36 - -
Schneider 900 3.125 - - 110 96.11
SES 500 3.875 52 100.78 119 96.77
Siemens 2,000 5.750 72 105.55 228 103.86
Sodexho 1,000 5.875 350 104.09 - -
Stora Enso 500 3.250 316 96.31 - -
Technip 650 4.625 112 100.97 194 98.97
Telecom Italia I 750 4.500 300 99.88 299 98.35
Telecom Italia II 2,000 7.250 269 110.40 299 104.28
Telefonica 2,250 3.750 317 97.41 272 97.89
Telekom Austria 500 3.375 137 97.40 255 98.36
Teliasonera 500 3.625 - - 383 95.65
Tesco I 750 4.750 347 102.18 276 100.85
Tesco II 500 3.875 303 98.67 286 98.74
Thales 500 4.375 111 100.17 298 99.95
Thyssenkrupp 750 5.000 235 101.73 358 100.52
Union Fenosa 500 5.000 317 103.00 288 100.92
Veolia Environ. 2,000 5.875 239 103.20 - -
Vinci 1,025 5.875 158 104.73 - -
Vivendi 630 3.625 97 97.85 - -
Vodafone 1,900 5.125 311 100.22 - -
Volkswagen 1,000 4.125 255 98.93 400 98.01
Volvo 300 5.375 324 103.79 327 99.86
Average 942 4.788 235 101.59 285 99.78
Nov 2005 - Aug 2007 Aug 2007 - June 2009Coupon (%)
Panel B
Issuer
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CDS vs AS
Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Corr
Akzo Nobel I 23.55 17.14 30.72 2.31 17.66 3.80 35.60 8.25 19.29 4.50 37.40 8.43 0.48
Akzo Nobel II 14.11 9.85 27.89 3.47 17.17 4.90 28.80 5.57 18.26 5.60 30.80 5.49 0.72
Altadis 16.83 8.59 35.00 6.36 20.91 9.90 37.50 5.84 23.49 12.30 39.50 5.66 0.33
BMW 12.10 6.61 23.86 4.77 10.49 2.10 18.70 3.69 12.03 4.30 20.60 3.80 0.72
Bouygues I 21.10 12.00 35.00 5.81 25.52 11.50 39.30 6.56 26.93 12.80 41.30 6.55 0.70
Bouygues II 20.24 11.94 33.60 6.35 15.80 4.00 28.10 5.33 16.91 6.10 29.70 5.08 0.79
British AM Tob. I 24.81 6.05 54.00 13.18 20.20 3.00 45.90 9.31 22.01 3.20 47.80 9.05 0.88
British AM Tob. II 24.89 13.12 40.00 6.96 32.99 16.19 54.10 8.86 35.03 20.00 57.00 9.01 0.90
Carrefour I 16.19 9.43 38.63 4.58 18.75 8.17 31.20 5.13 20.35 9.70 31.90 5.17 0.20
Carrefour II 12.87 6.80 28.05 3.51 7.45 1.20 22.80 3.90 8.30 1.20 23.20 3.87 0.61
Casino I 48.03 31.05 76.51 8.67 55.06 33.70 77.20 9.87 57.60 36.90 79.80 9.83 0.68
Casino II 45.02 22.31 122.71 24.22 49.67 17.30 126.10 25.99 51.29 19.30 128.20 25.78 0.95
Compass Group 22.99 10.80 83.29 15.59 31.36 4.53 94.00 18.18 32.42 6.20 93.40 17.70 0.94
Edison 16.90 6.52 30.40 5.30 23.93 10.20 32.80 5.71 24.97 10.80 34.10 5.53 0.76
Enel 15.51 8.98 38.05 5.73 13.50 2.40 29.84 6.61 14.93 4.00 30.30 6.95 0.71
Energias de Portugal I 12.30 6.37 23.65 4.92 12.11 1.80 19.60 3.18 19.93 2.20 19.90 3.02 0.47
Energias de Portugal II 14.80 8.46 28.00 4.93 16.72 3.24 24.20 3.49 17.41 5.00 24.00 3.07 0.54
E.ON 10.87 5.02 15.46 2.63 9.47 2.10 18.60 3.63 10.58 2.50 19.40 3.67 0.50
France Telecom I 21.25 14.56 39.39 4.31 25.22 18.80 44.01 4.75 27.45 21.00 48.50 5.34 0.73
France Telecom II 21.39 15.00 40.57 4.64 25.36 19.30 38.99 4.20 27.53 20.90 43.40 4.68 0.88
France Telecom III 25.15 10.68 50.03 10.18 17.46 4.10 30.00 6.82 19.68 6.50 32.70 7.28 0.81
Iberdrola I 16.63 6.82 27.97 5.00 16.78 3.30 28.70 5.39 19.48 5.40 30.10 5.23 0.65
Iberdrola II 11.70 6.00 18.40 3.09 10.77 2.50 17.00 2.47 12.30 7.50 19.90 2.49 0.36
Kingfisher 44.81 31.99 80.96 8.85 49.22 29.10 71.80 9.07 51.53 31.90 74.20 8.89 0.81
Louis Vuitton I 19.26 9.09 29.19 5.45 23.04 10.30 38.70 7.77 24.61 11.70 41.40 7.85 0.87
Louis Vuitton II 16.40 5.86 27.07 6.22 21.62 4.06 31.20 7.14 22.98 5.40 33.50 7.04 0.93
PPR 39.60 25.73 72.88 6.89 47.98 30.10 60.90 6.79 49.47 32.80 63.70 6.65 0.74
Reed Elsevier 13.83 8.67 28.18 4.03 12.57 4.80 21.10 3.25 14.84 8.00 23.50 2.87 0.48
Renault 16.85 5.05 30.80 6.69 22.29 5.00 43.90 9.10 23.15 6.07 45.40 9.02 0.93
Repsol YPF 21.08 9.69 36.24 7.15 26.49 10.40 37.90 7.73 27.17 13.02 38.50 7.26 0.80
Reuters 17.75 9.13 31.78 5.64 23.42 6.68 34.20 6.55 24.92 8.70 35.30 6.49 0.81
Saint Gobain I 18.10 10.13 31.77 4.64 17.36 6.30 28.30 5.19 18.84 7.30 29.80 5.29 0.65
Saint Gobain II 26.86 15.93 47.58 6.86 31.75 16.90 49.60 8.42 33.96 19.90 52.70 8.57 0.89
Saint Gobain III 22.78 11.65 38.06 7.23 26.75 9.60 39.00 8.15 28.07 11.80 40.40 7.93 0.81
Scania 24.69 10.31 41.00 8.58 23.53 8.60 38.20 7.46 25.79 10.20 41.30 7.66 0.53
SES 20.92 14.28 26.18 3.16 21.42 11.02 28.30 4.82 23.95 16.20 30.90 4.14 0.65
Siemens 12.08 9.35 17.00 1.58 9.60 4.94 13.50 1.81 10.61 6.60 14.40 1.63 -0.04
Sodexho 9.98 4.45 25.89 4.56 18.90 3.39 34.40 5.56 20.21 6.30 34.60 5.11 0.81
Stora Enso 38.10 21.18 88.19 13.38 40.27 21.30 62.30 12.15 43.66 24.60 64.80 12.66 0.91
Technip 24.55 15.79 34.93 3.61 33.84 20.60 41.40 4.17 35.57 21.90 45.10 4.29 0.17
Telecom Italia I 44.46 23.01 71.60 10.27 46.49 20.90 84.80 11.94 48.87 24.00 87.00 12.02 0.92
Telecom Italia II 45.95 24.40 75.40 10.85 45.34 22.00 64.30 10.64 44.46 23.70 62.80 9.65 0.87
Telefonica 33.40 16.46 59.20 8.87 36.77 17.70 57.90 9.32 39.55 20.20 60.10 9.59 0.93
Telekom Austria 24.04 9.55 64.27 12.71 25.57 11.32 51.60 9.61 28.00 11.70 55.20 9.95 0.94
Tesco I 9.45 4.06 21.63 4.81 12.09 1.70 24.60 5.06 13.35 2.50 25.90 5.03 0.52
Tesco II 10.38 5.00 22.95 4.36 14.46 2.30 29.30 5.99 16.10 3.30 30.60 6.17 0.77
Thales 13.98 9.31 19.08 3.19 18.63 6.74 27.40 5.39 20.21 8.60 28.70 5.35 0.74
Thyssenkrupp 35.04 17.12 68.64 12.85 36.92 9.80 75.90 18.28 38.63 12.10 78.70 18.30 0.96
Union Fenosa 20.74 7.29 38.08 7.63 25.07 7.86 36.10 6.47 26.28 9.00 35.50 6.29 0.89
Veolia Environ. 10.70 5.03 21.04 4.00 11.50 5.40 17.40 2.80 13.47 5.40 19.30 2.91 -0.05
Vinci 23.96 12.26 38.82 7.08 23.16 10.62 35.00 6.05 24.14 10.10 34.50 5.82 0.72
Vivendi 34.30 17.70 55.20 8.30 38.95 18.40 51.40 9.18 41.97 23.40 56.40 9.33 0.90
Vodafone 15.31 10.93 24.78 3.28 12.25 4.00 25.90 7.10 14.04 0.20 29.70 7.23 0.78
Volkswagen 21.21 10.82 37.60 6.33 23.61 6.97 37.60 8.11 25.52 7.50 40.40 8.30 0.77
Volvo 20.86 9.80 35.07 6.77 21.92 4.54 40.90 8.08 23.03 6.00 43.40 7.93 0.74
Average 22.19 11.91 41.50 6.77 24.31 9.84 41.05 7.31 26.09 11.60 42.92 7.27 0.70
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CDS vs AS
Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Corr
Akzo Nobel I 65.19 13.58 172.60 42.68 72.45 3.17 254.30 69.83 73.77 0.30 304.70 72.63 0.91
Astrazeneca 51.12 16.53 170.83 32.64 40.94 16.31 169.50 25.25 40.61 15.10 154.70 23.51 0.77
Auchan 27.82 8.62 68.00 12.04 37.37 1.09 145.40 34.79 34.19 1.02 132.00 28.01 0.73
BASF 64.26 14.37 159.37 41.23 36.69 2.30 119.20 31.94 35.32 2.00 125.30 31.74 0.78
Bayer 64.72 20.42 137.87 27.24 87.10 27.43 202.70 40.64 84.96 26.50 286.20 40.75 0.85
Belgacom 40.88 18.18 89.92 17.06 46.44 14.00 103.90 15.58 47.95 11.80 102.10 16.03 0.57
BMW 144.24 12.83 537.50 143.93 99.04 1.10 479.00 102.82 101.42 1.30 515.40 106.08 0.86
Bouygues I 102.76 23.00 270.32 67.01 101.66 16.73 262.10 65.28 99.20 16.70 263.50 64.47 0.91
British AM Tob. II 67.14 19.16 173.66 32.03 107.03 27.40 293.10 60.43 109.13 25.30 298.20 61.14 0.72
Carrefour I 49.82 13.89 153.67 28.23 52.93 1.00 174.60 42.99 50.76 2.00 174.20 41.51 0.83
Carrefour II 47.49 11.14 159.47 31.39 30.89 2.81 116.30 19.42 31.18 2.40 137.40 24.21 0.28
Casino I 142.33 38.24 390.00 75.60 172.53 58.08 389.70 95.31 177.10 59.50 418.30 99.07 0.90
Casino II 130.09 26.59 390.00 81.10 111.67 19.89 284.90 61.22 115.18 17.90 292.90 69.88 0.53
Casino III 146.96 45.32 390.00 73.33 208.31 64.89 456.20 110.23 211.57 64.60 489.80 114.06 0.88
Edison 65.48 16.87 198.00 52.92 82.27 6.30 215.50 62.45 81.05 4.80 218.80 59.79 0.87
Enel 178.55 23.43 743.31 166.70 53.71 0.20 146.00 39.91 53.71 0.80 150.10 40.08 0.80
Energias de Portugal I 73.52 17.11 205.52 50.81 53.74 1.50 165.00 37.86 52.70 0.40 167.34 38.64 0.67
Energias de Portugal II 82.34 21.48 190.27 45.93 100.71 4.94 244.90 65.18 98.78 4.90 247.70 65.40 0.81
France Telecom I 64.58 21.74 121.87 26.03 74.94 23.70 193.10 38.64 72.99 3.30 187.00 37.58 0.67
France Telecom II 64.98 21.96 121.65 25.90 87.54 35.12 209.80 39.49 88.27 32.10 211.60 38.92 0.78
France Telecom III 59.48 17.98 122.00 26.99 50.08 5.80 195.00 32.83 49.27 6.00 189.50 30.67 0.66
Iberdrola I 92.62 13.12 295.50 57.70 75.65 0.91 211.00 56.40 74.15 1.50 218.30 55.43 0.90
Kingfisher 191.71 46.30 435.00 101.87 218.77 41.00 376.50 109.45 232.37 43.30 407.50 119.06 0.84
Louis Vuitton I 71.15 15.74 246.00 50.72 70.56 11.09 200.90 47.50 69.89 12.00 201.30 47.31 0.90
Louis Vuitton II 65.95 11.55 246.00 54.05 62.37 1.13 234.20 49.06 61.37 1.20 211.70 48.38 0.88
Philips 59.31 13.80 162.66 34.89 65.24 5.07 197.00 58.26 63.13 6.00 194.60 56.32 0.87
PPR 252.50 49.20 759.03 199.38 200.16 35.18 553.70 144.48 205.98 36.10 590.60 151.84 0.97
Repsol YPF 115.13 21.18 441.16 111.58 107.20 18.21 368.40 87.01 106.35 13.40 391.90 88.56 0.91
Saint Gobain II 177.26 25.63 555.63 134.35 158.10 38.24 458.10 111.38 162.70 41.10 496.70 115.75 0.92
Saint Gobain III 156.89 19.87 522.04 132.37 110.95 22.78 323.10 72.01 117.41 23.10 366.30 85.89 0.85
Schneider 68.66 17.59 199.78 42.03 70.63 12.64 252.60 34.20 73.11 11.70 232.50 34.13 0.85
SES 77.35 24.58 181.86 41.73 122.23 30.11 352.30 83.71 127.17 30.80 369.60 87.52 0.88
Siemens 76.03 13.98 238.85 56.55 62.58 3.00 175.60 47.26 61.59 3.00 171.40 46.51 0.77
Technip 98.66 16.83 302.73 80.09 109.91 24.42 303.50 83.61 114.41 18.50 314.90 89.36 0.76
Telecom Italia I 183.38 30.18 546.17 138.43 158.12 38.94 434.70 95.31 171.65 36.10 654.50 118.10 0.84
Telecom Italia II 184.89 30.95 540.33 136.07 216.49 38.01 536.70 148.10 215.13 36.50 552.30 149.77 0.97
Telefonica 97.99 25.54 247.69 54.96 102.31 31.61 276.10 56.25 103.94 32.80 278.00 56.46 0.90
Telekom Austria 59.18 13.71 142.58 30.07 93.66 12.43 326.80 62.25 99.57 9.40 321.90 64.89 0.68
Teliasonera 62.75 18.82 127.51 25.89 82.56 0.00 259.30 62.00 86.10 0.00 270.40 64.48 0.86
Tesco I 59.59 8.94 182.00 52.12 63.17 1.93 246.30 61.63 62.76 1.73 239.70 60.91 0.79
Tesco II 64.20 11.19 182.19 49.32 67.64 2.43 189.70 53.60 66.84 2.10 197.40 53.13 0.91
Thales 78.50 12.70 300.99 60.90 74.07 0.70 211.10 67.53 77.81 0.64 557.20 78.43 0.58
Thyssenkrupp 192.95 25.52 580.00 166.28 106.84 0.30 313.30 96.80 114.43 0.10 327.00 101.68 0.87
Union Fenosa 88.40 13.73 382.50 82.13 89.31 6.30 215.80 65.98 86.99 5.60 213.30 63.84 0.79
Volkswagen 132.69 18.92 360.02 91.15 119.99 17.44 352.20 94.58 123.23 17.70 363.40 96.96 0.89
Volvo 219.66 16.24 733.80 234.40 252.10 0.20 777.80 271.29 263.15 1.00 857.90 290.67 0.96
Average 101.33 20.40 301.69 72.17 99.32 15.82 281.89 69.82 101.09 14.87 305.81 72.38 0.81
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Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Akzo Nobel I -5.89 -20.04 10.21 7.43 7.26 -53.23 117.83 35.69
Akzo Nobel II 3.06 -7.51 11.51 3.92 - - - -
Altadis 3.57 -14.29 16.19 7.09 - - - -
Astrazeneca - - - - -10.19 -86.63 93.67 20.74
Auchan - - - - 9.55 -26.74 101.42 27.25
BASF - - - - -27.57 -123.71 21.75 25.80
Bayer - - - - 22.37 -43.90 112.97 22.69
Belgacom - - - - 5.56 -25.12 30.95 15.18
BMW -1.61 -15.77 8.49 3.31 -45.20 -356.80 273.54 76.37
Bouygues I 4.41 -7.42 13.43 4.87 -1.10 -58.90 101.42 28.11
Bouygues II -4.43 -22.81 3.00 3.88 - - - -
British AM Tob. I -4.61 -26.30 10.90 6.65 - - - -
British AM Tob. II 8.10 -7.18 15.10 4.04 47.36 -16.35 202.58 44.59
Carrefour I 2.56 -26.95 15.53 6.15 3.11 -50.27 120.18 25.26
Carrefour II -5.42 -21.84 4.10 3.28 -16.60 -145.87 73.84 31.96
Casino G. P. I 7.04 -27.10 17.56 7.46 30.20 -55.30 170.01 42.99
Casino G. P. II 4.66 -27.15 16.25 7.98 -18.42 -315.10 112.15 71.18
Casino G. P. III - - - - 61.35 -31.73 218.98 57.14
Compass Group 8.37 -14.26 20.86 6.44 - - - -
Edison 7.03 -15.85 15.74 3.84 16.79 -30.09 134.90 30.66
Enel -2.01 -19.47 5.89 4.81 -124.83 -656.01 20.97 136.64
Energias de Portugal I -0.18 -10.00 7.59 4.44 -9.78 -71.42 95.40 28.60
Energias de Portugal II 1.91 -14.88 9.05 4.22 28.37 -72.24 155.44 42.72
E.ON -1.41 -9.36 9.08 3.24 - - - -
France Telecom I 3.97 -6.25 14.46 3.36 10.36 -64.55 94.61 28.52
France Telecom II 3.97 -6.32 7.99 2.17 22.56 -38.73 110.98 25.33
France Telecom III -7.68 -30.40 0.53 6.19 -9.41 -79.81 103.03 25.32
Iberdrola I 0.15 -11.47 12.10 4.40 -16.97 -110.50 57.54 25.66
Iberdrola II -0.93 -8.61 6.31 3.18 - - - -
Kingfisher 0.41 -43.52 10.18 5.55 27.06 -130.16 153.20 59.81
Louis Vuitton I 3.78 -16.28 13.70 4.03 -0.59 -86.30 82.79 22.17
Louis Vuitton II 3.22 -6.21 10.34 2.60 -3.58 -91.90 135.19 26.22
Philips - - - - 5.93 -51.09 109.81 32.95
PPR 8.38 -23.05 16.78 4.92 -52.34 -340.83 60.54 70.35
Reed Elsevier -1.26 -11.96 5.94 3.77 - - - -
Renault 5.43 -7.00 21.04 3.75 - - - -
Repsol YPF 5.41 -11.79 17.12 4.77 -7.93 -173.30 110.67 47.86
Reuters 5.67 -8.30 15.08 3.85 - - - -
Saint Gobain I -0.74 -21.91 9.16 4.17 - - - -
Saint Gobain II 4.89 -16.54 14.34 3.96 0.84 -122.94 161.76 44.82
Saint Gobain III 3.97 -16.68 14.70 4.79 -31.94 -267.54 101.73 55.43
Scania -1.17 -19.60 14.03 7.88 - - - -
Schneider - - - - 1.97 -49.42 86.03 21.94
SES 0.42 -9.91 5.59 3.70 44.88 -43.05 192.58 51.28
Siemens -2.48 -10.89 2.56 2.45 -13.46 -188.60 40.29 35.99
Sodexho 8.92 -5.86 15.52 3.27 - - - -
Stora Enso 2.17 -33.44 11.16 5.54 - - - -
Technip 9.30 -12.92 19.33 5.03 11.24 -167.69 127.37 56.59
Telecom Italia I 2.03 -13.60 17.54 4.69 -25.26 -356.17 84.10 78.72
Telecom Italia II -0.61 -11.77 18.98 5.54 31.59 -34.29 168.70 34.92
Telefonica 3.37 -15.80 12.72 3.51 4.31 -81.50 106.08 25.40
Telekom Austria 1.53 -17.34 8.82 5.03 34.48 -31.41 239.45 47.33
Teliasonera - - - - 32.49 -20.96 181.59 36.83
Tesco I 2.64 -10.02 12.06 4.86 3.59 -64.70 155.67 37.88
Tesco II 4.08 -12.61 13.15 3.81 3.43 -43.35 100.88 22.78
Thales 4.64 -9.70 13.73 3.74 -4.43 -296.49 73.78 59.07
Thyssenkrupp 1.87 -19.24 15.79 6.88 -72.11 -326.40 80.24 89.82
Union Fenosa 4.32 -7.49 10.88 3.53 12.91 -169.00 132.75 45.34
Veolia Environ 0.86 -9.87 9.87 4.97 - - - -
Vinci -0.80 -16.18 9.03 4.98 - - - -
Vivendi 4.66 -6.54 18.36 4.06 - - - -
Vodafone -3.05 -15.04 7.93 4.97 - - - -
Volkswagen 2.40 -27.12 11.22 5.14 -12.70 -151.92 180.09 43.70
Volvo 1.06 -17.49 13.48 5.48 32.44 -154.80 378.40 82.12
Average 2.00 -15.58 12.04 4.68 0.17 -129.50 125.39 43.43
Panel D
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Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Akzo Nobel I 23.55 17.14 30.72 2.31 23.39 15.40 41.80 3.68 22.98 14.55 49.90 4.10
Akzo Nobel II 14.11 9.85 27.89 3.47 12.57 6.31 25.30 3.95 12.93 5.46 31.33 4.45
Altadis 16.83 8.59 35.00 6.36 14.17 5.20 34.42 4.22 - - - -
BMW 12.10 6.61 23.86 4.77 11.98 6.28 26.11 4.80 11.66 5.11 26.82 4.92
Bouygues I 21.10 12.00 35.00 5.81 20.18 11.18 35.45 5.99 19.58 10.68 35.46 5.90
Bouygues II 20.24 11.94 33.60 6.35 20.01 11.45 33.15 6.02 19.22 10.38 35.14 6.01
British AM Tob. I 24.81 6.05 54.00 13.18 24.21 6.34 53.36 13.01 23.48 5.79 54.61 13.35
British AM Tob. II 24.89 13.12 40.00 6.96 24.38 14.51 38.73 6.18 23.96 12.12 36.72 6.48
Carrefour I 16.19 9.43 38.63 4.58 15.83 9.54 33.35 4.39 15.27 9.67 35.10 4.30
Carrefour II 12.87 6.80 28.05 3.51 12.67 6.80 23.20 3.54 12.84 6.82 30.78 3.97
Casino I 48.03 31.05 76.51 8.67 48.76 30.39 80.98 8.90 46.30 28.14 69.67 7.96
Casino II 45.02 22.31 122.71 24.22 44.97 20.26 122.98 24.35 42.33 16.81 124.43 25.45
Compass Group 22.99 10.80 83.29 15.59 24.05 11.19 80.48 14.62 22.33 9.88 80.93 14.86
Edison 16.90 6.52 30.40 5.30 15.94 6.36 28.38 5.04 15.91 5.64 28.87 5.32
Enel 15.51 8.98 38.05 5.73 15.32 9.39 36.99 5.36 14.64 8.40 33.27 5.42
Energias de Portugal I 12.30 6.37 23.65 4.92 11.37 4.43 20.87 4.36 11.59 4.96 22.70 4.97
Energias de Portugal II 14.80 8.46 28.00 4.93 14.26 7.40 27.50 4.83 14.57 8.69 26.22 4.08
E.ON 10.87 5.02 15.46 2.63 9.75 3.37 15.96 2.76 9.91 2.96 16.18 3.28
France Telecom I 21.25 14.56 39.39 4.31 21.90 15.73 43.61 4.48 20.85 14.60 40.45 4.17
France Telecom II 21.39 15.00 40.57 4.64 22.00 15.99 44.53 4.96 20.94 15.07 41.36 4.58
France Telecom III 25.15 10.68 50.03 10.18 25.12 11.05 49.58 9.84 24.51 10.29 49.29 10.18
Iberdrola I 16.63 6.82 27.97 5.00 16.06 8.17 27.87 4.74 16.56 7.84 27.81 4.92
Iberdrola II 11.70 6.00 18.40 3.09 10.57 6.05 18.89 3.00 10.58 4.48 20.39 3.61
Kingfisher 44.81 31.99 80.96 8.85 43.39 31.21 83.74 8.31 43.33 30.52 81.16 8.95
Louis Vuitton I 19.26 9.09 29.19 5.45 18.93 11.49 31.60 4.50 17.12 7.97 27.68 5.03
Louis Vuitton II 16.40 5.86 27.07 6.22 16.27 8.10 32.02 5.78 15.11 5.69 31.44 6.60
PPR 39.60 25.73 72.88 6.89 39.39 24.11 69.37 6.52 38.58 21.95 63.33 6.65
Reed Elsevier 13.83 8.67 28.18 4.03 8.92 5.61 24.61 3.09 7.59 3.52 29.28 3.28
Renault 16.85 5.05 30.80 6.69 17.20 6.85 29.85 5.34 15.68 6.05 29.27 5.54
Repsol YPF 21.08 9.69 36.24 7.15 20.81 10.14 40.99 7.03 21.25 9.52 43.77 8.16
Reuters 17.75 9.13 31.78 5.64 17.55 9.15 29.33 4.79 17.00 8.87 29.39 4.88
Saint Gobain I 18.10 10.13 31.77 4.64 15.87 8.34 28.59 5.21 14.90 4.29 32.66 5.90
Saint Gobain II 26.86 15.93 47.58 6.86 26.21 15.66 48.31 6.77 25.13 13.28 52.85 7.43
Saint Gobain III 22.78 11.65 38.06 7.23 21.62 11.09 34.22 6.83 20.51 8.15 40.03 7.68
Scania 24.69 10.31 41.00 8.58 23.90 11.11 40.50 7.78 22.46 9.94 38.53 7.71
SES 20.92 14.28 26.18 3.16 21.88 15.07 27.45 3.19 20.33 15.55 27.07 3.14
Siemens 12.08 9.35 17.00 1.58 11.26 8.50 16.07 1.82 10.98 7.49 16.46 1.97
Sodexho 9.98 4.45 25.89 4.56 10.05 4.51 23.83 3.86 - - - -
Stora Enso 38.10 21.18 88.19 13.38 36.55 20.79 73.32 11.71 34.90 16.47 99.83 14.20
Technip 24.55 15.79 34.93 3.61 22.82 13.98 28.30 2.53 22.00 10.89 26.68 2.91
Telecom Italia I 44.46 23.01 71.60 10.27 44.17 23.29 70.06 10.02 44.06 22.81 70.80 10.03
Telecom Italia II 45.95 24.40 75.40 10.85 45.88 24.90 74.26 10.65 45.69 23.93 74.02 10.55
Telefonica 33.40 16.46 59.20 8.87 32.45 15.82 57.05 9.06 31.73 15.44 56.67 9.15
Telekom Austria 24.04 9.55 64.27 12.71 23.91 9.19 60.32 11.48 23.20 8.99 62.40 12.21
Tesco I 9.45 4.06 21.63 4.81 9.74 3.80 22.28 4.69 10.47 4.94 20.87 4.42
Tesco II 10.38 5.00 22.95 4.36 11.07 5.42 22.50 4.38 11.42 6.09 22.35 4.01
Thales 13.98 9.31 19.08 3.19 14.22 9.77 23.05 3.10 14.31 10.19 22.47 2.98
Thyssenkrupp 35.04 17.12 68.64 12.85 33.76 16.59 64.20 12.35 32.72 14.96 61.79 12.54
Union Fenosa 20.74 7.29 38.08 7.63 21.15 8.30 35.56 6.99 21.69 9.22 34.86 7.11
Veolia Environ. 10.70 5.03 21.04 4.00 8.74 3.67 20.35 3.35 8.78 3.12 21.94 3.55
Vinci 23.96 12.26 38.82 7.08 20.48 10.08 32.71 6.12 19.81 7.54 37.90 7.84
Vivendi 34.30 17.70 55.20 8.30 32.49 17.06 47.89 7.25 32.25 17.76 50.12 7.85
Vodafone 15.31 10.93 24.78 3.28 14.02 8.62 22.85 3.69 12.70 7.50 78.08 5.07
Volkswagen 21.21 10.82 37.60 6.33 21.47 11.37 37.23 6.27 20.96 10.77 41.23 6.47
Volvo 20.86 9.80 35.07 6.77 20.50 8.69 33.77 6.45 18.84 7.80 34.08 6.67
Average 22.53 12.11 41.91 6.82 21.92 11.80 40.97 6.52 21.29 10.75 42.95 6.84
Panel E1
GFI CDS Premium (b.p.) CMA CDS Premium (b.p.) JPMorgan CDS Premium (b.p.)
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Panel E2
Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Akzo Nobel I 65.19 13.58 172.60 42.68 68.28 13.97 179.18 46.97 68.86 13.58 189.58 48.77 66.15 12.70 200.50 43.36
Astrazeneca 51.12 16.53 170.83 32.64 43.85 14.94 151.87 35.36 47.78 16.53 162.13 38.51 - - - -
Auchan 27.82 8.62 68.00 12.04 26.39 9.33 59.06 10.66 30.45 8.62 83.37 16.05 32.89 10.56 100.16 17.00
BASF 64.26 14.37 159.37 41.23 69.65 14.22 183.67 49.02 66.28 14.37 155.00 44.42 67.70 13.47 180.66 46.22
Bayer 64.72 20.42 137.87 27.24 67.40 20.19 151.83 31.81 65.77 20.42 145.00 30.04 67.58 18.65 177.00 34.73
Belgacom 40.88 18.18 89.92 17.06 40.88 18.18 89.92 17.06 38.84 18.18 93.43 16.79 - - - -
BMW 144.24 12.83 537.50 143.93 147.89 14.47 537.88 144.01 148.77 0.01 607.12 148.52 147.68 11.87 558.53 145.91
Bouygues I 102.76 23.00 270.32 67.01 100.60 20.42 271.44 69.67 104.58 23.00 270.44 74.15 105.66 23.25 330.46 78.81
British AM Tob. II 67.14 19.16 173.66 32.03 67.65 19.96 175.64 33.76 67.84 19.16 197.07 37.61 69.46 18.40 195.15 36.91
Carrefour I 49.82 13.89 153.67 28.23 47.19 13.20 111.50 22.28 50.26 13.89 142.59 28.58 55.16 8.78 154.90 32.58
Carrefour II 47.49 11.14 159.47 31.39 41.78 9.30 99.42 24.55 46.64 11.14 150.45 32.30 52.18 7.52 166.25 34.73
Casino I 142.33 38.24 390.00 75.60 135.51 40.03 316.49 65.06 143.83 19.12 419.32 87.12 150.97 34.70 425.99 91.91
Casino II 130.09 26.59 390.00 81.10 112.60 26.61 267.23 60.19 135.61 26.59 450.48 98.85 137.72 21.87 438.15 102.39
Casino III 146.96 45.32 390.00 73.33 143.81 46.53 338.00 65.83 148.11 45.32 405.34 80.40 153.80 41.71 424.19 87.68
Edison 65.48 16.87 198.00 52.92 60.62 16.78 168.94 45.33 60.43 17.58 230.22 44.52 63.61 14.93 190.48 48.41
Enel 178.55 23.43 743.31 166.70 182.04 26.04 627.55 164.44 191.97 23.43 687.16 177.35 189.28 18.47 678.26 177.13
Energias de Portugal I 73.52 17.11 205.52 50.81 71.86 13.79 206.06 52.63 82.55 17.11 198.06 55.94 81.86 9.97 212.77 60.11
Energias de Portugal II 82.34 21.48 190.27 45.93 79.96 20.77 195.22 45.77 83.88 21.48 185.04 47.08 90.13 14.53 191.58 53.91
France Telecom I 64.58 21.74 121.87 26.03 67.44 20.45 126.01 27.44 66.41 21.74 124.21 27.23 68.28 18.48 129.98 29.45
France Telecom II 64.98 21.96 121.65 25.90 67.87 20.82 125.68 27.38 66.82 21.96 124.98 27.15 68.63 18.82 129.60 29.33
France Telecom III 59.48 17.98 122.00 26.99 59.21 14.99 123.47 27.92 58.61 17.98 124.98 27.74 60.56 14.42 131.52 29.89
Iberdrola I 92.62 13.12 295.50 57.70 94.08 15.55 222.38 58.51 95.11 13.12 279.93 64.98 99.38 14.87 288.35 68.69
Kingfisher 191.71 46.30 435.00 101.87 193.77 48.05 417.92 104.68 196.90 46.30 504.99 110.12 198.97 42.65 451.60 112.29
Louis Vuitton I 71.15 15.74 246.00 50.72 66.59 15.97 192.27 44.48 68.54 15.74 241.28 51.84 68.94 13.52 215.16 50.47
Louis Vuitton II 65.95 11.55 246.00 54.05 56.99 11.08 172.17 43.20 63.18 11.55 256.77 56.03 62.13 10.45 215.36 53.00
Philips 59.31 13.80 162.66 34.89 60.41 15.05 178.02 36.68 60.01 13.80 177.75 38.07 62.20 16.88 544.72 50.23
PPR 252.50 49.20 759.03 199.38 235.09 42.71 626.48 178.01 260.37 0.31 777.31 214.88 253.72 20.45 766.72 209.60
Repsol YPF 115.13 21.18 441.16 111.58 111.62 21.93 418.33 103.32 129.17 21.18 538.76 135.36 129.48 17.89 540.68 136.95
Saint Gobain II 177.26 25.63 555.63 134.35 177.34 26.74 598.69 135.17 178.87 25.63 542.81 139.96 184.10 24.75 716.99 150.31
Saint Gobain III 156.89 19.87 522.04 132.37 157.73 19.99 558.35 136.76 162.85 19.87 551.90 145.83 166.59 16.22 678.78 149.80
Schneider 68.66 17.59 199.78 42.03 59.11 16.01 190.79 36.62 59.73 17.59 224.02 48.43 66.01 18.25 205.27 45.13
SES 77.35 24.58 181.86 41.73 67.10 25.24 209.14 49.28 75.85 24.58 171.71 38.95 73.58 22.70 186.25 46.81
Siemens 76.03 13.98 238.85 56.55 76.03 15.31 221.31 52.55 75.30 13.98 237.34 53.11 76.17 14.24 243.46 54.22
Technip 98.66 16.83 302.73 80.09 104.16 18.73 337.98 85.92 104.66 16.83 331.48 82.84 118.05 9.19 359.02 89.82
Telecom Italia I 183.38 30.18 546.17 138.43 181.85 31.08 509.91 134.23 185.45 30.18 506.29 140.39 183.89 30.76 533.91 140.90
Telecom Italia II 184.89 30.95 540.33 136.07 183.87 32.87 502.01 131.94 187.16 30.95 503.61 137.81 186.49 33.07 532.19 138.95
Telefonica 97.99 25.54 247.69 54.96 93.37 28.53 203.95 46.64 94.97 25.54 228.13 49.22 98.27 25.26 258.90 53.15
Telekom Austria 59.18 13.71 142.58 30.07 67.44 14.34 194.68 41.74 63.00 13.71 160.78 34.63 69.16 14.41 206.46 44.21
Teliasonera 62.75 18.82 127.51 25.89 67.02 19.01 130.62 27.39 65.70 18.82 126.65 26.67 68.52 18.76 186.44 30.58
Tesco I 59.59 8.94 182.00 52.12 52.16 8.43 152.47 42.97 59.16 8.94 198.54 51.65 57.72 6.61 175.34 46.65
Tesco II 64.20 11.19 182.19 49.32 60.26 11.31 162.82 43.96 66.21 11.19 198.35 51.82 62.94 11.47 175.18 44.84
Thales 78.50 12.70 300.99 60.90 75.73 13.66 314.25 63.64 77.27 12.70 313.26 61.36 77.59 14.90 299.55 61.62
Thyssenkrupp 192.95 25.52 580.00 166.28 198.62 25.45 599.56 174.80 204.98 17.06 652.42 182.89 206.40 23.67 589.30 180.49
Union Fenosa 88.40 13.73 382.50 82.13 90.06 17.20 396.35 84.08 92.34 13.73 388.82 84.11 92.00 14.71 349.09 79.00
Volkswagen 132.69 18.92 360.02 91.15 143.18 18.38 418.14 104.23 142.96 5.87 415.92 104.38 140.31 15.61 429.68 103.28
Volvo 219.66 16.24 733.80 234.40 230.55 16.02 790.37 237.53 226.83 16.24 774.29 228.44 217.25 10.26 724.63 227.37
Average 103.84 20.53 309.48 74.32 102.77 20.69 295.07 73.02 106.46 18.23 322.58 78.81 107.94 18.06 338.39 80.66
GFI CDS Premium (b.p.) CMA CDS Premium (b.p.) Reuters CDS Premium (b.p.) JPMorgan CDS Premium (b.p.)
54
CHAPTER 2. ARE THERE ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN CREDIT
DERIVATIVES MARKETS?
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Long-run arbitrage test empirical results
Table II shows that most spreads are I(1). Only in four cases in the rst subpe-
riod, Carrefour II, Casino II, Compass Group, and Siemens, and in other two cases in
the crisis period, Carrefour II and Schneider, credit spreads are I(0). Table II indicates
that the long-run equivalence relation holds and the two markets move together in the
long-run in 31 of the total 51 cases in the rst period and in 37 of the total 44 cases in
the second one.23 The potential long-run arbitrage opportunities could be due to the
presence of a cheapest-to-deliver option in the CDS price, the constraints in the bonds
short-sales or the existence of a liquidity premium, among other causes. These opportu-
nities should be exploited by means of cash-and-carry arbitrage strategies, where either
long or short positions in ASPs are needed.
23Norden and Weber (2004), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), and Zhu (2006) nd a long-run
equivalence relation between CDS and bond spreads in 36 of 58 cases, in 26 of 33 cases, and in 15 of 24
cases, respectively. De Wit (2006) nds a long-run equivalence relation between CDS and ASP spreads
in 88 of 144 cases.
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for the period before the crisis. The last three column contain the order of integration of the
CDS premium, ASP spread and the basis for the crisis period.
Issuer CDS ASP Basis CDS ASP Basis
Akzo Nobel I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Akzo Nobel II I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Altadis I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Astrazeneca - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
Auchan - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
BASF - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
Bayer - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
Belgacom - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
BMW I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Bouygues I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Bouygues II I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
British AM Tob. I I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
British AM Tob. II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Carrefour I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Carrefour II I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Casino I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Casino II I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Casino III - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
Compass Group I(0) I(0) I(0) - - -
Edison I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Enel I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Energias de Portugal I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Energias de Portugal II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
E.ON I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
France Telecom I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
France Telecom II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
France Telecom III I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Iberdrola I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Iberdrola II I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Kingfisher I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Louis Vuitton I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Louis Vuitton II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Philips - - - I(1) I(1) I(0)
PPR I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Reed Elsevier I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Renault I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Repsol YPF I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Reuters I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Saint Gobain I I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Saint Gobain II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Saint Gobain III I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Scania I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Schneider - - - I(0) I(0) I(0)
SES I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Siemens I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Sodexho I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Stora Enso I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Technip I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Telecom Italia I I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Telecom Italia II I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Telefonica I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Telekom Austria I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Teliasonera - - - I(1) I(1) I(1)
Tesco I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Tesco II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Thales I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Thyssenkrupp I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Union Fenosa I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Veolia Environ I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Vinci I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Vivendi I(1) I(1) I(0) - - -
Vodafone I(1) I(1) I(1) - - -
Volkswagen I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Volvo I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0)
November 2005 - August 2007 August 2007 - June 2009
Table II: Unit Root Test for Credit Spreads
Table II reports the results of the unit root test for the credit spreads and the basis. The first
three columns contain the order of integration of the CDS premium, ASP spread and the basis
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The previous analyses based on the CDS and bond spreadslong-run equivalence
relation do not distinguish among the cases in which the investor needs either short or
long positions in ASPs. Nevertheless, shorting ASPs is not always a feasible option and
for this reason, we distinguish between both cases. We consider that a given strategy is
based on an asset swap short sale (long position) whenever the sum of the discounted
trading prots is signicantly negative (positive). This sum is signicantly negative in
Akzo Nobel I, Bouygues II, Scania, Tesco I, and Vodafone in the rst subperiod and
in Enel, Energias de Portugal I, and Thyssenkrupp in the second subperiod. On the
other hand, the sum of the discounted trading prots is signicantly positive for the
rest of the cases. It means that there are 15 potential long-run arbitrage opportuni-
ties based on long positions in ASPs in the rst subperiod and 4 in the second one.
However, if we attend to the cointegration tests results, there are 20 (7) long-run arbi-
trage opportunities before (during) the crisis although some of them cannot be exploited.
The signicant increase of funding costs during the crisis [see Elizalde and Doctor
(2009)] makes di¢ cult to accept that in the cases in which the basis is not stationary
there are long-run arbitrage opportunities. However, these cases do reect a persistent
long-run deviation between the corresponding credit spreads. The decrease in long-run
arbitrage opportunities is consistent with the increase in correlation across nancial
markets in crisis periods documented in many papers. Although Table II reports the
results obtained from GFI data, the same results are obtained using the other data
sources. We next analyze the potential arbitrage opportunities that could be exploited
by means of long positions in both ASPs and CDSs based on the statistical arbitrage
methodology.
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2.7.2 Statistical arbitrage test empirical results
The increments in the discounted cumulative trading prots v(ti) are summa-
rized in Table III. Panel A reports the prots obtained in the rst subperiod while Panel
B reports the prots during the crisis. We observe that the average value is around 72
Euros in the rst period and 168 Euros in the second one. These prots present a high
deal of variation: 79 and 403 Euros on average in the rst and second period, respec-
tively. The coe¢ cient of variation for these prots during the crisis doubles the one
obtained in the rst period. The vast majority of the cases in which the average basis
is negative also have a negative average of v(ti):
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period before crisis while Panel B reports the descriptive statistics corresponding to the crisis. * indicates long-run arbitrage
opportunities according to Table II.
Panel A
Issuer Sample Size Min (€) Max (€) Median (€) Mean (€) S.D. (€) Skewness Kurtosis
Akzo Nobel I* 252 -263.31 127.31 -15.14 -28.12 89.85 -0.36 2.48
Akzo Nobel II 405 -117.31 314.56 124.47 124.77 87.34 -0.09 2.36
Altadis* 402 -36.73 541.64 220.79 225.94 126.69 0.13 2.47
BMW 343 -118.89 6.38 0.00 -18.63 33.93 -1.43 3.49
Bouygues I* 377 -85.84 378.81 108.99 111.47 100.66 0.20 2.33
Bouygues II* 414 -119.82 5.94 -0.18 -27.97 41.79 -0.98 2.20
British AM Tob. I 418 -224.29 136.07 -1.95 -25.35 75.36 -0.74 4.01
British AM Tob. II 299 49.11 637.32 236.93 258.20 125.55 0.74 2.92
Carrefour I 299 -210.59 342.67 123.07 127.35 70.13 -0.10 5.27
Carrefour II 443 -158.68 10.16 0.02 -20.31 42.58 -1.79 4.67
Casino I* 273 -236.88 531.98 148.18 147.37 124.15 0.22 2.54
Casino II 397 -167.80 554.81 121.12 131.37 127.81 0.70 2.98
Compass Group 405 -36.25 554.61 113.24 129.38 136.74 0.95 3.28
Edison* 404 -33.58 671.12 297.26 273.62 161.16 0.02 1.91
Enel 316 -233.54 122.46 -0.01 -3.99 48.76 -0.93 6.00
Energias de Portugal I 363 -110.53 3.70 -0.04 -25.28 36.30 -0.84 2.00
Energias de Portugal II 349 -127.60 68.35 -0.01 -16.09 44.16 -1.11 3.45
E.ON 410 -116.90 42.08 -0.90 -20.13 35.30 -0.98 3.02
France Telecom I* 146 -33.50 212.43 46.13 52.98 53.61 0.74 3.16
France Telecom II 122 -77.94 158.41 51.03 55.29 42.01 0.33 3.34
France Telecom III 440 -332.43 8.65 0.05 -14.86 67.25 -4.23 18.98
Iberdrola I 400 -84.76 8.87 -0.05 -19.38 30.28 -0.96 2.05
Iberdrola II 348 -107.16 4.15 -1.28 -30.11 33.61 -0.52 1.78
Kingfisher 400 -147.86 222.92 44.36 42.28 60.03 -0.21 3.94
Louis Vuitton I 287 -64.87 345.12 138.34 146.09 70.97 0.12 3.12
Louis Vuitton II 414 -35.14 352.81 119.32 121.76 84.66 0.32 2.43
PPR 353 -120.38 679.26 291.10 285.61 170.16 0.01 2.09
Reed Elsevier 387 -158.42 12.96 -12.63 -35.87 44.16 -0.84 2.38
Renault* 344 -26.46 483.63 188.59 187.04 94.12 0.06 2.80
Repsol YPF 410 -64.16 573.18 151.33 174.82 140.43 0.47 2.27
Reuters* 415 -79.56 523.83 109.21 127.21 111.02 0.70 2.85
Saint Gobain I 398 -326.44 132.47 0.05 2.09 60.54 -0.83 5.38
Saint Gobain II 310 -25.82 402.05 192.10 186.13 81.36 0.15 2.45
Saint Gobain III 452 -132.28 479.56 177.52 160.39 124.46 -0.03 1.95
Scania* 380 -209.71 7.99 0.04 -16.79 49.86 -2.73 8.86
SES* 367 -118.50 93.99 0.00 8.54 24.59 0.19 6.97
Siemens 274 -122.21 24.30 0.00 -10.11 23.42 -2.81 11.59
Sodexho* 403 -0.43 776.56 369.08 357.99 192.90 0.01 1.96
Stora Enso* 449 -147.99 318.71 107.43 104.74 90.16 -0.03 1.97
Technip* 311 -6.32 512.24 137.88 143.40 131.97 0.76 2.89
Telecom Italia I 397 -168.95 67.73 -4.11 -14.96 41.02 -1.31 6.40
Telecom Italia II 338 -327.23 248.78 -8.94 -17.73 90.59 -0.54 3.84
Telefonica* 394 -161.50 351.80 119.98 116.38 96.16 0.11 2.46
Telekom Austria 407 -216.61 10.43 0.04 -23.45 55.39 -2.20 6.49
Tesco I* 411 -124.89 9.89 0.00 -22.96 40.64 -1.27 2.86
Tesco II* 358 -0.04 388.22 187.28 177.83 89.68 0.03 2.07
Thales* 260 -64.51 308.67 72.56 75.33 68.35 0.92 3.83
Thyssenkrupp* 355 -177.82 371.69 117.90 114.70 103.87 0.12 2.35
Union Fenosa 409 -144.62 365.64 107.83 119.61 104.52 0.13 2.04
Veolia Environ 424 -123.08 6.13 -36.26 -36.83 38.85 -0.36 1.62
Vinci 431 -248.46 87.01 -0.02 -18.57 53.56 -1.77 7.32
Vivendi 414 -63.05 299.16 25.82 54.13 71.76 1.20 3.89
Vodafone* 384 -169.58 121.65 -9.99 -24.64 61.25 -0.39 2.45
Volkswagen 310 -232.47 295.36 108.34 109.53 74.00 -0.45 3.95
Volvo 412 -121.11 136.63 -19.39 -24.37 38.92 -0.44 3.46
Average 365 -129.38 262.78 77.21 71.94 78.52 -0.40 3.77
Table III: Descriptive Statistics for Incremental Cumulative Trading Profits
This table provides descriptive statistics for the increment in the discounted cumulative trading profits, which are obtained from
the cash-and-carry arbitrage strategy and are denoted as ?v(t). Panel A reports the descriptive statistics corresponding to the
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Panel B
Issuer Sample Size Min (€) Max (€) Median (€) Mean (€) S.D. (€) Skewness Kurtosis
Akzo Nobel I 480 -312.96 38.05 0.01 -21.73 66.99 -2.87 7.00
Astrazeneca 415 -506.96 187.62 19.78 -33.32 161.45 -0.96 0.10
Auchan 472 -635.74 1373.19 11.49 115.85 381.50 1.54 2.24
BASF 480 -223.42 20.64 -0.01 -17.54 51.05 -2.83 6.88
Bayer 480 -269.88 2987.31 459.25 627.79 582.89 1.16 1.11
Belgacom 480 -308.50 390.79 0.21 36.99 120.29 0.58 2.01
BMW 480 -331.21 25.63 -0.16 -24.83 67.34 -2.75 7.01
Bouygues I 480 -1367.03 1392.84 62.97 57.50 383.58 0.04 2.19
British AM Tob. II* 480 -121.11 5192.88 777.32 1211.50 1176.86 1.19 0.62
Carrefour I 480 -233.06 22.32 -0.36 -24.08 55.41 -2.19 3.62
Carrefour II 463 -203.87 28.80 -1.04 -33.02 62.00 -1.44 0.30
Casino G. P. I 480 -694.12 2827.54 99.17 296.95 603.76 1.76 3.57
Casino G. P. II 442 -1493.23 834.44 -0.25 -93.64 401.82 -0.81 0.94
Casino G. P. III 480 -295.07 4439.21 575.94 921.33 995.94 1.36 1.22
Edison 480 -753.78 3190.80 291.44 536.99 693.19 1.40 1.54
Enel* 480 -404.82 22.50 -0.05 -24.41 83.35 -3.33 9.83
Energias de Portugal I* 312 -327.60 243.70 -0.12 -34.30 93.76 -1.14 2.37
Energias de Portugal II 480 -282.72 27.18 -0.09 -25.69 72.00 -2.56 4.94
France Telecom I 480 -938.23 508.55 0.42 -89.40 316.69 -0.52 -0.64
France Telecom II 480 -622.14 2641.78 357.34 514.26 540.29 1.27 1.39
France Telecom III 480 -239.45 25.13 -0.82 -30.18 62.72 -1.95 2.49
Iberdrola I 480 -252.78 39.22 -0.32 -27.42 64.19 -2.19 3.51
Kingfisher 324 -1425.17 3383.41 77.86 329.24 797.85 0.89 1.49
Louis Vuitton I 480 -1616.56 1107.59 90.56 -36.30 546.18 -0.82 0.43
Louis Vuitton II 445 -1025.47 593.97 29.03 -56.82 362.17 -0.60 -0.32
Philips 480 -572.69 200.56 0.03 -11.42 130.34 -1.89 5.82
PPR 480 -1089.23 344.26 35.50 -10.88 264.10 -1.83 3.68
Repsol YPF 451 -3134.09 2119.35 151.50 97.05 861.39 -1.20 2.68
Saint Gobain II 480 -2070.10 2296.55 141.71 75.26 634.94 0.08 1.27
Saint Gobain III 435 -1617.87 783.78 36.35 -98.24 485.71 -0.88 0.07
Schneider 480 -617.60 1017.40 27.88 50.62 254.37 -0.28 0.36
SES* 480 -522.90 4192.00 264.83 479.69 702.76 2.25 5.92
Siemens 480 -243.25 22.16 -0.07 -23.48 64.81 -2.40 3.92
Technip 480 -1727.33 3282.13 324.61 346.18 649.37 -0.42 1.81
Telecom Italia I 480 -4577.43 1531.38 121.73 -265.17 1253.56 -1.61 1.88
Telecom Italia II 480 -811.16 4560.67 591.18 783.26 812.20 1.37 2.22
Telefonica 480 -1127.02 2126.51 195.86 227.94 391.27 0.84 3.03
Telekom Austria* 372 -589.60 3955.00 272.20 503.60 743.14 2.50 6.50
Teliasonera* 480 -60.45 5151.41 900.01 1257.90 1127.19 1.28 0.97
Tesco I 433 -1568.02 2058.54 25.06 153.66 542.60 1.60 3.20
Tesco II 480 -732.93 1390.59 43.92 119.07 377.67 1.17 1.67
Thales 480 -185.89 21.57 -0.42 -22.50 45.84 -1.85 2.15
Thyssenkrupp* 480 -429.46 57.17 -0.25 -26.40 67.95 -3.56 15.27
Union Fenosa 480 -247.97 60.78 -0.58 -28.10 61.62 -1.70 1.94
Volkswagen 480 -205.68 44.81 -0.62 -25.05 49.73 -1.91 3.04
Volvo 371 -648.70 556.50 76.04 58.94 256.32 -0.31 -0.17
Average 462 -818.79 1463.44 131.65 167.77 402.61 -0.53 2.89
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The Panels A and B of Table IV show the results for the analysis of statistical
arbitrage under the UM model during the rst and second subperiods, respectively.
The sign of parameter  for every company in Panel A is in line with the sign of the
mean incremental cumulative trading prots collected in Panel A of Table III with few
exceptions (British AM Tob. I and Enel). The unconstrained mean specication is not
rejected in most of the cases as the t-statistic associated with the parameter  reveals.
We nd 16 statistical arbitrage opportunities at 5% condence level during the period
before the crisis. We nd that eight of these cases are also long-run arbitrage opportu-
nities. However, the existence of statistical arbitrage is strongly rejected for cases such
as Akzo Nobel I, Bouygues II, Scania, Stora Enso, Telefonica, Thales, Thyssenkrupp,
Tesco I, and Vodafone where supposedly there are long-run arbitrage opportunities (the
basis is not stationary). During the crisis period there are eight statistical arbitrage
opportunities and among them, we nd the four long-run arbitrage opportunities based
on long positions in ASPs. As in the rst subperiod, the existence of statistical arbitrage
is strongly rejected for some cases in which supposedly there exist long-run arbitrage
opportunities (the basis is not stationary) that should be exploited by shorting ASPs
such as Enel, Energias de Portugal I, and Thyssenkrupp. Thus, the results obtained
using our procedure are di¤erent to the ones obtained using the long-run arbitrage test.
The reason is that if we employ the cointegration methodology, we are ignoring (i)
bonds or ASPs short sales restrictions and (ii) the real risk incurred to obtain arbitrage
prots. However, the statistical arbitrage methodology overcomes these two problems.
The results obtained with the other data sources (Reuters, CMA, and JPMorgan) are
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similar to the ones reported in Table IV.24 The last column in Panels A and B of Table
IV show the results using JTTWs test. In fact, we nd that both HJTW and JTTW
tests o¤er similar results. A total of 27 arbitrage opportunities at 5% condence level
are found during the rst subperiod and 11 during the second one. As expected and
given the simulations results, our test seems to be more conservative than JTTW. The
di¤erences between both tests are due mainly to the estimators and the corresponding
p-values associated with restrictions Rc1 and R
c
2 which are dened in Subsection 4.3.
25
The UM model usually presents smaller Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz
Information Criteria (SC) than the CM model, suggesting that the former is the most
appropriate model. For this reason, we only report the results obtained for the UM
model. Comparing Panels A and B of Table III, we observe that the average of the
incremental trading prots, v(t); is noticeably higher during the subprime crisis. This
could lead to the appearance of more statistical arbitrage opportunities if that devia-
tion between the ASPs and CDSs spreads persists over time. However, the volatility in
credit spreads has also increased considerably during the crisis which makes that the
variance of the incremental trading prots also increases and as a consequence, it could
even lead to the non-rejection of the restriction Rc2.
24 In the period before the crisis, we nd an additional statistical arbitrage opportunity using the CMA
and the J. P. Morgan databases: Stora Enso. In the crisis period, we nd that Edison (Telecom Italia
II) does not represent a statistical arbitrage opportunity in the Reuters and CMA databases (Reuters
and J.P. Morgan databases) but it does in the J. P. Morgan database (CMA database).
25Our test does not reject the absence of statistical arbitrage in some cases in which the mean pa-
rameter  is not signicantly di¤erent to zero at the 5% level (France Telecom I, Kingsher, SES, and
Vivendi in the rst subperiod, and Casino I and Union Fenosa in the second one). With respect to
restriction Rc2, our test does not nd that the rate of growth of the mean, ; is signicantly higher than
the rate of growth of the variance, ; for Akzo Nobel II, Thyssenkrupp, and Volkswagen in the period
before the crisis and for Volvo in the crisis period. Indeed, in all these cases, the t-statistic associated
with the di¤erence of the QML parameters    ; which is part of the restriction Rc2 in Subsection
4.3, is not signicantly higher than zero at a signicance level of 5%. Restriction Rc2 ensures that the
variance of the incremental trading prots, given a potential drop in them, converges to zero. Note
that it corroborates the results obtained when we compare the Type I errors of both tests focused on
restriction Rc2.
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Panel A reports the statistical test results obtained for the period before crisis (November 2005 - August 2007) while Panel B
reports the results obtained during the crisis  (August 2007 - June 2009). The first four columns of each panel include the
estimated parameters. The next four columns report the t-statistic of the corresponding parameter. The nineth column of each
panel shows whether statistical arbitrage (SA) opportunities exist or not. The tenth column of each panel presents the p-value
associated to the absence of SA. The last column reports the existence or absence of SA under JTTW test. In boldface are
the statistical arbitrage opportunities detected by our test. The symbols ***, **, and * denote that the null hypothesis (absence
of SA opportunities) is rejected at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A
SA
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? p-value
Akzo Nobel I  -2x10-3 67.55 2.05 0.02 -0.59 5.05 6.53 0.50 No 0.59 No
Akzo Nobel II 14.18 11.46 0.42 0.38 5.05 4.64 11.01 8.98 No 0.35 Yes***
Altadis 12.48 13.82 0.56 0.38 6.24 5.06 18.45 9.83 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
BMW -59.66 37.89 -0.25 -0.03 -2.76 4.98 -3.00 -0.63 No 1.00 No
Bouygues I 1.52 32.67 0.83 0.18 2.59 5.57 11.84 4.97 Yes* 0.06 Yes***
Bouygues II -82.59 40.11 -0.22 0.01 -3.63 4.81 -3.66 0.14 No 1.00 No
British AM Tob. I 98.68 90.79 -1.62 -0.03 1.16 4.86 -1.89 -0.67 No 1.00 No
British AM Tob. II 54.86 40.32 0.32 0.19 4.90 5.38 7.75 4.97 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Carrefour I 39.84 6.03 0.25 0.48 13.48 6.01 14.26 13.91 No 0.92 No
Carrefour II -71.84 53.33 -0.26 -0.05 -2.66 5.40 -3.18 -1.32 No 1.00 No
Casino I 7.71 27.83 0.61 0.28 2.79 4.74 8.58 6.36 Yes** 0.02 Yes***
Casino II 3.32 28.60 0.70 0.26 2.22 7.01 8.57 9.44 Yes*** 0.00 Yes***
Compass Group 3.37 52.32 0.70 0.17 1.88 7.16 7.25 6.15 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Edison 2.71 12.80 0.87 0.34 6.56 6.52 31.78 11.30 Yes*** 0.00 Yes***
Enel 0.00 14.79 4.42 0.23 0.00 3.62 53.93 8.23 No 0.86 No
Energias de Portugal I -74.31 36.63 -0.23 -0.01 -3.59 4.86 -3.61 -0.12 No 1.00 No
Energias de Portugal II -68.21 47.46 -0.31 -0.02 -2.49 5.34 -3.23 -0.45 No 1.00 No
E.ON -37.51 40.50 -0.13 -0.03 -2.33 5.62 -1.44 -0.82 No 1.00 No
France Telecom I 0.27 11.86 1.22 0.28 1.45 5.48 8.24 6.44 No 0.10 Yes***
France Telecom II 11.14 5.03 0.40 0.49 4.89 3.71 7.47 7.14 No 0.50 No
France Telecom III -330.98 73.33 -0.81 -0.03 -4.25 5.26 -4.86 -0.67 No 1.00 No
Iberdrola I -58.25 33.35 -0.23 -0.02 -3.63 5.15 -3.79 -0.59 No 1.00 No
Iberdrola II -57.61 27.08 -0.15 0.04 -4.51 4.43 -3.16 0.76 No 1.00 No
Kingfisher 1.57 27.82 0.63 0.14 1.35 5.38 4.70 3.88 Yes* 0.08 Yes***
Louis Vuitton I 57.60 50.72 0.20 0.06 4.70 4.99 4.52 1.37 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Louis Vuitton II 1.18 26.05 0.87 0.15 3.17 6.33 15.57 4.98 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
PPR 3.94 20.21 0.83 0.29 5.51 5.50 24.84 8.07 Yes*** 0.00 Yes***
Reed Elsevier -48.31 54.90 -0.06 -0.05 -3.20 5.28 -0.97 -1.19 No 1.00 No
Renault 11.75 19.38 0.55 0.24 6.37 5.19 18.38 6.14 Yes** 0.02 Yes***
Repsol YPF 0.71 13.99 1.03 0.36 3.15 7.49 18.27 14.02 Yes** 0.02 Yes***
Reuters 0.52 8.99 1.03 0.41 2.56 7.21 14.79 15.39 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Saint Gobain I 4.36 8.76 -1.46 0.36 0.52 6.30 -0.92 11.75 No 1.00 No
Saint Gobain II 46.42 20.30 0.28 0.23 7.81 6.01 10.89 7.03 Yes** 0.05 Yes**
Saint Gobain III 0.49 15.38 1.07 0.30 3.41 5.51 20.87 8.72 No 0.13 Yes***
Scania -68.78 75.84 -0.29 -0.09 -1.86 5.46 -2.50 -2.44 No 1.00 No
SES 0.22 4.49 0.71 0.32 0.88 6.87 3.37 11.28 No 0.10 Yes***
Siemens -0.43 5.99 0.65 0.28 -0.82 4.81 2.69 6.34 No 0.95 No
Sodexho 6.52 41.16 0.76 0.15 6.64 6.53 28.16 5.16 Yes** 0.03 Yes***
Stora Enso 0.29 9.84 1.08 0.35 2.68 5.36 16.63 9.88 No 0.17 Yes***
Technip 16.92 39.30 0.43 0.23 2.78 5.09 6.13 5.75 Yes** 0.02 Yes***
Telecom Italia I -4.47 14.91 0.24 0.20 -1.37 4.45 1.67 4.45 No 1.00 No
Telecom Italia II  -3x10-4 32.82 2.17 0.19 -0.41 5.46 4.97 5.15 No 0.58 No
Telefonica 0.36 10.71 1.09 0.35 2.91 5.54 17.72 9.76 No 0.17 Yes***
Telekom Austria -43.98 70.42 -0.13 -0.05 -1.63 5.86 -1.02 -1.47 No 1.00 No
Tesco I -78.92 40.38 -0.26  -1x10-3 -3.37 5.29 -3.81 -0.03 No 1.00 No
Tesco II 6.96 22.14 0.63 0.16 6.85 6.74 23.46 5.39 Yes*** 0.00 Yes***
Thales 48.80 26.02 0.09 0.20 4.06 4.67 1.67 4.39 No 0.63 No
Thyssenkrupp 18.67 17.40 0.36 0.35 4.18 4.45 7.61 7.69 No 0.53 No
Union Fenosa 0.55 19.32 1.01 0.26 2.74 6.79 15.69 9.12 No 0.24 Yes***
Veolia Environ. -39.40 44.15 -0.01 -0.03 -3.60 5.59 -0.25 -0.74 No 1.00 No
Vinci -0.42 8.50 0.71 0.35 -0.92 5.03 3.60 9.00 No 0.94 No
Vivendi 0.94 9.68 0.77 0.36 1.58 6.58 6.66 12.37 No 0.11 Yes***
Vodafone  -2x10-7 2.18 3.44 0.60 -0.49 3.92 9.70 11.81 No 0.47 No
Volkswagen 17.07 17.09 0.38 0.27 4.66 6.74 8.81 9.00 No 0.11 Yes***
Volvo -6.68 40.84 0.25 -0.01 -1.94 5.89 2.68 -0.38 No 1.00 No
Under the UM model, the process for the increment in the discounted cumulative trading profits is defined as ?vi=?i
?+i?zi.
t-stat
SA SA (JTTW)Issuer
Table IV: Statistical Arbitrage Test for Unconstrained Mean (UM) model
Parameters
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Panel B
SA
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? p-value
Akzo Nobel I -238.73 67.18 -0.53 -0.01 -3.89 5.38 -6.08 -0.15 No 1.00 No
Astrazeneca -0.25 82.09 0.93 0.13 -0.44 5.26 2.32 3.48 No 0.67 No
Auchan -157.36 14.62 -1.17 0.58 -10.74 8.06 -3.69 25.18 No 1.00 No
BASF -76.46 65.90 -0.30 -0.05 -1.99 6.12 -2.71 -1.68 No 1.00 No
Bayer 4.12 17.32 0.92 0.58 2.55 5.18 13.09 15.83 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Belgacom 4.65 11.35 0.40 0.44 1.72 3.94 3.58 9.06 No 0.53 No
BMW -198.15 71.26 -0.44 -0.01 -3.35 5.47 -5.33 -0.43 No 1.00 No
Bouygues I 10.91 21.76 0.36 0.51 1.88 7.04 3.53 19.21 No 0.65 No
British AM Tob. II 0.69 11.45 1.35 0.74 2.59 8.38 20.07 33.28 Yes** 0.03 Yes***
Carrefour I -70.70 69.77 -0.21 -0.05 -2.09 5.97 -2.17 -1.46 No 1.00 No
Carrefour II -91.26 69.85 -0.20 -0.02 -2.48 5.60 -2.41 -0.73 No 1.00 No
Casino I 0.15 10.45 1.45 0.75 0.92 7.30 7.74 29.21 No 0.16 Yes**
Casino II 0.00 4.06 2.65 0.41 -0.34 5.93 5.42 12.82 No 0.67 No
Casino III 1.08 21.69 1.22 0.64 2.05 7.23 14.37 24.51 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Edison 1.36 32.40 1.09 0.52 1.83 8.14 11.38 22.79 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Enel -82.74 116.84 -0.24 -0.07 -1.42 6.40 -1.67 -2.28 No 1.00 No
Energias de Portugal I -66.19 98.89 -0.12 -0.01 -1.75 5.64 -1.08 -0.35 No 1.00 No
Energias de Portugal II -82.64 96.30 -0.23 -0.06 -1.72 6.28 -2.03 -1.93 No 1.00 No
France Telecom I 72.24 43.58 -0.38 0.37 2.36 5.35 -2.51 10.51 No 1.00 No
France Telecom II 23.22 15.56 0.57 0.61 4.01 5.63 11.74 18.07 No 0.55 No
France Telecom III -104.98 74.34 -0.25 -0.04 -2.50 5.73 -2.92 -1.06 No 1.00 No
Iberdrola I -89.98 78.76 -0.24 -0.04 -2.14 5.80 -2.42 -1.27 No 1.00 No
Kingfisher 0.00 15.45 2.30 0.74 0.25 5.86 3.14 21.39 No 0.46 No
Louis Vuitton I -11.53 16.33 -0.94 0.63 -0.76 5.99 -1.05 19.99 No 1.00 No
Louis Vuitton II -176.41 23.14 -0.79 0.51 -8.16 5.18 -4.74 13.82 No 1.00 No
Philips -80.45 82.09 -0.43 0.09 -1.39 5.25 -2.15 2.42 No 1.00 No
PPR -135.61 79.49 -0.57 0.22 -2.20 6.17 -2.64 7.30 No 1.00 No
Repsol YPF 3.90 11.75 0.68 0.75 1.73 8.53 6.28 34.31 No 0.44 No
Saint Gobain II 29.38 16.66 0.32 0.65 3.73 6.11 5.31 21.15 No 0.93 No
Saint Gobain III 0.00 52.84 2.12 0.40 -0.31 5.68 3.95 12.07 No 1.00 No
Schneider 11.01 18.70 0.32 0.48 1.82 4.50 2.87 11.39 No 0.64 No
SES 0.26 2.86 1.36 0.94 2.18 6.67 13.82 33.24 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Siemens -166.11 71.49 -0.41 -0.02 -2.97 5.55 -4.70 -0.66 No 1.00 No
Technip 3.82 3.54 0.85 0.93 3.76 5.34 16.54 26.17 No 0.80 No
Telecom Italia I 72.40 9.96 0.07 0.85 8.74 8.02 1.07 36.51 No 1.00 No
Telecom Italia II 16.25 21.86 0.71 0.56 3.39 6.55 13.01 21.43 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Telefonica 24.20 13.19 0.42 0.60 4.56 7.18 9.36 22.94 No 0.76 No
Telekom Austria 0.21 2.23 1.47 1.04 2.11 7.49 17.59 41.54 Yes** 0.05 Yes***
Teliasonera 7.01 9.26 0.92 0.70 6.60 24.42 69.97 7.44 Yes** 0.04 Yes***
Tesco I -128.68 5.52 -0.24 0.81 -25.52 6.76 -6.23 29.18 No 1.00 No
Tesco II -108.21 15.23 -0.48 0.58 -8.25 6.99 -5.20 21.55 No 1.00 No
Thales -32.44 49.43 -0.07 -0.01 -2.06 5.81 -0.76 -0.46 No 1.00 No
Thyssenkrupp -69.91 86.34 -0.19 -0.05 -1.83 5.92 -1.73 -1.49 No 1.00 No
Union Fenosa 0.40 33.52 1.29 0.53 1.35 7.03 10.09 19.71 No 0.12 Yes***
Volkswagen -83.03 56.11 -0.24 -0.03 -2.80 5.85 -3.16 -0.79 No 1.00 No
Volvo 10.22 62.75 0.30 0.27 1.18 5.96 2.16 8.57 No 0.25 Yes**
t-stat
SA SA (JTTW)Issuer
Parameters
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Table V shows the prots, the total investment, the returns, the probability of a
loss, the Fishers skewness of the payments when these are below the percentile 33% and
a performance ratio of the arbitrage opportunities. As one of the statistical arbitrage
conditions states that investors are only concerned about the variance of a potential
decrease in wealth, we avoid penalizing positive prot deviations from their expected
values, since investors benet from these deviations. For this reason, as a performance
measure ratio we show a modied version of the symmetric downside risk Sharpe ratio
in Ziemba (2005). This performance ratio is dened as the ratio between the total
prots and the corresponding semi-standard deviation of payments.26 To take into
account the downside risk in the payments and more specically, the downside risk
in the losses or lower payments, we employ the skewness of the payments below the
percentile 33% given that the investors could be averse to negative skewness. In Figure
1 we show Fishers skewness as dened above to clarify the economic di¤erence between
our test and JTTWs test. Before the crisis and using our test, all statistical arbitrage
opportunities have positive skewness except in one case ( 0:04). On the other hand,
the arbitrage opportunities discarded by our test but accepted by JTTWs test all have
negative skewness ranging from ( 0:08; 2:36): During the crisis and using our test, all
statistical arbitrage opportunities have positive skewness except in one case ( 0:05).
26The semivariance of payments is calculated as:
2  =
nP
i=1
(paymenti payment)2 
n 1
where paymenti represents the payment at time i; payment
 refers to the payment in the 30th percentile
and n denes the number of observations. The summatory is applied whenever the payment is below
payment

: The modied version of the Ziemba ratio is dened as:
S  = Total Protsp2  :
65
CHAPTER 2. ARE THERE ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN CREDIT
DERIVATIVES MARKETS?
On the other hand, the arbitrage opportunities discarded by our test but accepted
by JTTWs test all have negative skewness ranging from ( 1:45; 2:24): Therefore, as
explained in Section 5 there is a relevant economic di¤erence between JTTWs test and
ours. Arbitrageurs engaging in arbitrage opportunities detected by JTTWs test (but
not detected by our test) are exposed inadvertently to signicant downside risk that is
even more extreme during the crisis period.
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In Table V we show that the number of investment days presents a high deal of
variation. In fact, we observe that in some cases this number is even below ten. The
reason is that in those cases, the investment strategy stops because the total expected
future losses exceed e25,000.27 Regarding the prots and the performance measures
27As the stop rule imposed to the strategy leads to a low number of investment days in some of the
cases in which the existence of statistical arbitrage is rejected, we extend the analysis by excluding this
stop rule and nd similar results (see Section 8). In this case the number of investment days coincides
with the number of observations reported in the Panel B of Table I whenever the trading strategy does
not stop due to other reasons. Note also that the cases in which the investment strategy stops due to
the high expected future losses, correspond to potential statistical arbitrage opportunities using inverse
positions based on short sales of ASPs.
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obtained during the period before the crisis which are reported in Panel A of Table V,
it should be noted that the only attractive opportunities compared to the ones where
our test nds statistical arbitrage are: Saint Gobain III and Vivendi. However, the
probability of loss in Saint Gobain III is around 10%, while in Vivendi investments
take place on only 23% of the total potential trading days, respectively, and so total
prots are low. On the other hand, we nd statistical arbitrage opportunities under
both HJTW and JTTW methodologies which correspond to cases with either a high
probability of a loss or a poor performance or both, such as Bouygues I, France Telecom
I, Kingsher, SES, Stora Enso, Union Fenosa, or Volkswagen. These are rejected under
our test. According to the prots and performance measures corresponding to the crisis
period which are reported in Panel B, we observe that the only attractive opportunities
that our test does not detect are France Telecom II and Union Fenosa. However, France
Telecom II does not fulll the restriction Rc2 and in Union Fenosa the mean parameter 
is not signicantly higher than 0 and moreover the number of days with losses is around
24% of the total. HJTW and JTTW tests consider as statistical arbitrage opportunities
Casino I, Union Fenosa, and Volvo. In these cases we observe a high probability of a loss
and a poor performance compared with the statistical arbitrage opportunities detected
by our test which, on the other hand, seem to be the most protable opportunities
according to all the performance measures of Table V.
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period (August 2007 - June 2009). The first column of each panel reports the total profits in Euros. The second column of each panel
shows the number of investment days while the third one shows the total investment in ASPs or CDSs, which is calculated as the
Fisher's skewness of the payments obtained by the investor when these payments are below the percentile 33% (pctl 33). The symbol
denotes that the skewness of the payments below the percentile 33% is significantly positive at 5% level. The last column includes a
modification of the symmetric downside-risk Sharpe ratio in Ziemba (2005), which is obtained as the ratio between the total profits
and the corresponding semivariance of the payments. In boldface are the statistical arbitrage opportunities deteced by our test.
Number of Total investment Returns per Days with Skewness (pctl 33 Modified
investment days in AS/CDSs AS/CDS invest. (b.p.) losses (%) of payments) Ziemba Ratio
Akzo Nobel I -7,089 152 76,000,000 -0.93 0.49 -1.22 -117.71
Akzo Nobel II 50,534 344 172,000,000 2.94 0.06 -0.09 871.42
Altadis 90,829 300 150,000,000 6.06 0.00 1.29* 1274.58
BMW -6,391 15 7,500,000 -8.52 1.00 -1.11 -114.33
Bouygues I 42,025 197 98,500,000 4.27 0.11 -0.49 880.47
Bouygues II -11,578 21 10,500,000 -11.03 1.00 -1.05 -234.42
British AM Tob. I -10,595 42 21,000,000 -5.05 0.76 -1.45 -140.05
British AM Tob. II 77,202 232 116,000,000 6.66 0.00 1.05* 2632.81
Carrefour I 38,077 221 110,500,000 3.45 0.04 -0.08 809.54
Carrefour II -8,996 13 6,500,000 -13.84 1.00 -1.13 -131.55
Casino I 40,231 148 74,000,000 5.44 0.05 0.25 1173.74
Casino II 52,153 196 98,000,000 5.32 0.08 -0.04 1293.27
Compass Group 52,398 121 60,500,000 8.66 0.01 2.68* 24460.91
Edison 110,543 339 169,500,000 6.52 0.00 1.33* 1610.33
Enel -1,263 91 45,500,000 -0.28 0.58 -1.68 -21.70
Energias de Portugal I -9,176 21 10,500,000 -8.74 1.00 -1.07 -474.67
Energias de Portugal II -5,615 37 18,500,000 -3.04 0.62 -1.32 -106.64
E.ON -8,255 43 21,500,000 -3.84 0.70 -1.20 -251.67
France Telecom I 7,735 119 59,500,000 1.30 0.09 -1.89 597.31
France Telecom II 6,745 100 50,000,000 1.35 0.01 -0.74 268.70
France Telecom III -6,537 3 1,500,000 -43.58 1.00 -1.08 -65.60
Iberdrola I -7,752 19 9,500,000 -8.16 1.00 -1.05 -439.92
Iberdrola II -9,596 28 14,000,000 -6.85 1.00 -1.08 -615.27
Kingfisher 16,911 270 135,000,000 1.25 0.19 -2.36 396.31
Louis Vuitton I 41,928 251 125,500,000 3.34 0.01 1.14* 975.46
Louis Vuitton II 50,408 345 172,500,000 2.92 0.03 1.49* 1127.47
PPR 100,819 289 144,500,000 6.98 0.02 1.32* 1117.27
Reed Elsevier -13,883 36 18,000,000 -7.71 0.97 -1.11 -414.19
Renault 64,342 249 124,500,000 5.17 0.01 1.24* 1058.43
Repsol YPF 71,678 298 149,000,000 4.81 0.04 1.16* 1665.42
Reuters 52,793 229 114,500,000 4.61 0.02 1.07* 1684.79
Saint Gobain I 833 312 156,000,000 0.05 0.51 -1.92 15.86
Saint Gobain II 57,699 261 130,500,000 4.42 0.00 1.09* 1818.04
Saint Gobain III 72,495 348 174,000,000 4.17 0.09 -0.57 1402.95
Scania -6,382 7 3,500,000 -18.23 1.00 -1.11 -84.03
SES 3,134 52 26,000,000 1.21 0.35 -2.26 179.61
Siemens -2,771 36 18,000,000 -1.54 0.83 -1.89 -83.01
Sodexho 144,270 350 175,000,000 8.24 0.00 1.27* 1386.46
Stora Enso 47,029 250 125,000,000 3.76 0.13 -1.47 1136.87
Technip 44,597 112 56,000,000 7.96 0.00 3.50* 1339.04
Telecom Italia I -5,940 63 31,500,000 -1.89 0.70 -1.65 -138.85
Telecom Italia II -5,993 197 98,500,000 -0.61 0.56 -1.47 -77.62
Telefonica 45,854 317 158,500,000 2.89 0.09 -1.11 1015.34
Telekom Austria -9,545 11 5,500,000 -17.35 1.00 -1.18 -109.26
Tesco I -9,439 150 75,000,000 -1.26 1.00 -1.07 -139.61
Tesco II 63,664 250 125,000,000 5.09 0.00 1.31* 1070.41
Thales 19,586 110 55,000,000 3.56 0.05 -0.77 738.67
Thyssenkrupp 40,719 235 117,500,000 3.47 0.10 -1.90 820.77
Union Fenosa 48,922 250 125,000,000 3.91 0.13 -0.91 1036.56
Veolia Environ. -15,617 34 17,000,000 -9.19 1.00 -1.06 -727.89
Vinci -8,006 53 26,500,000 -3.02 0.66 -1.67 -110.11
Vivendi 22,408 97 48,500,000 4.62 0.08 -1.69 2131.29
Vodafone -9,462 233 116,500,000 -0.81 0.52 -1.16 -198.53
Volkswagen 33,954 256 128,000,000 2.65 0.05 -0.48 681.39
Volvo -10,040 71 35,500,000 -2.83 0.69 -1.20 -320.31
defined as the ratio between the number of days with losses and the total number of investment days. The sixth column reports the
Table V reports the profits and performance measures corresponding to the different cases under study. This table splits into two
panels. Panel A refers to the period before the crisis (November 2005 - August 2007) while Panel B corresponds to the crisis
number of investment days multiplied by the nominal of each purchase (500,000 Euros). The fourth column includes the returns in
basis points obtained as the ratio between the first and the third columns. The fifth column reports the probability of a loss, which is
Panel A
Issuer Total Profits
Table V: Profits and Performance Measures
69
CHAPTER 2. ARE THERE ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN CREDIT
DERIVATIVES MARKETS?
Number of Total investment Returns per Days with Skewness (pctl 33 Modified
investment days in AS/CDSs AS/CDS invest. (b.p.) losses (%) of payments) Ziemba Ratio
Akzo Nobel I -10,431 6 3,000,000 -34.77 1.000 -1.11 -101.75
Astrazeneca -13,828 81 40,500,000 -3.41 0.407 -1.31 -99.34
Auchan 54,683 169 84,500,000 6.47 0.373 -1.70 305.36
BASF -8,417 7 3,500,000 -24.05 1.000 -1.17 -107.18
Bayer 301,341 347 173,500,000 17.37 0.032 1.30* 2000.15
Belgacom 17,754 38 19,000,000 9.34 0.289 -1.54 212.54
BMW -11,920 8 4,000,000 -29.80 1.000 -1.22 -114.36
Bouygues I 27,598 260 130,000,000 2.12 0.377 -1.83 86.12
British AM Tob. II 581,521 300 150,000,000 38.77 0.017 1.46* 2386.71
Carrefour I -11,560 11 5,500,000 -21.02 1.000 -1.21 -130.99
Carrefour II -15,850 13 6,500,000 -24.38 1.000 -1.05 -156.35
Casino G. P. I 177,187 200 100,000,000 17.72 0.230 -2.24 1065.67
Casino G. P. II -18,947 190 95,000,000 -1.99 0.453 -1.46 -122.91
Casino G. P. III 442,238 231 115,500,000 38.29 0.056 1.28* 2584.89
Edison 257,755 338 169,000,000 15.25 0.080 0.11 1780.05
Enel -11,719 5 2,500,000 -46.87 1.000 -1.13 -92.62
Energias de Portugal I -16,025 20 10,000,000 -16.02 0.750 -1.27 -126.52
Energias de Portugal II -12,331 7 3,500,000 -35.23 1.000 -1.09 -111.00
France Telecom I -17,910 154 77,000,000 -2.33 0.442 -1.19 -211.82
France Telecom II 246,844 298 149,000,000 16.57 0.108 -0.27 1626.87
France Telecom III -14,488 13 6,500,000 -22.29 1.000 -1.22 -143.50
Iberdrola I -13,160 10 5,000,000 -26.32 1.000 -1.16 -129.91
Kingfisher 106,675 146 73,000,000 14.61 0.267 -1.77 233.51
Louis Vuitton I -17,424 282 141,000,000 -1.24 0.379 -1.43 -33.23
Louis Vuitton II -17,272 243 121,500,000 -1.42 0.449 -1.28 -103.31
Philips -5,484 44 22,000,000 -2.49 0.455 -1.96 -33.04
PPR -5,221 116 58,000,000 -0.90 0.379 -1.85 -15.63
Repsol YPF 46,583 358 179,000,000 2.60 0.310 -1.95 49.07
Saint Gobain II 36,126 384 192,000,000 1.88 0.393 -1.56 71.12
Saint Gobain III -17,957 202 101,000,000 -1.78 0.361 -1.31 -107.86
Schneider 24,296 110 55,000,000 4.42 0.364 -1.47 101.75
SES 230,252 119 59,500,000 38.70 0.091 -0.05 2721.04
Siemens -11,270 7 3,500,000 -32.20 1.000 -1.04 -112.62
Technip 166,168 194 97,000,000 17.13 0.144 -2.17 328.26
Telecom Italia I -19,283 205 102,500,000 -1.88 0.341 -1.53 -75.31
Telecom Italia II 375,964 299 149,500,000 25.15 0.057 0.33* 1549.79
Telefonica 109,413 272 136,000,000 8.05 0.235 -2.53 438.23
Telekom Austria 366,608 250 125,000,000 29.33 0.056 0.77* 3242.14
Teliasonera 479,520 250 125,000,000 38.36 0.007 1.30* 2186.69
Tesco I 73,755 276 138,000,000 5.34 0.453 -2.30 308.19
Tesco II 57,154 250 125,000,000 4.57 0.408 -1.56 294.27
Thales -10,800 15 7,500,000 -14.40 0.933 -1.23 -145.61
Thyssenkrupp -12,673 12 6,000,000 -21.12 1.000 -1.81 -118.63
Union Fenosa 240,685 250 125,000,000 19.25 0.236 -2.08 965.01
Volkswagen -12,026 15 7,500,000 -16.03 1.000 -1.31 -149.18
Volvo 23,846 150 75,000,000 3.18 0.373 -1.45 116.86
Panel B
Issuer Total Profits
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The previous results are concentrated on the income from the basis itself and ignore
any of the funding costs involved in entering the trade. Although during the period
prior to the crisis, funding costs are probably very low, the situation changes after the
summer of 2007 and funding costs increases signicantly. Funding costs are a function
of the investor credit quality and of the credit quality of the underlying instrument (e.g.
investment grade vs. high yield). Elizalde and Doctor (2009) denote investors who have
access to cheap credit as banks and investors who are required to pay higher levels
of funding as hedge funds. Elizalde and Doctor (2009) estimations for the banks
and hedge fundscosts of funding long risk positions in bonds for a typical investment
grade bond are: 6 / 25 b.p. in July 2008, 51 / 101 b.p. in October 2008 and 14 / 44 b.p.
in July 2009. On the other hand, the funding costs before August 2007 were negligible
for the banks.
We nd that if the annualized average funding cost associated to each investment
during the period before the crisis is greater than 2 b.p. the statistical arbitrage oppor-
tunities disappear in British AM Tob. II, Louis Vuitton I and II, Repsol YPF, Reuters,
Saint Gobain II, and Technip. When they are greater than 3 b.p., the same is true for
Altadis, Casino I and II, and Compass Group. Ditto for 4 b.p. in Edison and Renault;
and in PRR and Tesco II for 5 b.p.. Finally, the statistical arbitrage opportunity found
in Sodexho remains until costs exceed 7 b.p..28 We conclude that for a highly rated
investor (bank), statistical arbitrage opportunities are protable even after the use of
funding costs given that they are negligible before the crisis and that the underlying
28We are considering average constant funding costs for the corresponding period although it is likely
that an investor would have to renew their funding at regular intervals and so would be somewhat
exposed to changes in the levels of funding. To have a better perspective of these average costs, the
average ASP, bond, and CDS spread during the period before the crisis is around 25 b.p. and, so, a
cost of 3 b.p. is around 12% of the credit spread.
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instruments are investment grade bonds.
We nd that if the annualized average funding cost associated to each investment
during the crisis is greater than 1 b.p., the statistical arbitrage opportunities disappear
in SES, Telecom Italia II, and Telekom Austria. When they are greater than 2 b.p., the
same is true for Casino III and Edison. Ditto for 3 b.p. in Bayer, British AM. Tob.
II, and Teliasonera. According to the funding costs of the long risk positions estimated
by Elizalde and Doctor (2009), we conclude that no statistical arbitrage opportunity
remains during the crisis neither for banksnor for hedge fundsinvestors.
In addition to funding costs, the trading costs probably increased during the crisis.
This increase reinforces the absence of statistical arbitrage opportunities during the
crisis but it could also a¤ect to the statistical arbitrages that were found before the
crisis. We employ the quote-level data to answer this question and add the trading
costs, which are measured by means of the bid-ask spread, to the strategys prots. We
nd that the number of statistical arbitrage opportunities decreases to nine: Altadis,
British AM Tob. II, Compass Group, Edison, PRR, Renault, Saint Gobain II, Sodexho,
and Tesco II.
Although shorting a corporate bond or ASP is not always a feasible option, we
also apply the statistical arbitrage test to the strategy based on short positions both in
Portfolio I and Portfolio II for the whole sample of entities. We nd three additional sta-
tistical arbitrage opportunities during the period before the crisis (Carrefour II, British
AM Tob. I, and France Telecom III). The number of statistical arbitrage opportunities
increases to eight during the crisis (Astrazeneca, BASF, Enel, France Telecom III, Iber-
drola I, PPR, Thyssenkrupp, and Volkswagen). It shows that there exists a noticeable
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di¤erence between both subperiods. Nevertheless, during the crisis the ASPs short sales
are less feasible and most costly than under a normal regime. It could prevent investors
to exploit potential arbitrage opportunities and then, deviations from the equivalence
relation between ASPs and CDSs spreads could persist over time.
During periods of nancial distress, the cash-and-carry strategy based on ASPs and
CDSs is not completely riskless due to a higher risk of default, to a liquidity premium
derived from the uncertainty about ASPs and CDSsliquidity, to market segmentation,
to funding risk which could a¤ect ASPs and to counterparty risk in CDSs. The inuence
of the previous aspects could cause that credit spreads depart farther from the no-
arbitrage relation. We nd persistent deviations between credit spreads, based on either
long or short risk positions, in 34.8% of the cases during the crisis.
Finally, we test how asset swaps, bonds and CDSs characteristics inuence the exis-
tence of statistical arbitrage. We employ a Probit regression model with heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard errors for the total 101 cases studied in both subperiods, using as
dependent variable a dummy variable that equals one if there is a statistical arbitrage
opportunity, ignoring funding and trading costs, and zero otherwise. To control and
test the e¤ect of the crisis, we create a dummy variable equal to one if a given case
corresponds to the crisis period. As the coe¢ cients in the Probit model are di¢ cult to
interpret, we compute the marginal e¤ects that indicate the change in the probability
of statistical arbitrage for a marginal change in the independent continuous variable or
for a discrete change in the independent dummy variable. Results are shown in Table
VI. The statistical arbitrage opportunities seem to be more frequent when the asset
swaps packages contain relatively low-rated bonds. Thus, the higher the issuer risk, the
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more frequent are the persistent deviations between CDSs and ASPs spreads. More-
over, apparent long-run arbitrage opportunities are related with statistical ones. Thus,
a long-run arbitrage opportunity is also a statistical arbitrage one with a probability
around 28.5%. The bond coupon has a non-signicant e¤ect. Finally, the crisis dummy
has a non-signicant e¤ect on statistical arbitrage. According to these results, there is
one salient factor that determines the existence of statistical arbitrage: the issuers risk.
The higher the issuers risk, the more valuable are potential factors that could cause de-
viations between the ASP and CDS spreads: counterparty risk, liquidity, funding costs,
and CTD among others. Crouch and Marsh (2005) suggest that as the credit risk rises,
the arbitrage forces holding the two levels together begin to weaken. Yu (2006) also
nds that speculative obligors produce a higher mean excess return and Sharpe ratio
than investment grade obligors for capital structure arbitrage strategies, which relate
equity and CDS markets.
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This table presents the effects of the potential determinants of statistical arbitrage opportunities. The results are
estimated by a Probit model with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The sample is formed by 101
cases/bonds from two different periods, 55 cases correspond to the period before crisis and 46 of them to the
crisis period. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a statistical arbitrage oppor-
tunity and 0 otherwise. The potential determinants of statistical arbitrage considered are: Rating  is a discrete
variable with values between 1 and 7, such that 1 corresponds to rating BBB- and 7 to rating AA-, the rest of
the values correspond to the intermediate ratings; Bond coupon ; Existence of long-run arbitrage opportunities
that refers to a dummy variable equals to one if there exists a long run arbitrage opportunity; Crisis  which is a
dummy variable with value equals to one when the observation corresponds to the crisis period. The first column
reports the estimated coefficients. The second column presents the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
The third column reports the coefficient p-value  and last column reports the marginal effect.
Rating -0.375 0.120 0.002 -0.097
Bond coupon 0.220 0.183 0.229 0.057
Existence of long-run arbitrage opportunities 0.935 0.337 0.006 0.285
Crisis -0.357 0.340 0.295 -0.091
Constant -0.763 1.055 0.469
Pseudo R-squared 0.201
Number of observations 101
Wald chi2(4 df) 23.220
Prob > chi2 0.000
Marginal
Effect
Robust Std.
Err.Coefficient
Table VI: Determinants of Statistical Arbitrage Opportunities
P-value
Liquidity could be other salient factor that a¤ects statistical arbitrage. However,
as Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007) state, while liquidity is easy to dene in theo-
retical terms, its empirical measurement in an accurate and reliable manner is quite
di¢ cult, except in markets that are relatively very liquid. Credit markets are not the
most liquid ones and moreover, we nd that the potential liquidity proxies are correlated
with the issuer rating and bond coupon. We have employed several liquidity measures
in the Probit regression but they are not signicant with high p-values which suggests a
potential relation between credit quality and liquidity and so, the liquidity e¤ect could
be implicit in the issuer rating or the coupon bond.29
Finally, we evaluate the e¤ect of additional factors which have been traditionally
considered as determinants of deviations between CDSs and ASPs or bonds:
29We have employed as liquidity proxies: the logarithm of the bond issued amount, the number of
issued bonds by the underlying company, the bond time-to-maturity (in years), the bond age (in years),
the average relative bid-ask spread for the bonds and CDSs, and the number of 5-year CDS missing
trading prices during the corresponding period. The last CDS liquidity measure presents more missing
trading prices during the crisis.
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Funding costs: We nd that funding costs have a highly signicant e¤ect given that
they impede the existence of statistical arbitrage opportunities during the crisis. During
this period, there are noticeable deviations from the parity relation but the increase in
funding costs makes the apparent arbitrage opportunities non protable. Thus, these
deviations could persist over time given that the arbitrageurs cannot exploit them. This
novel fact, regarding the credit derivatives markets, is formally shown in this paper for
the rst time as far as we know.
ASP short sales restrictions: Other factor that could cause deviations between
credit spreads is the relative ease of shorting credit risk in the CDS market compared
to the underlying cash market. However, contrary to the long-run arbitrage test, our
test is not a¤ected by these restrictions given that the arbitrage strategy is based on
ASP and CDS long positions.
Bond price close/far to/from par : The ASP spread is a fair indicator for the CDS
spread when the bond price is close to par. However, as the bond price deviates from
par the ASP spreads role as a fair indicator worsens. Moreover, when the bond is priced
at a discount, buying the ASP could be more attractive than buying the CDS and it
suggests that the ASP spread should be greater than the CDS spread. Although we
focus on the cases in which the bond price is relatively close to par, we include a proxy
that is dened as the di¤erence between the average price during the corresponding
period and the par value. We nd that this proxy is not signicant, suggesting that
the statistical arbitrages found by our test are not a¤ected by how far the bond price
is away from par. This fact implies that, in all cases, the asset swap is an appropriate
indicator for the CDS spread and thus the arbitrage opportunities detected are evidence
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of persistent mispricings.
Cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option: The CTD option in the CDS contract could
also cause deviations between the credit spreads. Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005)
suggest that the violations in the long-run equivalence relation are possibly due to a
wider range of deliverable debt obligations. We repeat the Probit analysis using as a
proxy for the CTD the total number of bonds issued by the underlying company. This
variable is not signicant at any standard condence level.30
2.8 Robustness tests and extensions
In this section, we perform some robustness tests and extensions. First, we
analyze the e¤ect on results of a periodic liquidation of positions every quarter. Then,
we test how the results are a¤ected by increasing the number of trading days without
attending to liquidity restrictions and employing quotes instead of transaction prices.
We also repeat the analysis by allowing the standard deviation parameter to evolve as
a GARCH process. Finally, we study whether a change in the limit of acceptable losses,
which had been set at 25,000 Euros, has any inuence on the previous results. We
comment the results under the model that best ts the data according to AIC and SC.
30The existence of counterparty risk could be a factor impacting potential statistical arbitrages. As
counterparty risk is di¢ cult to measure and involve many additional issues we left this topic for future
research. It should be pointed out that the new practice derived from the Standardized North American
Contract (SNAC) could lead to a fall in counterparty risk due to the margin requirements that this
contract implies. If the counterparty risk is the main factor that determines the existence of persistent
deviations between credit spreads, the deviations should be partly mitigated after the arrival of the
SNAC.
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2.8.1 Closing positions
The investor positions were not closed in the previous analysis since future losses
are perfectly known at the current moment if no default occurs. CDSs transfer credit
risk from one party to another and it is possible that the investors only want exposure
to risk for a limited period of time. These investors could liquidate their positions at
a given price if there is an adequate level of liquidity in this OTC market. Thus, we
analyze the same strategy but closing, at the end of every quarter, any investment made
during that quarter under the assumption that both CDSs and ASPs positions can be
closed at the same time.31 Positions are closed whenever the basis (sAt  
_
st) is negative
to avoid closing positions at dates when an important and certain loss would take place.
If the basis is positive at a given date, the positions will be closed on the rst subsequent
date when it is negative. However, if investors close a high number of positions at a given
date, it would lead to a large payment a quarter after that date which is derived from
the closed positions. It a¤ects the mean and variance growth rates. Ignoring funding
and trading costs, the number of arbitrage opportunities decreases to seven during the
period before the crisis (Bouygues I, Louis Vuitton II, Renault, Sodexho, Stora Enso,
Technip, and Tesco II) and increases to nine during the crisis period (British AM. Tob.
II, Casino III, Edison, Kingsher, Repsol, SES, Telekom Austria, Teliasonera, and Union
Fenosa). If we repeat the analysis closing the positions every 45 days instead of every
quarter, we nd that the number of statistical arbitrage opportunities before the crisis
increases to 18 (the 16 opportunities reported in Panel A of Table IV plus Bouygues I
31Note that it is easier to get into credit derivatives contracts than it is to get out of them. The
CDSsmaturity is set at a given horizon and the investor can take the other side of the nearest maturity
contract and build a book of o¤setting positions, or try to sell the current contract.
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and Stora Enso). Nevertheless, we nd the same nine opportunities during the crisis.
2.8.2 Trading days and CDS prices analysis
The investment strategy is implemented whenever there is an adequate grade
of liquidity according to the information on transaction prices. However, we repeat
the analysis ignoring this restriction and assume that the investments are implemented
every day. For this aim, we employ quotes from CMA, Reuters, J.P. Morgan, and the
Fenics curve from GFI. In the rst subperiod, we nd the same statistical arbitrage
opportunities that are reported in Panel A of Table IV and other ve additional oppor-
tunities. The additional opportunities are common to CMA, J.P. Morgan, and Fenics
(GFI) databases: Bouygues I, Saint Gobain III, Stora Enso, Telefonica, and Vivendi. In
the crisis period and ignoring funding and trading costs, we nd two statistical arbitrage
opportunities less, for the four databases, than the ones reported in Panel B of Table
IV: Edison and Telecom Italia II.
2.8.3 Trade size analysis
We employ CDSs with a notional equal to e500,000 and assume that the stra-
tegy stops if the total investment in a given bond exceeds 25% of the bonds issued
amount or if the total expected future losses exceed e25,000. The reason for using
this notional is to guarantee a substantial number of investments to test the existence
of persistent anomalies in credit markets. However, as in some execution platforms
for CDSs the minimum trade size is of e1 million, we repeat the analysis employing
CDSs of this notional value and increasing the barrier of losses to e50,000. In the rst
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subperiod we nd one additional statistical arbitrage opportunity: Bouygues I. In the
crisis period and ignoring funding and trading costs, we nd an additional statistical
arbitrage opportunity: Union Fenosa.
2.8.4 Nonconstant variance parameter
Although the standard deviation parameter of the prots process, ; was as-
sumed to be constant, it could evolve as a GARCH process. We have repeated the
analysis by letting the standard deviation parameter evolve as a GARCH. Results do
not change signicantly.
2.8.5 Limit of losses analysis
The barrier of 25,000 Euros for the total expected losses which determine the
point at which the strategy stops could seem to be an arbitrary limit. For this reason,
we repeated the test with barriers of 10,000 and 50,000 Euros and with no barrier under
both UM and CM models. Results conrm that a barrier of 10,000 Euros seems too
low given that it could lead to stopping the strategy prematurely. However, a barrier
of 50,000 Euros leads to the same results as using a limit of 25,000 Euros for both
subperiods. Finally, if the strategy does not stop, independently of the investors losses,
we only nd one additional statistical arbitrage opportunity for Tesco I under the CM
model in the rst subperiod and none under the UM model. As the preferred model
for Tesco I is UM, we conclude that the last alternative does not lead to additional
statistical arbitrage opportunities and moreover its use would involve a high risk.
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2.9 Conclusions
The ongoing nancial crisis and its possible consequences for the regulation
of nancial markets makes the study of the possible persistent mispricing in credit
derivatives markets a topic of salient relevance.
We make ve contributions to this important topic. First, we present a new test
of statistical arbitrage allowing for more general structure in the innovations and which
has lower Type I error and selects arbitrage opportunities with lower downside risk
than existing alternatives. Second, we apply the new test to a specic segment of the
credit derivatives markets: CDS and ASP. We also apply cointegration techniques to
the same problem. Our third contribution relates to the appropriate way of testing for
arbitrage opportunities. We focus our analysis to test the cases in which long positions
in CDSs and ASPs are needed. Fourth, we employ four di¤erent databases to show
that during the period before the subprime crisis, in 27% of the cases there are long-run
arbitrage opportunities and in 29% there are statistical arbitrage opportunities. On
the other hand, during the crisis we nd 9% of cases of long-run arbitrage and 17%
of statistical arbitrage. In this second period, we nd a higher correlation between
credit spreads and a higher volatility in the basis and the credit spreads. We show that
arbitrageurs engaging in arbitrage opportunities detected by the previous alternatives
(but not detected by our test) are exposed unwittingly to signicant downside risk
that is even more extreme during the crisis period. This is an economically relevant
di¤erence between JTTWs test and our test besides its better statistical properties.
After considering funding and trading costs, we nd statistical arbitrage opportunities in
16% of the cases before the crisis but never during the crisis. Nevertheless, the persistent
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deviations between credit spreads, based on either long or short risk positions, are very
frequent during the crisis. Fifth, we show that statistical arbitrage opportunities seem
to be more frequent when the ASPs contain relatively low-rated bonds.
In summary, the papers main empirical ndings are: rst, before the crisis some
persistent mispricings are found. Specically, CDS spreads are too low in comparison
with asset swap spreads. This fact puts into question the e¢ ciency of this segment of
the CDS market. Second, once the crisis started, the increase in funding costs makes the
apparent arbitrage opportunities non protable. This novel fact, regarding the credit
derivatives markets, is formally shown in this paper for the rst time as far as we know.
Looking forward, we expect more denite evidence on other arbitrage strategies as well
as in other market segments. The new test and the procedure (long positions only) of
this paper can also be applied to other nancial markets.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECT OF LIQUIDITY ON THE PRICE DISCOVERY
PROCESS IN CREDIT DERIVATIVES MARKETS IN TIMES
OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the role of liquidity in the price discovery
process. Specically, we focus on the credit derivatives markets in the context of the
subprime crisis. Liquidity is dened in terms of the relative number of participants in
a given market, i. e. the number of agents operating in one market relative to the
number of participants in another market. Our results suggest that this is the main
factor that determines the leadership of the price discovery process between the two
markets. We present a theoretical model that helps to understand how the process of
price discovery works in the asset swap, bond and CDS markets. Then we present an
empirical application with data from 2005 to 2009 that conrms the theoretical models
insights.
The importance of liquidity in the corporate bond market is not a new topic. Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001), Perraudin and Taylor (2003), Elton et al. (2001), Delianedis and
Geske (2002) and Chen et al. (2007) among others nd that liquidity is an additional
factor to credit risk which is present in credit spreads. Longsta¤ et al. (2005) and Tang
83
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF LIQUIDITY ON THE PRICE DISCOVERY
PROCESS IN CREDIT DERIVATIVES MARKETS
and Yan (2007) also support the presence of a liquidity premium in CDS spreads. Tang
and Yan (2007) nd that both liquidity level and liquidity risk1 are signicant factors
in determining CDS spreads. De Jong and Driessen (2006) show that not only liquidity
in a given market a¤ects credit spreads but there are also liquidity risk and liquidity
spillover e¤ects from the treasury bonds and equity markets, e¤ects.
According to Yan and Zivot (2007) an e¢ cient price discovery process is charac-
terized by the fast adjustment of market prices from the old equilibrium to the new
equilibrium with the arrival of new information. The new equilibrium is achieved by
means of the interactions of buyers and sellers. Thus, the nancial instrument prices
that contributes more and newer information to the price discovery process should be
the one with the highest number of informed market participants. Assuming that in
a given market the higher the overall number of market participants, the higher the
number of informed agents and given that the overall number of market participants is
a measure of market liquidity, we state that liquidity is the common element in price
discovery analyses that determines which market reveals information more e¢ ciently.
The price discovery analysis has been applied to a wide number of nancial instruments
such as stocks, commodities and credit markets among others. Working (1948), Stein
(1961) and Garbade and Silver (1983) (GS henceforth) can be considered among the
pioneers on this topic. GS posit a formal model to analyze the process of price discovery
and show empirically that this process is led by the markets where the number of par-
ticipants is higher, in their case the futures market in comparison with the spot market.
1Acharya and Schaefer (2006) posit that liquidity risk can be dened as unpredictable changes in
transaction costs and in liquidity. These adverse liquidity shocks, systematic or idiosyncratic, are mainly
due to high and negative changes in nancial productsreturns and reduce the amount of capital available
to nancial intermediaries which lowers the ability of their trading desk to provide liquidity.
84
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF LIQUIDITY ON THE PRICE DISCOVERY
PROCESS IN CREDIT DERIVATIVES MARKETS
More recently, a number of analyses that study price discovery on the basis of either
Hasbroucks (1995) or Gonzalo and Grangers (1995) (GG henceforth) methodologies
have appeared. Both methodologies are supported by an empirical test based on a VAR
with an Error Correction Term model. In one of these applications to the commodities
market, Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2008) (FFG henceforth) develop an econome-
tric approach in order to match the theoretical model of GS (1983) and the econometric
methodology of GG based on the permanent-transitory decomposition. They nd that
the prices of futures on non-ferrous metals are information dominantwith respect to
the spot prices in the most liquid futures markets.
The applications of the price discovery methodology to credit derivatives markets
are relatively new, if we compare them with the applications to the futures and spot
markets, due to the recent development of CDS market.2 These applications analyze
the e¢ ciency of both CDS and bond markets in terms of price discovery. Blanco et
al. (2005) and Zhu (2006) use American and European corporate bonds and CDSs and
obtain that the CDS market reects the information more accurately and quickly than
the bond market. The same results are found in Baba and Inada (2007) who repeat
the same analysis for subordinated CDS and subordinated bond spreads of Japanese
mega-banks. In other analyses of price discovery based on emerging markets sovereign
bonds and CDS, Ammer and Cai (2007) nd that bond spreads lead CDS premiums
more often than has been found for investment-grade corporate credits.3 Based on
2The value of CDSs outstanding at the end of 2004, 2005 and 2006 was $8.42, $17.1 and $34.4 trillion,
respectively. The CDS market exploded over the past decade to more than $45 trillion in mid-2007 and
more than $62 trillion in the second half of the same year, according to the ISDA. The size of the
CDS market in mid-2007 is roughly twice the size of the U.S. stock market (which is valued at about
$22 trillion) and far exceeds the $7.1 trillion mortgage market and $4.4 trillion U.S. treasuries market.
However, the notional amount outstanding decreased to $38.6 trillion at the end of 2008.
3The main reason is the existence of a higher cheapest-to-deliver option due to the higher risk of
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iTraxx companies, Dötz (2007) nds that both markets make net contributions to price
discovery, with the CDS market dominating slightly the bond market.4 In general terms,
liquidity and credit risk factors are considered as the main determinants of the role of
leadership in credit markets.
The analysis of price discovery is extended in Norden and Weber (2004), Forte and
Peña (2009) and Coudert and Gex (2008) to the stock market. All of them nd that
the stock market leads the CDS and bond markets while there is a leading role of the
CDS market with respect to the bond market.5
However, a formal theoretical model that analyzes the process of price discovery in
credit derivatives markets is still lacking. We ll this gap presenting a theoretical model
based on the participation of di¤erent market players and match this model with GGs
econometric methodology by means of FFGs econometric approach. Our model is an
extension of GS model allowing for the simultaneous participation of agents in di¤erent
markets. This is our rst contribution.
Moreover, we nd another gap in the price discovery literature in credit markets,
namely, no analysis of the price discovery process between Asset Swap Packages (ASPs)
and CDSs has been carried out up to now.6 Price discovery in credit markets has focused
borrowers and also to liquidity reasons given that the higher the number of bonds issued, which they
use as a liquidity measure, the more di¢ cult is that CDSs leads price discovery.
4According to Dötz (2007), the relatively large contribution of the CDS market to price discovery
is not necessarily tantamount to general and lasting improvement in the processing of information;
the turbulence in the credit markets in spring 2005 was apparently handled much better by the bond
market than by the CDS market. The weaknesses of the CDSs are likely to consist in the relatively high
concentration and homogeneousness of its market players, whose herding behavior, particularly in times
of crisis, can strain liquidity, amplify market volatility and hamper price discovery.
5Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) relate the same three nancial instruments but for emerging market
sovereign issuers. In most countries they do not nd any equilibrium price relationship between equity
and bond markets and in terms of price discovery it is di¢ cult to conclude that one particular market
dominates the price discovery process.
6As far as we know, the relationship between ASP and CDS has only been treated in De Wit (2006).
However, the perspective adopted in De Wit (2006) is based on the long-run equilibrium that should
exist, and which the author nds, between ASP and CDS, ignoring the price discovery process.
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on bond and CDS spreads. We analyze the price discovery process between ASPs and
CDSs in the time period from 2005 to 2009 and nd that the leadership, in terms of price
discovery, between ASPs and CDSs is very sensitive to the appearance of the subprime
crisis. During the period before the crisis, the CDSs appear clearly as the more e¢ cient
market in 87.5% of the cases. During the crisis, ASP spreads reveal more e¢ ciently
credit risk than before up to the point that in 71.88% of the cases ASP spreads lead
CDS spreads in the price discovery process. This is our second contribution.
De Wit (2006), Felsenheimer (2004) and Francis et al. (2003) among others suggest
that ASP spreads should be a more accurate measure of credit risk than bond spreads.
Actually, according to Schonbucher (2003), ASPs are liquid instruments and it is even
easier to trade an ASP than the underlying defaultable bond alone. We give support
to this idea by means of our empirical price discovery analysis for asset swap and bond
spreads up to the point that according to GS (1983) terms, we nd that the bond market
is a pure satelliteof the asset swap market. This nding is our third contribution.
To summarize, our analysis and results are signicant contributions to an important
contemporary issue in the discipline of Financial Institutions and Markets research for
the following reasons. First, we present a simple theoretical model which helps to
understand the process of price discovery in credit derivatives markets in the context
of the recent nancial crisis. Second, our empirical results may be of special interest
for market regulators and investors because they provide a number of insights into
the relative reliability of market-based credit risk measures. Given the fact of the
relatively low liquidity of CDS market in comparison with bonds and ASPs, our results
cast doubts on the representativeness of market prices quoted in the CDS market in
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periods of nancial distress as the current crisis. The key implication of this result is
that inferences on the creditworthiness of a given rm based solely in CDS spreads in
periods of high market turbulence and low liquidity are bound to be misleading. Third,
given that we nd that, in all cases, the ASP spread reects credit risk more e¢ ciently
than the bond spread our results suggest that it is more appropiate to use the ASP
spread as a credit risk indicator instead of the bond spread.
This chapter is divided into four sections, in Section 2 we describe the price discovery
model and the hypotheses to test. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the
price discovery results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Price Discovery Model
First of all, we report a brief denition of the two credit derivatives employed in this
paper. A CDS is a traded insurance contract which provides protection against credit
risk until the occurrence of a credit event or the maturity date of the contract, whichever
is rst, in exchange for periodic premium payments (the CDS premium or CDS spread)
and/or an upfront payment. In the event of default CDSs are settled in one of two
ways: by physical settlement or by cash settlement. A buyer of CDS protection on a
single name makes regular payments of the CDSfull running spread to the protection
seller. The CDS contract that we analyze is unfunded and so investors do not make
an up-front payment (ignoring dealer margins and transaction costs). Thus, the traded
CDS premium or the market CDS spread is an at-market annuity premium rate
_
s such
that the market value of the CDS is zero at origination.
An ASP contains a defaultable coupon bond with coupon
 
c and an interest-rate
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swap (IRS) that swaps the bonds coupon (xed leg) into Euribor plus the asset swap
spread rate sA (oating leg). The asset swaps xed leg represents the buyers periodic
xed rate payments, while its oating leg represents the sellers payment. The asset
swap spread is chosen so that the value of the whole package is the par value of the
defaultable bond and for this reason it is also known as a par to par swap. The Interest
Rate Swap (IRS) included in the asset-swap package has zero cost and so the asset
swaps cost is equal to the price of the defaultable bond included in the package. As the
asset swap spread valuation is obtained using the bonds face value (FV ), an up-front
payment must be added to the bonds price at the investment period t to ensure that
the value of the whole package is FV . The asset swap spread is computed by setting
the present value of all cash ows equal to zero and the up-front payment represents
the net present value of the swap.
The goal of the price discovery model is to analyze the dynamics and interaction
between CDS and ASP spreads in an equilibrium non-arbitrage model.7 The procedure
is based on the behaviour of market participants in the corresponding market place.
We adapt and extend to the credit derivatives markets, the model of price discovery
developed in GS and focus in the case where the arbitrageurs present a nite elasticity
demand/supply of arbitrage services. We modify the model of price discovery developed
in GS by considering ve di¤erent types of market participants instead of three. Each
agent that participates in the market place can be classied into one of the following
groups:
i) The rst group is formed by arbitrageurs. Whenever there exists an adequate
7Although we develop the case of CDS and ASP prices, the model can also be applied to study the
interaction between CDS and bond spreads or between ASP and bond spreads.
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grade of liquidity they try to exploit possible discrepancies among CDS and ASP prices.
Thus, they invest whenever a security is trading above/below the correct price.8
ii) Agents that only take positions in the asset swap market. They can be under-
stood either as long-run investors such as portfolio managers that feel attracted by asset
swap characteristics or as investors that must hold any capital requirement. Examples
of these agents are insurance rms or pension funds that invest in bonds or asset swaps
as a buy and holdstrategy.
iii) Agents that only participate in the CDS market either as protection sellers or
buyers. For instance, the CDO issuer usually enters the CDS market as a protection
seller.9 These participants in the CDS market can also be understood in most cases as
speculators.10 Some examples of these agents are hedge funds that benet from CDSs
leverage e¤ect, contrary to the ASPs or bonds, whose buyers incur in an outlay at the
investment date.
iv) Agents that participate in both nancial markets as market makers. According
to Acharya et al. (2007), most of the nancial institutions that make markets in corpo-
rate bonds are also the liquidity providers in other related segments of the xed-income
markets, specically in credit markets such as CDSs and CLOs or CDOs. This type
of agents can also be considered as nancial intermediaries who manage portfolios for
8A popular arbitrage strategy employed by hedge funds in credit derivatives markets denes the
correct price from a long-term equilibrium price based on the cointegration methodology. The arbi-
trageur is betting only that the spread between the two cointegrated assets will narrow, which can be
understood as a permanent adjustment process towards an economic equilibrium.
9As Dötz (2007) state, the market for synthetic CDO products, which as opposed to cash CDS
products are not backed by bonds or loans but by CDSs, presents some advantages such as the better
availability of CDSs relative to bonds or loans and the heavy demand among investors for unfunded
supersenior tranches.
10We may also nd protection sellers who hedge their positions, again, in the CDS market or individ-
uals that participate in the CDS market in order to hedge their exposures to other institutions that are
not due to debt positions.
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di¤erent customers or simply as investors in credit markets. We consider that these indi-
viduals take a given position in one market or the other, attending to their reservations
prices for the corresponding market.
v) Agents that use the CDS market to hedge their positions in corporate debt.
These agents buy bonds or asset swaps that at the same time are hedged by means
of CDSs.11 They employ CDSs to hedge their bond or ASP positions contrary to the
individuals in group iii) who do not have any underlying bond or ASP.
GS, as well as FFG, consider three types of agents and two markets in such a
way that the only individuals that operate in both markets are the arbitrageurs. We
o¤er a more general model that includes participants that operate in both markets and
hedgers. It means that both markets are not only linked by arbitrageurs as in GS
but by the two additional groups of individuals. This aspect is of special relevance
for understanding price discovery in credit markets given that price setters in the CDS
market are frequently the same as in bonds or asset swap markets and the link is not
only given by the arbitrageurs.
3.2.1 Arbitrageurs demand
The procedure employed by arbitrageurs to exploit potential mispricings between
CDSs and ASPs is based on a cash-and-carry strategy. This strategy is equivalent to the
one employed in Chapter 2 to study the existence of statistical arbitrage opportunities
in CDS and ASP markets. The arbitrageur strategy is constructed from the following
portfolios depending on if asset swap spread is above (below) CDS spread:
11We include this type of agents in order to make the model more comprehensive given that the nature
of CDSs is to provide insurance. In fact, CDSs are usually used to manage the credit risk.
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Portfolio I
 Long (short) position in a CDS with an annual full running premium equal to _s
which is paid (received) quarterly.
Portfolio II
 Long (short) position in an ASP whose cost is equal to the bonds par value. The
investor pays to (receives from) the counterparty the bonds coupon at the coupon
dates in exchange for receiving (paying) every quarter the 3-month Euribor rate
(E3m;t) plus the asset swap spread (sAt ). The quarterly payments dates coincide
with the CDS premium payment dates.12
 Loan (deposit) with a principal equal to the bonds face value at 3-month Euri-
bor.13 Interest payment dates coincide with both CDS premium and asset swap
oating leg payment dates.
Portfolio II is equivalent to a synthetic short (long) position in a CDS and so, there
should be an equivalence relationship between CDS and asset swap spreads. Otherwise,
arbitrage opportunities may appear.14
At origination, the cost of both portfolios is zero, and so the net payo¤ is also
zero. A quarter after origination and every subsequent quarter, in case of no default,
12As CDSs are OTC instruments, it is possible to buy a CDS contract whose maturity coincides
with the bonds maturity and whose premium payments timing is agreed by the parties. As the bonds
maturity date approaches, the use of CDSs with a 5-year constant maturity would lead to overhedging,
given that the maturity dates of CDSs and asset swaps do not coincide. The consequence is that the
investor will pay a CDS spread above the one needed to be fully hedged. Thus, we take advantage of the
range of CDSs maturities to t a CDS curve using a Piecewise Cubic Hermite Interpolating Polynomial
(PCHIP) algorithm that allows us to match asset swap and CDS maturities. This method is also used
in Levin et al. (2005).
13 In order to proceed in this way we assume that the investor can borrow money at Euribor at.
14 If sAt  
_
st > 0, then a protable arbitrage opportunity exists. The investor should take long positions
in both CDS and ASP and borrow the required quantity of money in order to nance the investment
at 3 months Euribor. If sAt  
_
st < 0; the inverse strategy will lead to an arbitrage opportunity.
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a combination of long positions on both the CDS and ASP leads to a net payment
for the investor equal to the di¤erence between ASP and CDS spreads, sAt  
_
st;
15 both
of them converted into quarterly terms using an actual/360day count convention.16
This di¤erence is known as the basis.
However, in case of default, the investors net payment di¤ers from the basis. On
the one hand, the IRS included into the ASP remains alive after default, and it should
be serviced or unwound at market value. On the other hand, the CDS accrued premium
as well as loans accrued interests must be paid. Moreover, not only the underlying bond
but a given number of bonds, even cheaper than the underlying, can be delivered which
gives the holder of a CDS a cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) bond option. Then, the net
payment is di¤erent from the basis.
In order to nd the non-arbitrage equilibrium condition the following assumptions
must be imposed:
A1. No limitations on short sales of the ASP.17
A2. No limitations on borrowing and no restrictions on participating in the ASPs
and CDSs market (market segmentation does not a¤ect the arbitrageur).
A3. No tax e¤ects.
A4. No additional costs except the ones required to fund an ASP position.
Arbitrageurs can be identied as hedge fund investors whose demand takes place
after identifying securities that are trading above/below the correct price. Among the
15A combination of short positions on both the CDS and ASP leads to a net payment for the investor
equal to the di¤erence between CDS and ASP spreads,
_
st   sAt :
16The net payo¤ is also zero at coupon payment dates while at bonds maturity, as in every quarterly
payment, the net payo¤ is equal to the basis.
17Assumption A1 is necessary to reach a two-sided bound on the CDS rate and to guarantee that the
equivalence relationship holds.
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strategies employed to exploit arbitrage opportunities in xed-income markets hedge
funds employ merger arbitrage, xed-income arbitrage, capital structure arbitrage,
volatility arbitrage or what is known, from our point of view erroneously, as statis-
tical arbitrage that is based on the cointegration methodology proposed by Engle and
Granger (1987).18 Of the above strategies the one employed to exploit transitory mis-
pricings in CDS and ASP spreads is the one based on the cointegration methodology.
The idea is that, given two cointegrated assets, an investor can prot by buying one
cointegrated asset and selling the other in case of transitory mispricings. The investor
is betting that the spread between the two cointegrated assets will narrow given the
cointegrations adjustment process towards an economic equilibrium. Thus, if the ASP
spread is too high relative to the long term equilibrium, arbitrageurs will take long posi-
tions both in CDSs and ASPs. This long-term no-arbitrage equilibrium condition is also
known as the equivalence or parity relationship between ASP and CDS spreads. Thus,
we dene the arbitrageurs demand on the basis of the following long-run equivalence
relationship:
sAt = 2
_
st + 3 (3.1)
According to Blanco, Brennan and Marschs (2005) terminology, 2 includes nontran-
sient factors besides credit risk.19 The parameter 3 includes factors or imperfections
that generate a constant di¤erence between both spreads such as institutional factors
18An example of a statistical arbitrage analysis in credit derivatives markets according to the technique
and concept introduced Hogan et al. (2004) can be found in Chapter 2.
19Cossin and Lu (2005) state that the liquidity premium, the CTD option and the market segmentation
explain the pricing di¤erences between bonds and CDS. The e¤ect of the CTD option is more important
as default risk increases.
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causing di¤erences in funding or transaction costs, or other costs in general.
The demand of arbitrageurs will depend on the grade to which the equivalence
relationship holds and on their elasticity of demand which is denoted as H:
H(2
_
st + 3   sAt ); H > 0 (3.2)
We assume that there exist an unspecied number of arbitrageurs and 2 is allowed to be
di¤erent from 1.2021 The possibility of a default means that the cash-and-carry strategy,
which is based on long positions in the CDS and short positions in the synthetic CDS
or vice versa, is not completely riskless. In case of default, the investors net payment
di¤ers from the basis and the arbitrageur could even incur in losses which means that
the strategy is not exempt of risk. Another argument that reinforces the idea that the
strategy is not riskless is that the CDS and the synthetic CDS are not exactly the
same asset and thus their prices can change in a di¤erent way at a given time period.
Moreover, although we assume that there are no restrictions on corporate bond and
ASP short sales, these may appear in real world.22 These restrictions make it di¢ cult
to exploit arbitrage opportunities whenever short sales are needed and this fact limits the
20 In their analysis of price discovery in commodity markets, FFG introduce for the rst time a price
discovery analysis based on a VAR with Error Correction Term that allows a cointegrating vector
(1; 2) di¤erent from (1; 1).
21 If the two markets price credit risk equally in the long run, then their prices should be cointegrated
with cointegrating vector [1; 1; c], suggesting a stationary basis.
22Shorting a corporate bond or an ASP with a required maturity, even years, is not an easy task. The
short sale of bonds or ASPs could be done via a repurchase agreement (repo) but as Blanco et al. (2005)
explain, it is impossible to borrow a bond via a repo. The reason is that repo market for corporate bonds
is illiquid and even if it is possible to short a bond via a repo, the tenor of the agreement would be short.
Schonbucher (2003) states that this limitation could be solved by issuing credit-linked notes linked to
the corresponding bond and selling them to the investors in the asset swap market. This alternative
presents other limitations given that the issuance of credit-linked notes takes time and implies high
xed cost. This fact implies that deviations in the equivalence relationship might not imply arbitrage
opportunities whenever an asset swap short sale is needed. Thus, in some cases traders are not able to
exploit price di¤erentials when the CDS premium is higher than the asset swap spread and as Blanco et
al. (2005) suggest, this asymmetry may a¤ect signicantly the dynamic adjustment of credit spreads.
The restrictions on short-sales could be even more severe in periods of nancial distress.
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arbitrageurs demand. Moreover, there could be constraints in the short-run availability
of arbitrage capital or restrictions to market participation. For this reason it seems more
realistic to assume that H is nite. GS also consider as more realistic a nite value for
H in the commodities markets.
3.2.2 Demand schedule of market participants
The behaviour of the other agents in the market place is dened according to their
demand schedules. Thus, the demand schedule for the jth participant who deals only
in ASP market is:
Ej;t  AASP (RASPj;t   sAt ); AASP > 0; j = 1; :::NASP (3.3)
where according to GS notation we dene Ej;t as the ASP endowment of the jth parti-
cipant immediately prior to period t; NASP is the number of participants who deal only
in the asset swap market. Let RASPj;t be the reservation price at which participant j
th
is willing to hold the endowments of ASPs Ej;t while AASP represents the elasticity of
demand which is assumed to be the same for the NASP participants. AASP (RASPj;t  sAt )
represents the variation in the endowments prior to period t, Ej;t: An increase in the
asset swap spread means an increase in the ASP buyersreturns as these are given by
the sum of the oating rate and the asset swap spread. It leads to an increase in the
ASP endowments prior to period t+1; Ej;t+1; whenever RASPj;t < s
A
t : It is the reservation
price with respect to the ASP spread what denes an investor as ASP seller or buyer.
The demand schedule for the participants who deal only in the CDS market is:
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Ei;t  ACDS(
_
st  RCDSi;t ); ACDS > 0; i = 1; :::NCDS (3.4)
where Ei;t is the CDS endowment of the ith participant immediately prior to period
t; NCDS is the number of participants who deal only in the CDS market, RCDSi;t is the
reservation price at which participant ith is willing to hold the endowments of CDSs
Ej;t while ACDS represents the elasticity of demand which is the same for the NCDS
participants. The individuals that operate only in the CDS market are buyers or sellers
depending on their reservation prices. These individuals can be considered as speculators
that bet about the probability of default. The individuals with
_
st > R
CDS
i;t will be net
suppliers of CDSs or protection sellers as they benet from the periodic payments that
receive and implicitly nd that at that price they are willing to bet about the non-
default.23 As
_
st > R
CDS
i;t ; the CDS endowments of these individuals decrease with
respect to those immediately prior to period t. This supply of CDSs could be absorbed
for instance by an individual ith2 for whom that price of risk is such that
_
st < R
CDS
i2;t
or by the debt hedgers or by the other individuals that participate in both markets at
the same time. The individuals with
_
st < R
CDS
i2;t
are net demanders of CDSs or net
demanders of protection who bet about the underlying company default.
The demand schedule of individuals that participate in both nancial markets as
market makers is dened from the reservation price in the corresponding market such
that the endowments of ASPs are not conditioned by the endowments of CDSs. The
ASPs and CDSsdemand schedule of these agents is:
23These individual interpret that RCDSi;t is the CDS price given its probability of default. As the
market price
_
st is above the reservation price, the investor is interested in selling protection in exchange
of
_
st:
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EB;ASPk;t  AB;ASP (RB;ASPk;t   sAt ); AB;ASP > 0; k = 1; :::NBOTH (3.5)
EB;CDSk;t  AB;CDS(
_
st  RB;CDSk;t ); AB;CDS > 0; k = 1; :::NBOTH (3.6)
where the notation in equations (3.5) and (3.6) is equivalent to the one employed in
equations (3.3) and (3.4).
The demand schedule of hedgers is conditioned by their positions in ASPs. We
assume that the positions in ASPs of these agents are completely hedged. Thus, the
endowments and demand of CDSs are independent of the CDSs premium and they are
equal to the endowments and demand of ASPs. The endowments of ASPs increase as
the ASP spread increases:
EH;ASPh;t  AH;ASP (RH;ASPh;t   sAt ); AH;ASP > 0; h = 1; :::NH (3.7)
Notation for equation (3.7) is equivalent to the one in equations (3.3) and (3.5) and it
represents the debt hedgers demand schedule for both ASPs and CDSs.
3.2.3 Clearing market conditions
Using all the above demand schedules for the ve types of individuals, we set the
clearing market conditions for both markets.24
The ASP market will clear at the value of sAt that solves the supply/demand equa-
tion:
24Note that the total endowments can increase exogenously from period t to period t+1, for instance,
by means of CDS or bond issuances.
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NASPX
j=1
Ej;t +
NBOTHX
k=1
EB;ASPk;t +
NHX
k=1
EH;ASPh;t =
=
NASPX
j=1

Ej;t  AASP (RASPj;t   sAt )

+
NBOTHX
k=1
h
EB;ASPk;t  AB;ASP (RB;ASPk;t   sAt )
i
+
+
NHX
h=1
h
EH;ASPh;t  AH;ASP (RH;ASPh;t   sAt )
i
 H(2
_
st + 3   sAt ) (3.8)
The CDS market will clear at the value of
_
st that solves the supply/demand equa-
tion:
NCDSX
i=1
Ei;t +
NBOTHX
k=1
EB;CDSk;t +
NHX
h=1
EH;ASPh;t =
=
NCDSX
i=1

Ei;t  ACDS(
_
st  RCDSi;t )

+
NBOTHX
k=1
h
EB;CDSk;t  AB;CDS(
_
st  RB;CDSk;t )
i
+
+
NHX
h=1
h
EH;ASPh;t  AH;ASP (RH;ASPh;t   sAt )
i
 H(2
_
st + 3   sAt ) (3.9)
We solve the previous equations in order to nd the CDS and ASP prices that clear
both markets. For this purpose and as in GS, we assume that the mean reservation price
for the NCDS individuals in the CDS market is RCDSt = N
 1
CDS
NCDSP
i=1
RCDSi;t and for the
NASP individuals in the ASP market it is given by RASPt = N
 1
ASP
NASPP
j=1
RASPj;t : For the
individuals that are present in both markets we have that the mean reservation prices
are RB;CDSt = N
 1
BOTH
NBOTHP
k=1
RB;CDSk;t and R
B;ASP
t = N
 1
BOTH
NBOTHP
k=1
RB;ASPk;t as well as
for the hedgers the reservation price is dened as RH;ASPt = N
 1
H
NHP
h=1
RH;ASPh;t . As in GS
we assume that the elasticities are the same for all market participants in ASP and CDS
markets (AASP = AB;ASP = ACDS = AB;CDS = AH;ASP ):25 Solving equations (3.8)
25The idea is that under the assumptions employed when dening the arbitrageurs demand, the fact
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and (3.9) for sAt and
_
st as a function of the mean reservation prices, we obtain:26
sAt =
C +H2F +A(NCDS +NBOTH)(NHR
H;ASP
t +NBOTHR
B;ASP
t +NASPR
ASP
t )
B
(3.10)
_
st =
 D +HF +A(NCDS(NH +NBOTH +NASP )RCDSt +
B
+NH
h
NBOTH( RH;ASPt +RB;ASPt +RB;CDSt )+
B
+NASP ( RH;ASPt +RASPt )
i
+NBOTH(NBOTH +NASP )R
B;CDS
t
o
B
(3.11)
where the grouped elements that appear in equations (3.10) and (3.11) are dened as:
B = A(NCDS +NBOTH)(NH +NBOTH +NASP ) + (3.12.a)
+H(NCDS +NBOTH + 2NBOTH + 2NASP )
C = H3(NCDS +NBOTH) (3.12.b)
D = H3(NASP +NBOTH) (3.12.c)
F = NCDSR
CDS
t +NBOTH(R
B;ASP
t +R
B;CDS
t ) +NASPR
ASP
t (3.12.d)
In order to derive the dynamic price relationship, the model in equations (3.10)
and (3.11) must be characterized with a description of the evolution of the reservation
prices. Immediately after the market clearing in period t 1, a given market participant
that the ASP spread is a good indicator, although not perfect, of the CDS spread and given that both
spreads are prices of the credit risk of a given rm, it seems reasonable to assume that the elasticities
are similar.
26The objective of this paper is not related with the literature of credit risk pricing and so, equations
(3.10) and (3.11) are not pricing equations of credit risk, such as the ones dened from the probability
of default and recovery rates, but simply the ASP and CDS prices that clear both markets.
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in CDSs is willing to hold an amount Ei;t or E
B;CDS
k;t ; depending on the investors type,
at price
_
st 1: A given participant in the ASP market is willing to hold an amount Ej;t,
EB;ASPk;t or E
H;ASP
h;t ; depending on the investors type, at price s
A
t 1. It implies that the
corresponding reservation prices after that clearing are
_
st 1 and sAt 1 for participants
in CDS and ASP markets respectively. Thus, the reservation prices behave according
to the following process:
RCDSi;t =
_
st 1 + vt + wCDSi;t , i = 1; :::NCDS (3.13.a)
RASPj;t = s
A
t 1 + vt + w
ASP
j;t ; j = 1; :::NASP (3.13.b)
RB;CDSk;t =
_
st 1 + vt + w
B;CDS
k;t ; k = 1; :::NBOTH (3.13.c)
RB;ASPk;t = s
A
t 1 + vt + w
B;ASP
k;t ; k = 1; :::NBOTH (3.13.d)
RH;ASPh;t = s
A
t 1 + vt + w
H;ASP
h;t ; h = 1; :::NH (3.13.e)
such that:
cov(vt; wl;t) = 0; 8l (3.13.f)
cov(we;t; wl;t) = 0; 8l 6= e: (3.13.g)
where vt is a white noise with nite variance that is a common component for all
participants and wi;t; wj;t; wk;t and wh;t are also white noises with nite variance that
represent the idiosyncratic component for participants i; j, k and h; respectively.
As GS state, the price change for the above individuals, for instance RCDSi;t  
_
st 1
for the individuals that operate only in the CDS market, reects the arrival of new
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information between period t  1 and period t which changes the price at which the ith
participant is willing to hold the quantity Ei;t of the CDS. The price changes have a
component common to all participants (vt) and a component idiosyncratic to the ith
participant (wi;t): Thus, the mean reservation price can be also expressed as:
RCDSt =
_
st 1 + vt + wCDSt (3.14.a)
RASPt = s
A
t 1 + vt + w
ASP
t (3.14.b)
RB;CDSt =
_
st 1 + vt + w
B;CDS
t (3.14.c)
RB;ASPt = s
A
t 1 + vt + w
B;ASP
t (3.14.d)
RH;ASPt = s
A
t 1 + vt + w
H;ASP
t (3.14.e)
where wCDSt =
NCDSP
i=1
wCDSi;t
NCDS
; wASPt =
NASPP
j=1
wASPj;t
NASP
; wB;CDSt =
NBOTHP
k=1
wB;CDSk;t
NBOTH
, wB;ASPt =
NBOTHP
k=1
wB;ASPk;t
NBOTH
and wH;ASPt =
NHP
h=1
wH;ASPh;t
NH
: We substitute the expressions (3.14) into the
equations (3.10) and (3.11) and obtain the following equation (see Appendix A.1):
0BB@ sAt

_
st
1CCA = HB
2664  (NBOTH +NCDS)
(NBOTH +NASP )
3775 (1; 2; 3)
0BBBBBB@
sAt 1
_
st 1
1
1CCCCCCA+
0BB@ uASPt
uCDSt
1CCA
(3.15)
where ut =

uASPt u
CDS
t

is a vector white noise with E(ut) = 0 and V ar(ut) =

 > 0: In ut we include both the common components and the participantsnoises.27
27We do not report the whole expression of ut in order to save space and also, because of the assump-
tions on residuals they are not going to appear in our analysis.
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The model in equation (3.15) can be changed into a VECM model by subtracting vector
of prices (sAt ;
_
st)
0 from both sides:
Although GS provide the rst step for understanding price discovery, current analy-
ses are based on either Hasbroucks (1995) or Gonzalo and Grangers (1995) metho-
dologies. Contrary to GS, the last two approaches are based on a VAR with an Error
Correction Term model. As in FFG, we pretend to match GS and GG methodology
from the use of a VECM specication. Equation (3.15) can be extended, with lags of
vector
 
sAt ;
_
st
0
; and represented according to a VECM specication:
Xt = 
0Xt 1 +
p

i=1
 iXt i + ut (3.16)
where Xt = (sAt ;
_
st)
0 and ut is a white noise vector. According to expression (3.15),
0 =
  HB (NBOTH +NCDS); HB (NBOTH +NASP ) and 0 = (1; 2):
In this paper we adopt GGs methodology and thus, their permanent-transitory
(PT) component decomposition to measure market contribution to price discovery (see
Appendix A.2). We nd that the percentages of price discovery of ASP and CDS
markets can be dened from the GG price discovery metrics that we denote as GG1 and
GG2, respectively:
GG1 =
2
 1 + 2 and GG2 =
 1
 1 + 2 (3.17)
Or equivalently:
GG1 =
NBOTH +NASP
2NBOTH +NASP +NCDS
and GG2 =
NBOTH +NCDS
2NBOTH +NASP +NCDS
(3.18)
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Note that the number of hedgers are not relevant to dene the price discovery
metrics and as a consequence in the price discovery process.28 Note also that although
the theoretical models liquidity variable is dened as the number of market participants
in a given market relative to other market, this metric can be easily related with other
commonly employed liquidity measures like the number of contracts or the volume in a
given market relative to the other.
3.2.4 Hypothesis
According to the price discovery metric in equation (3.18), the interaction between
both markets due to the market players that operate jointly in CDS and ASP markets
is of crucial importance. The subprime crisis has a¤ected liquidity in credit derivatives
markets and as a consequence the ve types of market players. The subprime crisis
leads to a decrease in CDS liquidity. The high counterparty risk in the CDS market
jointly with, as Dötz (2007) suggests, the relatively high concentration and the homoge-
neousness of its often leveraged market players has a¤ected the CDS market severely.29
According to the International Financial Services London (IFSL) Research (2009a), cen-
tralized clearing and voluntary termination of contacts has contributed to a 39% drop
in notional amounts outstanding of CDS from $62 trillion at end-2007 to $38 trillion
at end-2008, according to the ISDA (see Panel A of Figure 1).30 However, as the IFSL
28Although hedgers are not important in the price discovery process, they must be included in the
model because these individuals really participate in credit markets and we need them in order to make
the model more comprehensive.
29This concentration seems to be common in the OTC derivatives markets and is increasing through
time. According to the IFSL Research (2009a), the OTC derivatives markets in UK became even more
concentrated between 2004 and 2007, with the share of the largest 10 institutions rising from 79% to
81%. In 1995 the share of the top ten had been 52%. In the US, the share of the largest 10 institutions
was over 90% of turnover. Moreover, according to the BIS, the market share of major players seems to
be even larger in Europe than it is for the total global market.
30This decline in trading during the second half of 2008 reects a combination of signicantly reduced
risk appetite, expectations of stable low interest rates in major markets and lower hedge fund activity.
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Research (2009b) states, the fall in liquidity during the subprime crisis has increased
the importance of bond markets as a source of nance for companies and governments.
The issuance of corporate bonds increased to record levels towards the end of 2008 and
the rst quarter of 2009, particularly in Europe.31 With respect to the bond trading ac-
tivity, IFSL Research (2009b) reports that the trading of bonds on exchanges increased
by a quarter in 2008 to over 19$ trillion (see Panel A of Figure 1).
Exchange rate movements may also have a¤ected to this decline. Most institutions report their positions
in US dollars and the euro and the pound sterling depreciated by 30% and 12%, respectively, against
the US dollar between June and December 2008.
31During the rst quarter of 2009, issuance of investment grade corporate bonds in Europe totalled
a record e140bn, well above quarterly levels of less than e50bn seen in recent years. It is motivated,
among other reasons, by the use of bond markets for funding and the government guarantees to aid to
the bond issuance. IFSL Research (2009b) reports that the amounts outstanding on the global bond
market, which includes bonds, notes and money market instruments, increased 6% in 2008 to $83 trillion.
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This figure reports the CDS notional amount outstanding and the bond trading in exchanges. Panel A shows the
CDS amount outstanding and the bond trading in USD trillion. Both amounts have a semi-annual frequency. The
first observation for both series corresponds to the first half of year 2005 while the last observation corresponds
to the first half of year 2009. The CDS notional amount outstanding is labeled in the left axis while the bond trading
on exchanges is labeled in the right axis. Panel B reports the ratio of the bond trading in exchanges and the CDS
notional amount outstanding. The ratio has a semi-annual frequency. The first observation corresponds to the
first half of year 2005 while the last observation corresponds to the first half of year 2009.
Figure 1: Credit Default Swap Notional Amount Outstanding and Bond
Trading on Exchanges
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Our rst aim is to analyze whether in periods when liquidity is especially low,
CDSs maintain their role as the main determinant in the price discovery process. To
test this statement we analyze price discovery for two subperiods which correspond to
the periods before and after the subprime crisis such that the break point is set at July
2007. Given previous published evidence,32 we expect that before the crisis, CDSs lead
the price discovery process or at least, if the role of participants in both markets is highly
inuential (NBOTH is high), the price discovery measure of equation (3.18) should be
close to 0.5.33 According to our model, the leadership of CDSsmarket can be explained
by its higher liquidity (number of participants). The buy-and-hold strategy employed
by the ASP or bond investors contrary to the active behaviour of CDS investors, in part
due to the leverage associated with a CDSs purchase, could lead to a higher market
activity in the CDS market than in the bond market before the subprime crisis.
Hypothesis 1: Under scenarios with high liquidity, the CDS market should lead
the ASP market in the price discovery process.
The reason is that the number of participants in the CDS market is high relative
to the number of players in the ASP market (NCDS > NASP ). In addition to the
previous hypothesis, when the number of individuals who operate in both markets is
high (NBOTH is high), the CDS market should reveal information as e¢ ciently as the
ASP market.
According to Acharya and Schaefer (2006) and Acharya et al. (2007), in periods
with low liquidity one should expect that market makers, who at the same time are price
32See for instance Norden and Weber (2004), Blanco et al. (2005), Zhu (2006), Baba and Inada
(2007), Dötz (2007), Forte and Peña (2009) and Coudert and Gex (2008).
33 In a limit case, if NBOTH tends to innity, the price discovery is equal to 0:5.
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setters in both credit markets, are nancially constrained and thus their participation
in both markets will decrease. In terms of our model notation is equivalent to say that
NBOTH  ! 0 and the new percentages of price discovery would change into a measure
similar to the one introduced in GS and employed by FFG:
NASP
NASP +NCDS
and
NCDS
NASP +NCDS
(3.19)
According to the IFSL Research (2009a and 2009b) reports, the attraction of bonds,
and implicitly ASPs, as an investment has increased since the start of the credit crisis
and large institutional, as well as retail, investors increased their holdings due to the
losses on equity markets and due to the bonds and ASPs high returns as yields during
2008.34 On the other hand, there is a drop in both the notional amounts outstanding
and the number of participants in the CDS market.35 Thus, if the crisis has a¤ected
activity in the CDS more severely than in the ASP market, we expect the ASPs to
reveal information faster and more adequately than before the crisis, up to the point
that ASPs could lead the process of price discovery in some cases.36
Hypothesis 2: Under scenarios with low liquidity leading to a generalized reduc-
tion in market participation in credit derivatives markets, the relative position of the
ASP market as information provider improves with respect to the one observed under
34Allocation to bonds from high-net-worth individuals increased form 27% to 29% during 2008 with
equities seeing the largest decline in their share of portfolio allocation.
35The nominal of CDSs with respect to ASP contracts serves to show how in periods of nancial
distress it is much more di¢ cult to participate in CDS than in ASP markets. The standard bonds
faced value is e1,000 while the CDS typical notional amount is e10-20 million for investment grade
credits and e2-5 million for high yield credits.
36Ammer and Cai (2007) state that the main reason to support that bond spreads lead CDS premiums
is the existence of a higher cheapest-to-deliver option and for liquidity reasons. In particular they employ
as a liquidity measure the number of bonds outstanding by a given rm and nd that the higher the
number of bonds the less likely it is that CDSs will lead price discovery. Under illiquid scenarios, the
CTD option embedded in CDS becomes more valuable and the liquidity premium to bear liquidity risk
increases.
108
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF LIQUIDITY ON THE PRICE DISCOVERY
PROCESS IN CREDIT DERIVATIVES MARKETS
high liquid scenarios.
Finally, we analyze the process of price discovery between ASP and bond spreads.
Hypothesis 3: The ASP market always (before and after the subprime crisis)
leads the price discovery process with respect to the bond market.
3.3 Data
Our database contains daily data on Eurobonds and ASPs denominated in Euros
and issued by non-nancial companies that are collected from Reuters and on CDSs
also denominated in Euros and issued by the same non-nancial companies that are
obtained from GFI.
GFI is a major inter-dealer broker (IDB) specializing in the trading of credit deri-
vatives. GFI data contain single-name CDSs market prices for 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 years
maturities. These prices correspond to actual trades, or rm bids and o¤ers where
capital is actually committed and so they are not consensus or indications. Thus, these
prices are an accurate indication of where the CDS markets traded and closed for a
given day. For some companies and for some maturities, especially two and four years,
the data availability is scarce and in these cases we employ mid-price quotes from a
credit curve also reported by GFI to ll the missing data.37 GFI data have also been
used by Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Predescu (2006), Saita (2006), Nashikkar
37The GFI FENICS R Credit curves are calculated each hour for over 1900 reference entities. The
calculation of the curves gives preference to real trades and quoted mid points where available, and
in their absence will calculate a running point level using the John Hull and Alan White methodology
to ensure a credit curve always exists for each reference entity. This curve is a good approximation
for CDSs at any maturity as several error analyses reveal. The median of the absolute di¤erence in
basis points between ve years CDS premiums as dened from credit curve and the actual quotes or
transaction prices for the period between April 2001 and May 2002, is equal to 1.16, 2.01 and 3.82 basis
points for AAA/AA, A and BBB ratings for a total of 2,659, 9,585 and 8,170 companies respectively.
Moreover, market CDS spread could be di¤erent from what we are assuming to be the true CDS spread
by as much as 3.725 bps. on average.
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and Subrahmanyam (2007), Fulop and Lescourret (2007) or Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam
and Mahanti (2009) among others.
For each bond there is information on both bid and ask prices, the swap spread, the
asset swap spread, the sector of the entity and its geographical location, the currency,
the seniority, the rating history (Fitch, S&P and Moodys ratings), the issuance date and
the amount issued, the coupon and coupon dates and the maturity. We use bonds whose
maturity at the investment dates is lower than ve years. Several bonds issued by the
same company may be used whenever they satisfy all the required criteria. The reason is
that although CDS spread quotes refer to the issuer and not to an individual bond, asset
swap spreads are quoted for individual bonds. Due to liquidity considerations, bonds
with time to maturity equal to or less than twelve months in the date corresponding
to their last observation are excluded. Moreover, our sample contains xed-rate senior
unsecured Euro denominated bonds whose issued quantity exceeds 300 million Euros.38
Other requirements imposed on bonds to be included in the sample are: i) straight bonds
, ii) neither callable nor convertible, iii) with rating history available, iv) with constant
coupons and with a xed frequency, v) without a sinking fund, vi) without options, vii)
without an odd frequency of coupon payments, viii) no government bonds and ix) no
ination-indexed bonds. We cross-check the data on bonds with the equivalent data
obtained from Datastream. Due to liquidity restrictions, investments are restricted to
periods where there are 5-year CDS data on either actual trades or bids and o¤ers where
capital is committed.
The data spans from November 1st, 2005 to June 29th, 2009. However, we split
38This limit is set in order to avoid the selection of bonds with a small volume which could require
higher transaction costs due to their reduced liquidity.
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the data into two subperiods to take into account the possible e¤ects of the ongoing
nancial crisis. We estimate the breakpoints for each series of CDSs by means of the
algorithm described in Bai and Perron (2003) for simultaneous estimation of multiple
breakpoints. The ideas behind this implementation are described in Zeileis et al. (2003).
The breakpoint is, on average, the 17th July 2007. For this reason, the rst subperiod
covers the period from November 1st, 2005 to July 16th, 2007 while the second one
spans from July 17th, 2007 to June 29th, 2009.39 The nal sample consists of 38 non-
nancial companies and 50 ASPs and bonds.40 Table 1 presents information about all
issuers, asset swaps, bonds and CDSs for the full sample. According to Panel B we
observe a great deal of variation both in the amount issued and in the sample size. The
last column shows how far bonds are from par. Panel C1 and Panel C2 include the
CDS spread, the asset swap spread, the bond spread and the bases descriptive statistics
before and during crisis, respectively.
39The rst subperiod does not show any episode of signicant market turbulence. This subperiod
starts after the episode of GM and Ford downgrades to junk categorywhich reduced market liquidity
and ends with the beginning of the subprime crisis. The subprime crisis implies an illiquid regime for
ASP, bond and CDS markets.
40Our initial sample was 285 corporate bond issuers. We found a total of 116 Euro denominated
bonds that mature before February 2012 but only 67 of them include information on 5-year bid/ask
CDS spreads, asset swap spreads and Fenics Curve for at least 90 trading days. Of these, two bonds have
been discarded because the issued amount does not exceed 150 millions of Euros, another four bonds
were discarded because they were not investment grade bonds throughout the whole sample period.
Another four bonds were discarded because their asset swap spreads were persistently negative and,
nally, seven bonds were discarded because prices were too far from par.
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This table reports several descriptive statistics and includes different panels.
the rating at the end of the first subperiod, which spans from November 2005 to
July 2007, and at the end of the second subperiod, which covers the subprime
crisis and spans from July 2007 to June 2009. Panel B provides descriptive
obtained as the difference between the ASP and the CDS spreads and as the
difference between the bond and the CDS spreads, before the crisis (Panel C1)
and during the crisis (Panel C2).
Issuer Rating Sector
Akzo Nobel A- / BBB+ Chemicals
BMW A+ / A Automobile
Bouygues BBB+ / BBB+ Construction
British AM Tob. BBB+ / BBB+ Beverages & Tobacco
Carrefour A / A Food & Drug Retailers
Casino G. P. BBB- / BBB- Food & Drug Retailers
Compass Group BBB+ / BBB+ Support Services
Edison BBB+ / BBB+ Public Utilities
Enel A- / A- Public Utilities
Energias de Portugal A- / A- Electricity
E.ON A / A+ Utilities
France Telecom A- / A- Fixed-Line Telecommunication Svs.
Iberdrola A / A- Petrol and Power
Kingfisher BBB- / BBB- General Retailers
Koninklijke KPN BBB+ / BBB+ Telecommunication Services
Louis Vuitton BBB+ / BBB+ Other Textiles and Leather Goods
PPR BBB- / BBB- Retailers - Multi Department
Renault BBB+ / BBB+ Automobiles
Repsol YPF BBB+ / BBB+ Petrol and Power
Reuters BBB+ / A- Publishing
Saint Gobain A- / BBB+ Building and Construction Materials
Scania A- / A- Machinery and Engineering
Siemens AA- / A+ Industrial
Sodexho BBB+ / BBB+ Business Support Services
Stora Enso BBB- / BBB- Forest Product & Paper
Technip BBB / BBB Oil - Services
Telecom Italia BBB+ / BBB Public Utilities
Telefonica BBB+ / A- Technology and Telecommunications
Telekom Austria BBB+ / BBB+ Machinery, Transport and Technology
Tesco A / A- Food & Drug Retailers
Thales A- / A- Defence
Thyssenkrupp BBB+ / BBB- Industrial
Union Fenosa A- / A- Petrol and Power
Vinci BBB+ / BBB+ Other Construction
Vivendi BBB / BBB Subscription Entertainment Networks
Vodafone A- / A- Wireless Telecomunications Svs.
Volkswagen A- / BBB+ Automobile
Volvo A- / BBB+ Machinery & Engineering
Panel A
the ASP spread; the bond spread; the CDS spread; and the bases, which are
Table I: Descriptive Statistics
statistics for bonds. Panel C includes descriptive statistics (in basis points) for
Panel A describes the rating and sector of the CDS and bond issuer. We report
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Amount issued
(millions of euros) Obs. Avg Price Obs. Avg Price
Akzo I 750 4.250 264 99.99 411 99.20
Akzo II 1,000 5.625 386 103.76 287 101.13
BMW 750 3.875 329 98.80 403 97.98
Bouygues I 750 4.625 346 101.33 275 99.71
Bouyges II 1,000 5.875 384 104.48 289 101.30
British AM Tob. I 1,700 4.875 406 101.88 285 100.08
British AM Tob. II 1,000 4.375 280 99.69 315 98.98
Carrefour I 1,100 4.375 278 100.28 334 100.21
Carrefour II 1,000 6.125 392 107.07 334 103.44
Casino G. P. I 400 4.750 249 100.14 316 98.24
Casino G. P. II 500 5.250 385 102.38 318 100.57
Compass Group 300 6.000 398 104.35 273 101.46
Edison Spa 700 5.125 377 103.43 347 101.29
Enel 750 4.125 298 99.60 221 100.29
Energia de Portugal I 1,000 6.400 391 106.75 273 102.22
Energia de Portugal II 747 5.875 337 106.47 266 103.40
E.ON 4,250 5.750 392 104.51 263 101.33
France Telecom 2,500 7.000 383 108.44 289 103.79
Iberdrola I 750 4.375 382 100.82 306 100.00
Iberdrola II 600 4.500 377 101.21 287 99.91
Kingfisher 500 4.500 383 100.14 161 95.17
Koninklijke KPN 1,425 4.500 253 99.27 402 98.66
Louis Vuitton I 600 4.625 261 101.01 373 100.31
Louis Vuitton II 750 5.000 419 102.93 376 100.99
PPR 800 5.250 328 102.64 354 98.66
Renault 1,000 6.125 322 104.53 290 101.66
Repsol YPF 1,175 6.000 388 105.83 371 101.99
Reuters 500 4.625 396 101.59 286 99.66
Saint Gobain I 1,000 4.750 378 101.65 290 99.88
Saint Gobain II 1,100 4.250 289 99.25 399 97.22
Saint Gobain III 1,000 5.000 376 102.52 399 100.27
Scania 600 3.625 361 97.49 290 96.30
Siemens 2,000 5.750 267 106.11 243 103.96
Sodexho 1,000 5.875 378 104.18 285 101.07
Stora Enso 500 3.250 384 96.34 290 94.64
Technip 650 4.625 291 100.78 209 98.91
Telecom Italia I 750 4.500 386 100.20 314 98.33
Telecom Italia II 2,000 7.250 320 110.62 314 104.40
Telefonica 2,250 3.750 375 97.55 287 97.85
Telekom Austria 500 3.375 389 97.51 270 98.33
Tesco I 750 4.750 400 102.26 291 100.95
Tesco II 500 3.875 339 98.70 301 98.69
Thales 500 4.375 251 100.23 313 99.95
Thyssenkrupp 750 5.000 335 101.97 370 100.51
Union Fenosa 500 5.000 395 103.04 303 100.92
Vinci 1,025 5.875 375 104.60 285 101.36
Vivendi 630 3.625 398 97.73 256 96.81
Vodafone 1,900 5.125 374 100.52 273 99.41
Volkswagen 1,000 4.125 290 99.07 405 97.97
Volvo 300 5.375 395 103.83 342 99.86
Average 990.04 4.94 350.60 101.99 308.68 99.98
Panel B
Issuer Coupon (%) Nov. 2005 - July 2007 July 2007 - June 2009
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Panel C1
Basis ASS - CDS Basis BS - CDS
Issuer Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean Mean
Akzo I 22.99 2.68 16.27 8.36 17.82 8.62 -6.72 -5.17
Akzo II 13.46 3.91 15.31 5.63 16.54 5.28 1.84 3.08
BMW 11.80 4.68 10.57 3.51 12.10 3.63 -1.24 0.30
Bouygues I 20.09 5.67 24.52 6.89 26.00 6.85 4.42 5.90
Bouygues II 18.94 6.02 14.97 5.08 16.03 4.83 -3.96 -2.91
British AM Tob. I 23.77 13.22 19.68 8.84 21.41 8.53 -4.09 -2.36
British AM Tob. II 23.75 6.73 32.26 8.42 34.27 8.57 8.51 10.52
Carrefour I 15.63 4.29 18.72 5.40 20.30 5.45 3.09 4.68
Carrefour II 12.51 3.30 7.48 4.30 8.33 4.26 -5.03 -4.18
Casino I 47.94 8.57 56.73 11.40 59.28 11.28 8.79 11.34
Casino II 47.73 24.70 54.23 26.19 55.86 26.12 6.49 8.13
Compass Group 26.32 18.28 35.19 19.90 36.13 19.37 8.87 9.82
Edison Spa 15.88 3.07 18.67 5.17 19.98 5.31 2.80 4.10
Enel 13.82 3.46 12.65 6.27 14.12 6.39 -1.17 0.29
Energia de Portugal I 11.01 4.78 10.85 4.00 11.77 3.75 -0.16 0.75
Energia de Portugal II 13.68 4.85 16.25 3.58 17.03 3.18 2.57 3.36
E.ON 10.46 2.76 9.32 3.91 10.55 3.77 -1.15 0.09
France Telecom 20.42 8.34 19.67 7.97 20.06 7.34 -0.75 -0.36
Iberdrola I 16.49 5.07 17.55 5.34 19.11 5.21 1.06 2.62
Iberdrola II 11.29 3.16 10.25 3.44 11.69 3.36 -1.05 0.40
Kingfisher 47.86 8.68 48.81 9.50 51.10 9.35 0.95 3.24
Koninklijke KPN 47.32 10.42 53.02 12.48 55.78 12.65 5.70 8.45
Louis Vuitton I 19.34 5.38 23.77 7.71 25.31 7.78 4.42 5.96
Louis Vuitton II 18.63 6.41 22.04 6.89 23.29 6.67 3.40 4.65
PPR 43.62 6.20 49.93 7.14 51.16 7.00 6.31 7.54
Renault 16.03 6.64 21.45 8.72 22.33 8.58 5.41 6.30
Repsol YPF 21.07 6.80 27.16 7.37 27.81 6.92 6.09 6.74
Reuters 19.04 5.66 25.79 5.63 27.20 5.53 6.76 8.16
Saint Gobain I 17.95 4.37 17.75 5.00 19.18 5.08 -0.19 1.23
Saint Gobain II 26.14 5.95 31.77 8.04 33.90 8.16 5.63 7.77
Saint Gobain III 21.64 6.22 26.83 7.74 28.14 7.60 5.19 6.50
Scania 24.83 8.49 24.59 7.06 26.80 7.34 -0.23 1.97
Siemens 12.21 1.59 10.25 1.75 11.19 1.65 -1.96 -1.02
Sodexho 10.17 4.97 19.38 5.60 20.63 5.18 9.22 10.47
Stora Enso 36.02 11.22 37.94 11.12 41.21 11.66 1.92 5.19
Technip 24.41 3.47 33.08 5.14 34.86 5.14 8.67 10.45
Telecom Italia I 45.57 10.80 47.86 12.81 50.22 12.81 2.29 4.65
Telecom Italia II 46.73 11.68 45.54 11.04 44.69 9.91 -1.19 -2.04
Telefonica 34.22 9.86 37.60 9.87 40.36 10.07 3.38 6.14
Telekom Austria 27.04 14.98 27.56 10.47 30.09 10.92 0.52 3.05
Tesco I 9.35 4.93 11.85 4.81 13.12 4.81 2.51 3.78
Tesco II 10.15 4.47 14.47 5.93 16.08 6.14 4.32 5.93
Thales 13.62 3.03 18.66 4.64 20.21 4.71 5.04 6.60
Thyssenkrupp 38.83 12.98 41.02 18.66 42.67 18.70 2.19 3.84
Union Fenosa 20.10 8.35 24.49 6.98 25.61 6.72 4.39 5.51
Vinci 22.62 6.89 22.48 5.72 23.40 5.56 -0.14 0.77
Vivendi 37.86 8.46 42.65 10.12 45.21 9.35 4.79 7.36
Vodafone 15.93 3.80 13.33 7.18 15.03 7.32 -2.60 -0.90
Volkswagen 21.66 5.81 24.25 7.61 26.16 7.83 2.59 4.50
Volvo 20.32 6.88 21.69 7.73 22.80 7.59 1.37 2.48
Average 23.37 7.06 25.76 7.88 27.28 7.80 2.40 3.91
CDS spread ASP spread (ASS) Bond spread (BS)
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Basis ASS - CDS Basis BS - CDS
Issuer Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean Mean
Akzo I 22.91 13.77 15.77 13.08 15.23 13.39 -7.14 -7.67
Akzo II 65.35 43.04 71.75 70.25 73.09 73.10 6.39 7.73
BMW 143.30 145.26 97.84 103.52 100.27 106.85 -45.46 -43.03
Bouygues I 102.37 67.46 101.73 65.78 99.32 64.96 -0.63 -3.05
Bouygues II 46.74 20.56 28.48 13.32 26.13 13.78 -18.26 -20.61
British AM Tob. I 21.75 13.04 27.88 13.73 26.59 15.03 6.13 4.84
British AM Tob. II 59.05 28.23 107.48 61.30 109.66 62.00 48.43 50.61
Carrefour I 49.78 28.57 52.85 43.52 50.35 42.18 3.07 0.57
Carrefour II 47.36 31.76 30.36 19.34 28.90 26.65 -17.00 -18.46
Casino I 142.42 76.61 172.68 96.59 177.36 100.39 30.26 34.94
Casino II 129.82 82.17 111.39 62.01 127.01 86.35 -18.43 -2.81
Compass Group 28.22 11.57 28.99 14.97 26.73 15.02 0.76 -1.49
Edison Spa 64.67 53.41 81.73 63.20 80.56 60.52 17.06 15.89
Enel 181.47 169.90 53.62 40.81 53.68 40.98 -127.85 -127.79
Energia de Portugal I 63.18 31.30 50.25 33.62 70.44 84.02 -12.92 7.26
Energia de Portugal II 72.19 34.54 101.37 66.28 99.56 66.46 29.18 27.37
E.ON 29.97 15.03 23.24 11.17 20.90 10.61 -6.73 -9.07
France Telecom 41.24 20.63 36.15 14.59 33.65 13.16 -5.09 -7.59
Iberdrola I 91.91 58.70 75.33 57.46 73.77 56.47 -16.57 -18.13
Iberdrola II 56.21 17.04 22.62 8.08 21.11 7.63 -33.59 -35.09
Kingfisher 191.71 101.87 218.77 109.45 232.37 119.06 27.06 40.66
Koninklijke KPN 72.67 28.30 113.49 55.43 118.28 59.64 40.82 45.61
Louis Vuitton I 71.18 51.35 70.48 48.09 69.81 47.89 -0.70 -1.37
Louis Vuitton II 65.82 54.71 62.18 49.64 60.81 48.82 -3.63 -5.00
PPR 251.15 200.92 200.10 145.78 206.13 153.20 -51.05 -45.02
Renault 58.74 40.11 34.95 13.50 32.73 13.39 -23.79 -26.02
Repsol YPF 115.08 112.21 107.03 87.49 106.07 89.01 -8.06 -9.02
Reuters 25.21 5.80 31.72 14.25 32.18 14.14 6.51 6.97
Saint Gobain I 71.05 44.75 36.41 13.34 35.05 13.62 -34.64 -36.00
Saint Gobain II 157.12 105.03 158.11 112.11 162.77 116.51 0.99 5.64
Saint Gobain III 142.68 102.03 110.63 72.43 117.04 86.39 -32.06 -25.64
Scania 53.84 22.69 52.89 17.10 55.32 17.84 -0.96 1.47
Siemens 75.68 56.84 62.26 47.49 61.29 46.75 -13.42 -14.39
Sodexho 20.22 11.43 37.02 15.13 34.54 16.24 16.81 14.33
Stora Enso 151.65 99.48 130.83 53.31 138.58 56.83 -20.82 -13.06
Technip 98.15 80.35 109.03 83.60 113.56 89.44 10.88 15.41
Telecom Italia I 183.94 140.76 157.81 96.93 171.91 120.12 -26.14 -12.03
Telecom Italia II 185.40 138.37 216.94 150.62 215.83 152.30 31.54 30.44
Telefonica 97.65 55.63 103.07 56.78 104.85 56.91 5.42 7.21
Telekom Austria 58.36 30.30 94.18 63.32 99.73 66.06 35.82 41.36
Tesco I 58.86 52.31 63.37 62.18 36.48 60.87 4.51 -22.37
Tesco II 63.58 49.52 67.35 54.03 66.59 53.57 3.77 3.01
Thales 78.65 61.84 72.49 67.95 76.33 79.17 -6.16 -2.32
Thyssenkrupp 173.81 157.73 104.64 96.12 112.44 105.46 -69.17 -61.37
Union Fenosa 72.71 69.03 87.48 65.76 85.18 63.58 14.77 12.47
Vinci 51.93 29.75 41.63 17.90 39.68 18.21 -10.30 -12.25
Vivendi 62.87 27.14 80.13 38.10 82.10 39.92 17.26 19.24
Vodafone 39.41 14.36 25.67 11.42 23.75 11.67 -13.74 -15.65
Volkswagen 131.18 91.80 118.90 95.54 122.20 97.98 -12.28 -8.98
Volvo 215.51 235.82 244.23 269.96 254.70 290.16 28.72 39.19
Average 91.11 64.70 86.11 59.15 87.65 63.29 -5.01 -3.46
Panel C2
CDS spread ASP spread (ASS) Bond spread (BS)
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3.4 Price Discovery Results
We analyze the price discovery process in two di¤erent contexts. On the one hand,
before July 2007 there exists a scenario of high liquidity where the number of market
participants is higher than in the second period, which represents the illiquid scenario.
The process of price discovery is analyzed from an equilibrium model based on an
Error Correction Model and the long-run equilibrium condition is based on the existence
of cointegration between credit spreads. Econometric details on the model estimation
of the VECM dened in equation (3.16) can be found in Juselius (2006).
Before the price discovery analysis, we rstly verify the series stationarity by means
of a Ng-Perron unit root test. Table 2 shows that credit spreads are I(1) for the two
periods considered in 46 of the total 50 cases which correspond to 50 di¤erent ASPs
and bonds.
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This table reports the unit root tests for CDS, ASP and bond spreads in two different periods. The first column is divided in two
sub-columns that present the order of integration of the CDS premium for the period before the crisis (November 2005 - July 2007)
and the crisis (July 2007 - June 2009), respectively. The second column is divided into other two columns that present the order of
integration for the ASP spreads for the same two periods. The last column reports the order of integration for the bond spreads for
the same periods. The cases where all the credit spreads are not integrated of order one in the two periods are in bold.
First Period Second Period First Period Second Period First Period Second Period
Akzo I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Akzo II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
BMW I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Bouygues I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Bouygues II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
British AM Tob. I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
British AM Tob. II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Carrefour I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Carrefour II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Casino I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Casino II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Compass Group I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Edison Spa I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Enel I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Energia de Portugal I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Energia de Portugal II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
E.ON I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
France Telecom I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Iberdrola I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Iberdrola II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
Kingfisher I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Koninklijke KPN I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Louis Vuitton I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Louis Vuitton II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
PPR I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Renault I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Repsol YPF I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Reuters I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Saint Gobain I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Saint Gobain II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Saint Gobain III I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Scania I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Siemens I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
Sodexho I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Stora Enso I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Technip I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Telecom Italia I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Telecom Italia II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Telefonica I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Telekom Austria I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Tesco I I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Tesco II I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Thales I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
Thyssenkrupp I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Union Fenosa I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Vinci I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Vivendi I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Vodafone I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Volkswagen I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Volvo I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Issuer
CDS ASP Bond
Table 2: Unit Root Test for Credit Spreads
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In Panel A of Table 3 we report Johansen (1991) cointegration test results for each
reference entity whenever the CDS and ASP spreads are I(1) in the two periods. In
32 of the total 46 cases we nd cointegration between ASP and CDS spreads. We nd
cointegration between bond and CDS spreads in the same 32 cases.41 The number of
cointegration relationships that we nd is similar to one obtained in previous analyses.
Norden and Weber (2004), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Zhu (2006) nd
cointegration relationships between CDS and bond spreads in 36 of 58 cases, in 26 of 33
cases and in 15 of 24 cases, respectively. De Wit (2006) nds cointegration relationships
between CDS and ASP spreads in 88 of 144 cases. With respect to ASP and bond
spreads we nd evidence of cointegration between them for all the 46 cases.42 We then
test why there is no cointegration between the ASP and CDS market. To achieve this,
we run a Probit regression with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors for the total
92 cases studied in both subperiods, using as dependent variable a dummy variable that
equals 1 if there is cointegration and 0 otherwise. In order to control and test the e¤ect
of the crisis, we create a dummy variable equal to one if a given case corresponds to
the crisis period. Results are shown in Panel B of Table 3. The cointegration seems
to be more frequent in bonds/ASPs and with a high coupon rate and with a long time
to maturity. The results suggest that the riskier the underlying bond or the longer the
time to maturity, the more similar are the credit spreads in the long run. The rst
result is consistent with the increase in correlation across nancial markets as the risk
increases. The second result suggests that the deviations among credit spreads are higher
41We do not report these results because they are similar to the ones presented in Table 3. However,
these results are available upon request.
42Cointegration test detailed results for ASP and bond spreads are avaiable upon request.
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close to the bond maturity. The rating; the basis, which is dened as the di¤erence
between the ASP and CDS spreads; and the crisis dummy have a non-signicant e¤ect
on cointegration.
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This table reports the results obtained in the cointegration analyses applied to the CDSs and the ASPs spreads. The
first two columns in Panel A of Table 3 report Johansen trace test statistics for the number of cointegrating relations
between the CDSs and the ASPs spreads for the period before the subprime crisis (November 2005 - July 2007). The
last two columns in Panel A of Table 3 report the same statistics for the crisis period (July 2007 - June 2009).
A constant is included in the long-run relation if it is significantly different from zero. The number of lags in the vector
autoregression is optimized using the AIC and attending to the autocorrelation LM residual test such that there is no
autocorrelation at an adequate lag order. The superscripts ***, ** or * denotes the rejection of the null at the 1, 5 or
10% level (in bold the cases where we do not find evidence of cointegration between credit spreads for the two periods).
In Panel B of Table 3 we test why there is no cointegration between the ASP and CDS market. The results are estima-
ted by a Probit model with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The sample is formed by 92 cases/bonds studied
in both subperiods, using as dependent variable a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is cointegration and 0 otherwise.
The potential determinants of cointegration considered are: Bond coupon ; Logarithm of the time to maturity  which is
measured in days from the beginning of the corresponding period; Rating  is a discrete variable with values between 1
and 7, such that 1 corresponds to rating BBB- and 7 to rating AA-, the rest of the values correspond to the intermediate
ratings;  Logarithm of the bond amount issued (in Euros); Basis  defined as the difference between the ASP and CDS
spreads; Crisis  which is a dummy variable with value equals to one when the observation corresponds to the crisis
period. The first column reports the estimated coefficients. The second column presents the heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. The third column reports the coefficient p-value and last column reports the marginal effect.
Panel A
Issuer
None At most 1 None At most 1
Akzo I 13.93** 0.36 16.81** 1.99
Akzo II 20.42*** 3.98 13.02** 3.24
BMW 14.88** 3.75 28.87*** 3.01
Bouygues I 13.74** 2.77 18.07** 2.04
Bouygues II 19.98** 4.47 20.01** 5.89
British AM Tob. I 21.14** 2.30 6.40 2.38
British AM Tob. II 21.84** 8.10 7.46 2.72
Carrefour I 13.70** 0.11 13.58** 0.58
Carrefour II 20.05** 6.12 13.03** 0.48
Casino I 26.90*** 4.00 22.29** 1.86
Casino II 20.18** 2.41 24.92*** 3.34
Compass Group 49.43*** 5.41 17.13** 3.03
Edison Spa 13.21** 3.56 20.75** 2.38
Enel 21.83** 1.64 10.79 1.97
Energia de Portugal I 22.80** 8.42 6.88 2.70
Energia de Portugal II 17.44*** 3.23 12.60** 0.00
E.ON 15.36** 1.67 24.11** 2.18
France Telecom 16.40 3.82 8.17 2.13
Iberdrola I 14.19** 2.90 22.41** 2.55
Kingfisher 42.19*** 6.21 21.78** 3.11
Koninklijke KPN 13.22** 3.57 23.32** 4.13
Louis Vuitton I 17.30** 0.60 21.26** 2.36
Louis Vuitton II 15.16** 2.43 32.78*** 2.79
PPR 17.85** 1.34 21.80** 2.03
Renault 15.57** 0.93 15.46** 1.97
Repsol YPF 13.74** 1.70 26.70*** 2.38
Saint Gobain I 21.67** 6.45 9.67 2.24
Saint Gobain II 12.67** 3.04 16.47** 1.59
Saint Gobain III 20.77** 4.78 20.77*** 0.01
Scania 7.33 2.82 20.302** 2.41
Sodexho 17.36** 3.50 13.06** 0.01
Stora Enso 15.60 4.20 11.69 4.50
Technip 12.01 1.60 21.47** 2.93
Telecom Italia I 23.71** 1.69 25.43*** 2.62
Telecom Italia II 12.98** 0.60 20.10** 2.32
Telefonica 16.41** 1.75 20.10** 2.78
Telekom Austria 19.99** 9.14 12.43 3.65
Tesco I 11.42 3.41 24.48** 2.70
Tesco II 27.13*** 3.65 21.25** 2.33
Thyssenkrupp 19.18** 1.82 16.93** 0.16
Union Fenosa 19.67** 6.01 13.23** 0.10
Vinci 14.26** 2.62 5.70 0.53
Vivendi 12.58 1.15 7.76 3.26
Vodafone 21.00** 3.56 17.95*** 0.21
Volkswagen 10.31 3.27 22.94** 2.78
Volvo 17.17** 3.76 12.54** 0.06
November 2005 - July 2007 July 2007 - June 2009
Table 3: Cointegration Tests based on CDS and ASP spreads
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Panel B
Explanatory Variable Coefficient Robust P-value Marginal
Std. Err. Effect
Bond Coupon 0.855 0.261 0.001 0.188
Rating 1.596 0.796 0.045 0.350
Logarithm of the bond amount issued 0.057 0.128 0.655 0.013
Basis (ASP spread - CDS spread) 0.005 0.007 0.495 0.001
Crisis dummy 0.441 0.536 0.411 0.097
Constant -14.954 6.623 0.024
R-squared 0.191
Number of observations 92
Wald chi2(6 df) 13.5
Prob > chi2 0.019
The analysis of price discovery is based on the VECM specication presented in
equations (3.15) and (3.16) and it is applied to the 32 cases where we nd a long-
run equilibrium behavior of the credit spreads series. The vector  in equation (3.16)
represents the coe¢ cients that determine the market contribution to price discovery.
We conclude that a given market leads the process of price discovery whenever its
corresponding price discovery metric (GGi for i = 1; 2) is higher than 0.5. Both
markets reveal information in an equally e¢ cient way whenever the price discovery
metrics are close to 0.5 for both markets (0:45 < GGi < 0:55 for i = 1; 2). The GGi
price discovery metric is dened such that it has a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound
of 1 in order to be consistent with the denition in equation (3.18) and the meaning of
this metric.
3.4.1 The leadership of the CDS market before the crisis
Panel A of Table 4 shows that during the period before the crisis, Hypothesis 1
is conrmed and the CDSs appear clearly as the more e¢ cient market in 87.5% of
the cases (28 cases). According to our model, the role of price discovery leadership
comes from the relative number of market participants in the CDS with respect to
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the ASP market. An implication of the above results is that the market activity in
Euro-denominated corporate bonds and ASPs is more limited than in CDS markets. A
possible explanation is that the former are often held by investors until maturity which
a¤ects in a negative sense during periods of high liquidity their role as information
providers. The ASP market reects credit risk more e¢ ciently in the remaining four
cases. In eight cases we observe that the CDS market reveals information as e¢ ciently
as the ASP market (GG1 is between 0.45 and 0.55). According to equation (3.18),
the last eight cases where both markets reveal information in an equally e¢ cient way
could be explained by a higher market participation of the agents who operate in both
markets (NBOTH is high). On average, we nd that the CDS market leads the ASP
market during the period before the crisis as the value of 0.227 for the corresponding
GG average metric reveals. The 95% condence interval for the average GG metric is
0.151 to 0.302, where even the upper limit implies that the CDS market leads the ASP
market. The minimum GG metric is 0, which means that the CDS market reveals all
the information, while the maximum is 0.55.
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This table reports the price discovery analysis results. Panel A reports the contributions to price discovery
the contribution of the previous spreads during the crisis. The measures of price discovery are based on
The values of coefficients ?1, ?2, ?1 and ?2
‡ and the t-statistics  of coefficients ?s are reported in Panels A
and B. The columns are named by the coefficients themselves. The last three columns in Panels A and B
report the price discovery measure attributed to the ASP (PD1), the price discovery measure attributed to
the CDS (PD2) and the percentage of price discovery attributed to the ASP market (GG1) which is equiva-
lent to the Gonzalo and Granger price discovery metric attributed to the ASP market for a parameter ?2
equal to 1. The ASP market leads the process of price discovery whenever GG1 is higher than 0.5.
However, when GG1 is below a value of 0.5, the CDS market leads the process of price discovery. The
last rows in Panels A and B show the average coefficient or metric and the corresponding lower limit (LL)
and upper limit (UL) for their 95% confidence interval. Panel C reports the results for the cases where credit
spreads are I(1) but cointegration is rejected. For these cases we test price discovery by means of a
Granger causality test from a VAR in first differences for the same three periods. Columns (1) and (2)
report the results for the period before the crisis and the crisis period, respectively. The null hypothesis
Ho: A states that CDS does not cause ASP while null hypothesis Ho: B states that ASP does not
cause CDS. For each test we report the Chi-Square  statistic and the corresponding p-value . In the second
sub-row for each issuer, we show the sum of the significant coefficients of lagged CDS and ASP spreads
as an additional test of price discovery.
Panel A: Contributions to Price Discovery (CDS vs ASP) before the crisis
Issuer ?1 t-stat ?2 t-stat ?3 ?2 PD1 PD2 GG1
Akzo I -0.037 -2.607 -0.005 -0.619 0.000 0.580 -0.146 1.085 0.000
Akzo II -0.075 -3.786 0.004 0.600 0.000 1.152 0.050 0.942 0.050
BMW -0.085 -3.023 -0.015 -1.547 0.000 0.771 -0.198 1.153 0.000
Bouygues I -0.015 -1.340 0.016 2.964 0.000 1.382 0.425 0.413 0.507
Bouygues II -0.034 -1.169 0.041 3.410 0.133 0.864 0.594 0.487 0.550
Carrefour I -0.058 -2.4462 -0.015 -1.079 0.000 1.128 -0.374 1.422 0.000
Carrefour II -0.101 -3.418 0.008 0.527 -10.492 1.461 0.069 0.899 0.072
Casino I -0.089 -4.310 -0.034 -1.354 1.837 1.213 -0.709 1.859 0.000
Casino II -0.050 -2.634 0.013 0.662 3.205 1.048 0.200 0.791 0.202
Compass Group -0.094 -5.141 0.008 0.561 29.194 0.631 0.084 0.947 0.081
Edison Spa -0.018 -1.145 0.022 2.688 0.000 1.543 0.422 0.350 0.547
Energia de Portugal II -0.021 -1.159 0.023 3.616 0.000 1.316 0.448 0.410 0.522
E.ON -0.092 -3.307 0.011 1.255 0.000 0.920 0.109 0.900 0.108
Iberdrola I -0.054 -2.661 0.019 2.171 0.000 1.096 0.250 0.726 0.256
Kingfisher -0.163 -6.045 0.006 0.184 -3.706 1.077 0.033 0.964 0.033
Koninklijke KPN -0.074 -1.858 0.073 2.351 0.000 1.129 0.468 0.472 0.498
Louis Vuitton I -0.116 -3.405 0.032 2.032 -2.542 1.357 0.201 0.728 0.216
Louis Vuitton II -0.094 -3.535 0.007 0.501 0.000 1.107 0.071 0.921 0.072
PPR -0.036 -3.495 0.024 2.017 -13.492 1.658 0.318 0.473 0.402
Renault -0.112 -2.707 0.075 3.864 0.000 1.353 0.352 0.524 0.402
Repsol YPF -0.064 -3.438 0.002 0.153 0.000 1.229 0.023 0.971 0.023
Saint Gobain II -0.078 -2.914 0.013 0.734 0.000 1.189 0.142 0.831 0.146
Saint Gobain III -0.045 -2.9105 0.019 2.039 -7.708 1.614 0.255 0.588 0.303
Sodexho -0.038 -1.372 0.033 2.668 6.973 1.257 0.413 0.481 0.462
Telecom Italia I -0.103 -3.296 0.062 2.386 -7.878 1.221 0.346 0.577 0.375
Telecom Italia II -0.056 -2.323 0.055 2.297 0.000 0.972 0.503 0.511 0.496
Telefonica -0.063 -2.287 0.055 2.526 1.246 1.063 0.454 0.518 0.467
Tesco II -0.056 -2.987 -0.031 -3.259 4.779 0.906 -1.095 1.992 0.000
Thyssenkrupp -0.071 -3.099 0.054 2.260 -14.014 1.465 0.360 0.473 0.432
Union Fenosa -0.073 -2.780 0.003 0.248 5.833 0.942 0.037 0.965 0.037
Vodafone -0.056 -2.301 -0.010 -1.238 -9.632 1.443 -0.241 1.348 0.000
Volvo -0.070 -3.369 -0.003 -0.306 -7.900 1.460 -0.042 1.062 0.000
Average -0.068 -2.883 0.018 1.104 -0.755 1.173 0.119 0.837 0.227
95% Conf. Interval  LL -0.080 0.008 -3.457 1.077 0.151
                            UL -0.057 0.028 1.947 1.270 0.302
‡ The paremeters ?s that we report in Panel A of Table 4 are significant at 5% level in all the cases that we study.
Table 4: Contributions to Price Discovery (CDS vs ASP)
of CDS and ASP spreads (                    ) during the period before the subprime crisis. Panel B presents
the following system of two equations:
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3.4.2 The leadership of the ASP and bond markets during the crisis
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results for the subprime crisis period. Comparing
Panels A and B of Table 4 we observe that during the crisis, ASP spreads reveal more
e¢ ciently credit risk than before. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2 up to the
point that in 71.88% of the cases (23 cases), ASP spreads lead CDS spreads in the price
discovery process. The CDS market reects credit risk more e¢ ciently in the remaining
nine cases. Thus, the ASPspredominant position as information providers during the
crisis is in line with the evidence reported in the IFSL Research (2009a and 2009b) about
CDS and bond notional amounts outstanding and trading activity. Dötz (2007) states
that the turbulence in the credit markets in spring 2005 was apparently handled much
better by the bond market than by the CDS market. The role of ASP as information
providers improves with respect to the one observed before the crisis in 84.4% of the
cases (27 cases). This role only worsens in ve cases which could be explained by a
drop in the ASPsliquidity that even exceeds the drop in CDS liquidity. On average,
we nd that the ASP market leads the CDS market during the crisis as the value of
0.554 for the corresponding GG average metric reveals. The 95% condence interval
for the average GG metric is 0.461 to 0.647. The minimum GG metric is 0.005, which
means that the CDS market reveals almost all the information, while the maximum
is 0.954, which means that the ASP market reveals almost all the information. The
range for this metric is wider than in the period before crisis which may be related
with a decrease in the presence of the agents that operate in both markets. This idea
is reinforced because in Panel B of Table we do not nd any GG metric close to 0.5
(0:45 < GG < 0:55): Comparing results before and during the crisis, the ASP spreads
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reveal credit risk more e¢ ciently during than before the crisis given that the average
GG measure during the crisis (0:554 with a standard deviation of 0:258) is almost 2:5
times the one observed before the crisis (0:227 with a standard deviation of 0:209).
We then test whether pre and during-crisis GG measures are di¤erent. The average
di¤erence (0:327) is signicantly greater than zero with asymptotic t-statistic equal
to 5:3 (p   value  0). Also, using a test of means we obtain that the average GG
measure during the crisis is higher than the average GG measure before the crisis with
asymptotic t-statistic equal to 2:7 (p   value  0:005). Panels A and B of Figure
1 help to understand these results given that there is one main determinant of price
discovery that we are considering in this paper: liquidity. We realize that there is no
generally held denition of liquidity. Many other measures have been suggested in the
literature. In fact there is a close relationship between many of the measures and actual
transactions costs, and the assumption that liquidity proxies measure liquidity seems to
be granted, see Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2008). The analysis of price discovery
is extended to the case where the informational e¢ ciency of CDS spreads are compared
to bond spreads. Results are similar to the ones presented for CDS and ASP spreads
and Hypotheses 1 and 2 also hold.43
Other factors that may inuence the price discovery process across markets are the
cheapest-to-deliver option embedded in the CDS, a potential illiquidity premium and
the existence of a high counterparty risk in the CDS. Regarding the rst two factors,
Ammer and Cai (2007) nd that the main reason supporting the price leadership of bond
spreads with respect to CDS premiums is the existence of a higher cheapest-to-deliver
43Results of this analysis are available upon request.
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option and the illiquidity. Actually, these two factors as well as the counterparty risk
are assumed to be more inuential during the current subprime crisis and it is precisely
in this period when we nd that both ASP and bond markets reect the information
more e¢ ciently that the CDS market.
Panel B: Contributions to Price Discovery (CDS vs ASP) during the crisis
Issuer ?1 t-stat ?2 t-stat ?3 ?2 PD1 PD2 GG1
Akzo I -0.068 -2.878 0.021 2.063 -33.021 1.616 0.204 0.670 0.233
Akzo II -0.011 -0.374 0.020 2.009 0.000 0.785 0.757 0.406 0.651
BMW -0.045 -1.527 0.069 4.390 0.000 0.667 0.757 0.495 0.605
Bouygues I -0.011 -0.369 0.065 3.346 -3.965 1.029 0.831 0.145 0.852
Bouygues II -0.030 -1.267 0.058 2.893 3.483 0.513 0.964 0.506 0.656
Carrefour I -0.018 -0.8861 0.034 2.832 0.000 1.169 0.585 0.316 0.649
Carrefour II -0.036 -1.258 0.061 3.089 0.000 0.562 0.867 0.512 0.629
Casino I -0.022 -1.401 0.068 3.717 -20.117 1.354 0.595 0.194 0.754
Casino II -0.048 -3.912 0.002 0.154 24.198 0.755 0.041 0.969 0.041
Compass Group -0.102 -2.142 0.029 2.072 -0.647 1.043 0.220 0.770 0.222
Edison Spa -0.027 -1.264 0.049 3.454 6.619 1.112 0.603 0.330 0.646
Energia de Portugal II -0.080 -3.072 0.016 1.219 0.000 1.508 0.153 0.769 0.166
E.ON -0.015 -0.604 0.025 2.340 5.165 0.586 0.840 0.507 0.623
Iberdrola I -0.037 -1.364 0.101 4.096 -19.347 1.010 0.726 0.267 0.732
Kingfisher -0.126 -3.339 0.068 1.682 45.657 1.029 0.348 0.642 0.351
Koninklijke KPN -0.066 -2.676 0.014 1.340 -31.071 1.643 0.153 0.749 0.169
Louis Vuitton I -0.046 -2.065 0.078 3.466 2.706 0.949 0.647 0.386 0.626
Louis Vuitton II -0.054 -2.055 0.082 4.315 4.995 0.857 0.658 0.437 0.601
PPR -0.059 -2.339 0.127 2.980 16.282 0.718 0.844 0.394 0.682
Renault -0.062 -1.110 0.132 3.068 10.265 0.594 0.938 0.443 0.679
Repsol YPF -0.010 -0.384 0.126 4.919 13.871 0.800 1.142 0.087 0.929
Saint Gobain II -0.027 -1.841 0.039 2.576 -17.603 1.109 0.558 0.381 0.594
Saint Gobain III -0.115 -4.3677 0.021 1.001 0.000 0.764 0.160 0.878 0.154
Sodexho -0.017 -0.592 0.053 3.527 0.000 2.239 0.392 0.123 0.761
Telecom Italia I -0.115 -4.569 0.001 0.021 45.865 0.636 0.005 0.997 0.005
Telecom Italia II -0.071 -1.702 0.088 2.562 13.265 1.104 0.522 0.424 0.552
Telefonica -0.030 -0.898 0.082 2.975 -4.623 1.073 0.692 0.257 0.729
Tesco II -0.004 -0.159 0.087 4.140 -5.743 1.073 0.892 0.043 0.954
Thyssenkrupp -0.030 -1.571 0.043 2.156 2.880 0.527 0.823 0.567 0.592
Union Fenosa -0.007 -0.478 0.077 3.583 0.000 1.025 0.894 0.083 0.915
Vodafone -0.031 -0.8451 0.043 2.118 0.000 0.672 0.723 0.516 0.584
Volvo -0.068 -1.898 0.045 2.581 0.000 1.229 0.364 0.552 0.397
Average -0.047 -1.725 0.057 2.709 1.847 0.992 0.591 0.463 0.554
95% Conf. Interval  LL -0.059 0.044 -4.209 0.855 0.461
                            UL -0.035 0.070 7.903 1.129 0.647
‡ The paremeters ?s that we report in Panel B of Table 4 are significant at 5% level in all the cases that we study.
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For the cases where credit spreads are I(1) but the existence of cointegration is
rejected, the VECM representation is not valid. In Panel C of Table 4, we report
the price discovery analysis results on the basis of a Granger causality test for a VAR
in rst di¤erences and for the three same periods. According to the p-value of the
chi-square statistics of the Granger causality test and the sum of the coe¢ cients on
lagged spreads which are signicantly di¤erent from zero, we conclude that in the rst
subperiod, CDS prices Granger-cause ASP spreads for ve of the fourteen cases, we nd
causation in the opposite direction in two cases, bidirectional causation in one case and
no causation in the remaining six cases. In the second subperiod, we nd that ASP
spreads Granger-cause CDS prices in three of the fourteen cases, we nd causation in
the opposite direction in one case, bidirectional causation in ve cases and no causation
in the remaining ve cases. The sum of the signicant coe¢ cients on lagged CDS and
ASP spreads conrm the results of the Granger causality test.
127
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF LIQUIDITY ON THE PRICE DISCOVERY
PROCESS IN CREDIT DERIVATIVES MARKETS
Panel C: Granger Causality Test (CDS vs ASP) for the cases where credit spreads are
I(1) but not cointegrated
Ho: A
Chi-Sq. P-val. Chi-Sq. P-val. Chi-Sq. P-val. Chi-Sq. P-val.
British AM Tob. I 6.480 0.091 3.404 0.334 3.443 0.487 5.249 0.263
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
British AM Tob. II 30.905 0.000 0.997 0.910 27.563 0.004 17.947 0.083
0.877 0.000 0.716 0.219
Enel 3.953 0.267 0.724 0.867 46.197 0.000 15.946 0.026
0.000 0.000 0.218 0.551
Energia de Portugal I 4.081 0.666 5.932 0.431 7.669 0.467 9.697 0.287
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
France Telecom 4.352 0.739 42.776 0.000 20.061 0.003 20.280 0.003
0.000 0.928 0.502 0.322
Saint Gobain I 26.891 0.000 10.845 0.093 0.641 0.726 0.310 0.856
0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000
Scania 5.735 0.220 2.867 0.580 11.848 0.065 26.600 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.340 0.408
Stora Enso 25.350 0.000 15.567 0.004 25.350 0.000 15.567 0.004
0.456 0.287 0.456 0.287
Technip 2.993 0.810 24.707 0.000 18.557 0.017 24.856 0.002
0.000 0.208 0.439 0.431
Telekom Austria 25.155 0.000 8.057 0.090 9.168 0.164 15.916 0.014
0.388 0.111 0.000 0.080
Tesco I 0.671 0.715 0.738 0.692 13.255 0.210 29.309 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.524
Vinci 1.994 0.737 4.7309 0.316 1.723 0.423 2.406 0.300
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vivendi 13.740 0.001 0.985 0.611 5.489 0.483 6.797 0.340
0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000
Volkswagen 7.149 0.028 3.390 0.184 25.216 0.003 26.216 0.002
0.275 0.000 0.264 0.289
(2) During the crisis
Ho: AIssuer Ho: B
(1) Before the crisis
Ho: B
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As a robustness test and to overcome the shortcoming that the precision of our
estimates cannot be assessed analytically, we use the bootstrap method for cointegrated
systems developed by Li and Maddala (1997). We choose to bootstrap from the es-
timated residuals of the VECM in order not to distort the dynamic structure of our
model. Using estimated parameters and initial values, we create a new set of system
variables (with the same number of observations as in the original data) by drawing
observations randomly with replacement from the innovations. Based upon the gene-
rated data, the common trend relationship and the subsequent price discovery measures
are re-estimated. This process is then repeated 1,000 times and the standard errors are
calculated from the empirical distribution. Finally, we test whether the corresponding
GG metric is signicantly higher than 0.5 before and during the crisis for both markets.
To test these hypotheses, we construct a t-statistic using the bootstrapped standard
errors. Results are reported in Table 5. Before the crisis the CDS spreads lead, in most
cases, the price discovery process with respect to the ASP spreads. During the crisis,
the roles are reversed being the ASP spreads the leaders in the price discovery process.44
44The t-statistics presented in Table 5 are obtained using the GG metrics reported in Table 4. More-
over, we employ the average GG metric obtained accross the 1,000 bootstrap repetitions and obtain
similar results.
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In this table we present the estimates of the t-statistics  which are employed to test
whether a given GG metric is significantly higher than 0.5 before and during the
crisis for the CDS and the ASP markets, respectively. These hypotheses are tested
by means of t-statistics  which are constructed using the bootstrapped standard
errors. Columns (2) and (3) report the results obtained when we test if the GG metrics
for the CDS market, Column (1), are higher than 0.5 before the crisis. Columns (5)
and (6) report the results obtained when we test if the GG metrics for the ASP market,
Column (4), are higher metrics for the ASP market, Column (4), are higher than 0.5
during the crisis. Columns (1) and (4) are extracted from Panels A and B of Table 4.
Issuer GG(CDS) t-stat p-val GG(ASP) t-stat p-val
Akzo I 1.000 369.499 0.000 0.233 -29.107 1.000
Akzo II 0.950 29.214 0.000 0.651 12.216 0.000
BMW 1.000 62.696 0.000 0.605 6.407 0.000
Bouygues I 0.493 -0.689 0.755 0.852 17.237 0.000
Bouygues II 0.450 -4.255 1.000 0.656 7.960 0.000
Carrefour I 1.000 158.322 0.000 0.649 24.527 0.000
Carrefour II 0.928 63.718 0.000 0.629 16.713 0.000
Casino I 1.000 159.017 0.000 0.754 14.534 0.000
Casino II 0.798 27.359 0.000 0.041 -67.913 1.000
Compass Group 0.919 51.098 0.000 0.222 -41.068 1.000
Edison Spa 0.453 -4.647 1.000 0.646 10.407 0.000
Energia de Portugal II 0.478 -2.390 0.991 0.166 -27.630 1.000
E.ON 0.892 198.328 0.000 0.623 8.809 0.000
Iberdrola I 0.744 29.706 0.000 0.732 12.883 0.000
Kingfisher 0.967 47.427 0.000 0.351 -13.782 1.000
Koninklijke KPN 0.502 0.080 0.468 0.169 -41.129 1.000
Louis Vuitton I 0.784 61.625 0.000 0.626 6.382 0.000
Louis Vuitton II 0.928 44.549 0.000 0.601 7.035 0.000
PPR 0.598 17.425 0.000 0.682 15.184 0.000
Renault 0.598 12.688 0.000 0.679 10.335 0.000
Repsol YPF 0.977 42.715 0.000 0.929 29.679 0.000
Saint Gobain II 0.854 21.746 0.000 0.594 2.104 0.018
Saint Gobain III 0.697 23.907 0.000 0.154 -42.130 1.000
Sodexho 0.538 4.207 0.000 0.761 27.442 0.000
Telecom Italia I 0.625 16.017 0.000 0.005 -52.782 1.000
Telecom Italia II 0.504 0.727 0.234 0.552 0.078 0.469
Telefonica 0.533 2.817 0.002 0.729 17.927 0.000
Tesco II 1.000 119.058 0.000 0.954 33.782 0.000
Thyssenkrupp 0.568 9.903 0.000 0.592 6.755 0.000
Union Fenosa 0.963 32.525 0.000 0.915 24.949 0.000
Vodafone 1.000 89.653 0.000 0.584 6.705 0.000
Volvo 1.000 93.904 0.000 0.397 -10.677 1.000
Table 5: Bootstrap Estimation of the Significance Level
of the Price Discovery Metrics
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3.4.3 Comparing the informational e¢ ciency of the ASP and bond spreads
In Table 6 we show that Hypothesis 3, which states that the ASP market re-
ects credit risk more e¢ ciently than the bond market, is consistent with the empirical
evidence for the two periods of time analyzed. This result conrms empirically for the
rst time, at least to our knowledge, that the ASP spread is a better measure for credit
risk than bond spreads are. Only in two of a total of 46 cases in the rst subperiod, do
bond spreads lead ASP spreads. This occurs in two cases in the second subperiod. The
reason that explains these results may be a higher relative liquidity in the ASP market,
which means that the number of market participants in the ASP market (liquidity) is
greater than the number of players in the bond market.
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This table reports the contributions to price discovery of bond and ASP spreads
(                      ). The first column presents the contribution of ASP spreads with
respect to bond spreads during the period before the crisis. A value equal to or
higher to 0.5 indicates that ASP markets lead bond markets in the process of
price discovery while a value equal to or higher than 1 indicates that negligible
information about credit risk is reported by bond spreads relative to the one repor-
ted by ASP spreads. The second column reports the same information for the
crisis period. As in Table 4, the measures of price discovery are based on the
following system of two equations:
We directly report the Gonzalo and Granger metric (GG1) that is obtained as the
ratio between the price discovery measure attributed to the ASP (PD1) and the
sum of PD1 and PD2 where PD2 is the price discovery measure attributed to the
bond. This ratio indicates the percentage of price discovery attributed to the ASP.
Nov. 05 - July 07 July 07 - June 09
Issuer GG1 metric GG1 metric
Akzo I 0.696 1.000
Akzo II 0.640 0.801
BMW 0.705 1.000
Bouygues I 0.634 1.000
Bouygues II 1.000 0.683
British AM Tob. I 1.000 1.000
British AM Tob. II 1.000 1.000
Carrefour I 0.607 0.856
Carrefour II 0.346 1.000
Casino I 0.732 1.000
Casino II 1.000 0.787
Compass Group 0.800 0.653
Edison Spa 1.000 1.000
Enel 0.701 0.619
Energia de Portugal I 0.985 0.967
Energia de Portugal II 1.000 0.694
E.ON 0.622 1.000
France Telecom 0.670 1.000
Iberdrola I 0.635 1.000
Kingfisher 0.842 1.000
Koninklijke KPN 0.730 0.737
Louis Vuitton I 0.864 0.980
Louis Vuitton II 1.000 0.869
PPR 1.000 1.000
Renault 0.614 0.254
Repsol YPF 1.000 1.000
Saint Gobain I 0.874 0.427
Saint Gobain II 1.000 1.000
Saint Gobain III 0.653 0.839
Scania 0.712 1.000
Sodexho 0.843 1.000
Stora Enso 0.603 1.000
Technip 1.000 0.825
Telecom Italia I 0.556 0.832
Telecom Italia II 0.844 1.000
Telefonica 0.745 1.000
Telekom Austria 0.708 1.000
Tesco II 0.556 0.949
Thyssenkrupp 0.723 0.915
Union Fenosa 0.565 1.000
Vinci 0.750 1.000
Vivendi 0.883 1.000
Vodafone 0.488 0.525
Volkswagen 0.983 1.000
Volvo 0.622 1.000
Average 0.781 0.893
95% Confidence Interval                LL 0.729 0.841
                                                  UL 0.833 0.945
Table 6: Contributions to Price Discovery (bond vs ASP)
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3.5 Conclusions
We nd that liquidity does a¤ect the price discovery process in credit derivatives
markets. We make three contributions to the literature. Firstly, we o¤er a theoretical
model for testing price discovery in credit derivatives markets that allows for simulta-
neous agent participation in di¤erent markets. Secondly, we analyze the price discovery
process between ASPs and CDSs and nd that the leadership, in terms of price disco-
very, between ASPs and CDSs is very sensitive to the appearance of the subprime crisis.
Before the crisis CDSs market leads ASP market but during the crisis ASP market leads
CDS market. Thirdly, to our knowledge, this is the rst price discovery analysis based
on the ASP and bond markets. We nd, according to GS terms, that the bond market
is a pure satelliteof the asset swap market. Thus, the ASP spread is a more accurate
measure of credit risk than the bond spread. For this reason, it seems more appropriate
to use the ASP spread as an alternative or as a complement to the CDS rather than
the bond spread.
Finally, we highlight the four main policy implications that emerge from our study
and which could be of special interest for investors and regulators alike. First, we nd
that during the crisis the ASP market reveals credit risk more e¢ ciently that the CDS
market. Reasons explaining this nding include the cheapest-to-deliver option embed-
ded in the CDS spread, the liquidity premium and the counterparty risk in CDSs.45 The
45Amato and Remolona (2003) state that when it turns out to be very costly to undertake transactions
in a given instrument, the investors must be compensated for it. This compensation is reinforced in the
presence of uncertainty about the liquidity (or illiquidity) of an ASP, bond or CDS at a given time, and
thus the investors could require a premium to bear this risk. This liquidity premium has been proved to
exist both in CDS and bond markets. Longsta¤ et al. (2005) and Tang and Yan (2007) among others
support the presence of a liquidity premium in CDS spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Perraudin
and Taylor (2003), Elton et al. (2001), Delianedis and Geske (2002) and Chen et al. (2007) among
others nd that liquidity is an additional factor to credit risk which is present in bond spreads.
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key implication of this result is that inferences on the creditworthiness of a given rm
based solely in CDS spreads in periods of high market turbulence and low liquidity are
bound to be misleading. Second, we nd that the ASP spread leads the price discovery
process of credit risk more e¢ ciently than the bond spread, before and during the cri-
sis. For this reason, it is more appropriate to use the ASP spread as an alternative or
as a complement to the CDS spread as a measure of credit risk rather than the bond
spread. However, most of the existing literature has focused primarily on the bond
and CDS spreads ignoring the role of the ASP spread as a credit risk indicator. Third,
our theoretical model and empirical results highlight the importance of the agents that
operate in both markets (NBOTH) in order to provide stability to the credit markets.
The arbitrageurs also play a special role in these markets given that their demands are
dened in terms of a long-run equivalence or adjustment which could reduce deviations
from the equilibrium prices. Fourth, the debt hedgers do not play any apparent role in
the price discovery process if they are fully hedged. However, when they only hedge a
given proportion of the total investment in ASPs or bonds, they also contribute to the
price discovery process.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EFFECT OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS ON
THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTEGRATION OF THE
EUROPEAN CORPORATE CREDIT MARKETS
4.1 Introduction
We present empirical evidence suggesting that the current nancial crisis a¤ects
both the degree of internal market integration of three individual corporate credit mar-
kets: Corporate Bonds (Bonds), Asset Swaps Packages (ASP) and corporate Credit De-
fault Swaps (CDS) and the degree of market integration among them. Market-specic
liquidity factors as well as global risks factors are signicant elements leading changes
in internal and external market integration.
In this chapter we dene market integration in terms of the correlation structures
estimated between two credit spreads innovations obtained after subtracting from the
credit spreads the e¤ect of the fundamentals of the underlying entities. We nd that
credit spread changes are largely driven by innovations. To capture the characteristics
of time-varying correlations we employ the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC-
GARCH) model of Engle (2002), which is particularly well suited to examine correlation
dynamics among assets. The higher the innovations correlation, the stronger is the
market integration. We test both the internal or intra-market integration (within a given
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market) and the external or inter-market integration (between two given markets). Our
measure of internal market integration is based on the correlation between an individual
(rm-specic) credit spread innovation, and the corresponding average market credit
spread innovations. Similarly, our measure of external market integration is based on
the DCCs between the two individual credit spreads innovations of the same rm but
in di¤erent markets.
The DCC models have been employed to study the integration or co-movement
among di¤erent nancial markets and among di¤erent economic areas as in Kim, Lucey
and Wu (2005), Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2006), Li and Zou (2008), or Savva,
Osborn and Gill (2009) among others. Kim, Lucey and Wu (2005) examine the integra-
tion of European government bond markets using daily returns over the 1998-2003 time
period. Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2006) analyze the behaviour of international
equities and government bonds. Li and Zou (2008) investigate the impacts of policy
and information shocks on the correlation of Chinas T-bond and stock returns. Other
examples of studies based on the stock and bond marketsintegration are: Kim, Moshirian
and Wu (2005), Kim, Moshirian and Wu (2006), Panchenko and Wu (2009) and Yang,
Zhou and Wang (2009) among others. Savva, Osborn and Gill (2009) investigate the
transmission of price and volatility spillovers across the New York, London, Frankfurt
and Paris stock markets.1
1Other extensions of the DCC models have been employed to study nancial integration. Aslanidis,
Dungey and Savva (2009) employ a single VAR model by embedding Smooth Transition Conditional
Correlation (STCC) models with fat tails, spillovers, volatility clustering, and asymmetric volatility
e¤ects (GJRGARCH). By means of this VARGJRGARCH-STCC-t specication they measure the stock
market integration between the three largest new EU members (Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Poland) and the Euro-zone. Cai, Chou and Li (2009) use the Double Smooth Transition Conditional
Correlation with Conditional Auto Regressive Range (DSTCC-CARR) model to investigate the dynamic
correlations among six international stock market indices and their relationship to ination uctuation
and market volatility.
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In related research, Acharya and Schaefer (2006) and Acharya et al. (2007) analyze
the existence of correlation risk in credit markets in the context of the Ford and GM
downgrades in May 2005 and nd an excess co-movement in the overall xed-income
securities. Coudert and Gex (2008) study the variations in the correlation between CDS
premium around the episode of Ford and GM downgrades by using di¤erent measures
such as the DCC-GARCH model. They nd a signicant increase in CDS premium
correlations between rms during the previous episode which can be interpreted as a
contagion e¤ect. The current nancial crisis represents an illiquid scenario even more
severe than the one analyzed by Coudert and Gex (2008) focused on the Ford and GM
downgrade context.
In this chapter we contribute to the literature by investigating the changes in inter-
nal and external integration over time in fty rms quoted in three European nancial
markets. Unlike a number of previous studies, we do not restrict ourselves to few par-
ticular aggregate market indexes. The reason for taking a broader perspective is to
provide an insight into the integration process of nancial markets at the micro level
rather than simply a narrower integration within or among overall markets.
The underlying motivation for the research stems from the current discussion on
the relative reliability of credit spreads provided by the di¤erent markets for credit risk
(Dötz, 2007 , Forte and Peña, 2009), which deserves further empirical testing. Beyond
that, the research ndings presented here have important implications for investors,
which are concerned by the proper degree of portfolio diversication, and regulators
in an international context, in the sense that a tendency towards stronger (weaker)
convergence of credit spreads provides for a more (less) stable environment for nancial
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decisions.
Our main ndings are as follows. Credit spread changes are largely driven by rm-
specic innovations and to a much lesser extent by changes in fundamentals. Internal
market integration increases during the crisis for CDSs but decreases for Bonds and
ASPs. External market integration decreases during the crisis between the CDS and
the other two markets. Both facts suggest that the CDS market tends to follow its own
way to a considerable extent in times of nancial distress. This nding combined with
the fact of the relatively low liquidity of CDS market in comparison with Bonds and
ASP casts some doubts on the representativeness of market prices quoted in this market.
The degree of internal and external integration is signicantly a¤ected by liquidity and
global risk factors.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 explains the un-
derlying principles of the test procedures employed. Section 3 describes the data set
and claries the choice of periods analysed, while Section 4 presents and discusses the
statistical results. In Section 5 we present several robustness tests. Finally, Section 6
summarises and sets out the main conclusions of the study and the economic implica-
tions.
4.2 Methodology
It is a generally accepted idea that the current nancial crisis leads to a decrease in
corporate CDS liquidity. The high counterparty risk in the CDS market jointly with, as
Dötz (2007) suggests, the relatively high concentration and the homogeneousness of its
often leveraged market players has a¤ected the CDS market severely. The International
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Financial Services London (IFSL) Research (2009a) states that centralized clearing and
voluntary termination of contacts has contributed to a 39% drop in notional amounts
outstanding of CDS from $62 trillion at end-2007 to $38 trillion at end-2008, according
to the ISDA statistics (see Panel A of Figure 1).2 However, as the IFSL Research (2009b)
states, the fall in liquidity during the subprime crisis has increased the importance of
bond markets as a source of nance for companies and governments. The issuance of
corporate bonds increased to record levels towards the end of 2008 and the rst quarter
of 2009, particularly in Europe.3 IFSL Research (2009b) reports that the amounts
outstanding on the global bond market, which includes bonds, notes and money market
instruments, increased 6% in 2008 to $83 trillion. With respect to the bond trading
activity, IFSL Research (2009b) reports that over $1 trillion was traded daily on the US
bond market in 2008, up 1% on the previous year. Moreover, the trading of bonds on
exchanges increased by a quarter in 2008 to over 19$ trillion (see Panel A of Figure 1).
2This decline in trading during the second half of 2008 reects a combination of signicantly reduced
risk appetite, expectations of stable low interest rates in major markets and lower hedge fund activity.
Exchange rate movements may also have a¤ected to this decline. Most institutions report their positions
in US dollars and the euro and the pound sterling depreciated by 30% and 12%, respectively, against
the US dollar between June and December 2008.
3During the rst quarter of 2009, issuance of investment grade corporate bonds in Europe totalled
a record e140bn, well above quarterly levels of less than e50bn seen in recent years. It is motivated,
among other reasons, by the use of bond markets for funding and the generalized government guarantees
aiming to encourage the bond issuance.
139
CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECT OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE
INTEGRATION OF THE EUROPEAN CORPORATE CREDIT MARKETS
This figure reports the CDS notional amount outstanding and the bond trading in exchanges. Panel A shows the
CDS amount outstanding and the bond trading in USD trillion. Both amounts have a semi-annual frequency. The
first observation for both series corresponds to the first half of year 2005 while the last observation corresponds
to the first half of year 2009. The CDS notional amount outstanding is labeled in the left axis while the bond trading
on exchanges is labeled in the right axis. Panel B reports the ratio of the bond trading in exchanges and the CDS
notional amount outstanding. The ratio has a semi-annual frequency. The first observation corresponds to the
first half of year 2005 while the last observation corresponds to the first half of year 2009.
Figure 1: Credit Default Swap Notional Amount Outstanding and Bond
Trading on Exchanges
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In Chapter 3, we employ a sample of 50 ASPs/Bonds and nd that before the
current crisis, the ASP spreads, in most cases, reveal credit risk as e¢ ciently as the
CDS spreads suggesting the existence of a high number of individuals operating in both
markets. During the crisis, they nd that the relative position of the ASP market as an
information provider has improved with respect to its role before the crisis, revealing
information on credit risk faster and more accurately than the CDS market.4 Overall
the above results indicate a decrease in the number of the individuals operating in both
markets. This follows from the fact that the number of cases where both markets reveal
credit risk in an equally e¢ cient way has declined during the crisis.
Acharya and Schaefer (2006) and Acharya et al. (2007) suggest that, in low-liquidity
periods, market makers, who are price setters in both credit markets, are nancially
constrained and thus their participation in both markets will decrease. Although tra-
ding in ASP and Bond markets is predominantly institutional, there is also retail invest-
ment. However, there are no retail participants in the CDS market. Thus, the market
participants in ASP and bond markets are more numerous and heterogeneous. On the
other hand, given the results in Acharya et al. (2007) and in Coudert and Gex (2008)
during the episode of Ford and GM downgrades, we should expect high correlation
among CDS innovations (internal market integration) due to the special characteristics
of the markets participants.
4According to IFSL Research (2009a and 2009b), the attraction of bonds, and implicitly ASPs,
as an investment has increased since the start of the credit crisis and large institutional, as well as
retail, investors increased their holdings due to the losses on equity markets and due to the bonds and
ASPs high returns during 2008. On the other hand, there is a drop in both the notional amounts
outstanding and the number of participants in the CDS market. The nominal of CDSs with respect
to ASP contracts suggests that in periods of nancial distress it is more di¢ cult to participate in CDS
than in ASP markets. The standard bonds face value is e1,000 while the CDS typical notional amount
is e10-20 million for investment grade credits and e2-5 million for high yield credits.
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Given that changes in fundamentals should have a¤ected in a similar way all credit
spreads in xed-income markets, we subtract the component of CDS, ASP and bond
spreads related to changes in fundamentals before analyzing internal and external inte-
gration. We follow Acharya et al. (2007), and the econometric methodology developed
in Acharya and Johnson (2007). Thus, we do not employ CDS, ASP or bond spread
changes but rather innovations to test co-movement between xed-income markets. The
innovations are the residuals obtained from a non-linear equation derived from a struc-
tural model of credit risk such as Merton (1974) in which we regress the credit spread
(CDS spread, ASP spread, Bond spread) percentage changes on a constant, the contem-
poraneous and ve lags of the stock return, the product of that return and the inverse
credit spread level (CDS spread level, ASP spread level, Bond spread level), ve lags of
the credit spread percentage changes (CDS spread percentage changes, ASP spread per-
centage changes, Bond spread percentage changes), the 3-month risk-free rate (3MRF )
and the 10-year risk free rate (10Y RF ):
CS(i) returnt = +
5X
k=0

t k+t k=(CS(i) levelt)

(Stock returnt k)+ (4.1)
+
5X
k=1
t k(CS(i) returnt k)+3MRF t+10Y RF t + "it for i = 1; 2; 3:
where CS(1); CS(2) and CS(3) represent the CDS, ASP and Bond spreads, respectively,
and "1t, "2t and "3t are the innovations for the CDS, ASP and Bond spread returns,
respectively. We assume that a given pair of innovations "t = ("1t; "2t)0 follows a Normal
distribution such that "t j It 1  N(0;Ht):
In order to study the external integration between CDS and ASP markets (we use
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this pair of credit markets to illustrate the methodology), or any other pair of markets,
we obtain the dynamic correlations between the innovations by means of the DCC-
GARCH model (Dynamic Conditional Correlation GARCH) of Engle and Sheppard
(2001) and Engle (2002). This methodology allows us to analyze the evolution over
time of the second moments and to detect any regime shifts or responses to shocks and
also to distinguish the di¤erent behaviour of shocks before and during the crisis period.
Company by company, we estimate the residuals "1t and "2t and form pairs by rm
in order to estimate bivariate DDC-GARCH models and the series of DCCs between
ASPs and CDSs.5 The multivariate conditional covariance matrix can be written as:
Ht = D
1=2
t VtD
1=2
t (4.2)
where Dt is a 2x2 diagonal matrix formed by conditional variances from univariate
GARCH models with hii;t on the ith diagonal, and Vt is a matrix that contains the
conditional correlations of the pair-wise residuals. The variance-covariance matrices are
expanded into individual equations as:
hii;t = ci + aihii;t 1 + bi"2i;t 1; i = 1; 2: (4.3.a)
hij;t = ij;t
p
hii;t
p
hjj;t; i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j: (4.3.b)
where hii;t and hij;t are, respectively, the conditional variance and conditional covariance
with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. The conditional correlation coe¢ cient ij;t is obtained as:
5 In total, we have 50 series of DCCs given that in some cases we have several ASPs by rm.
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ij;t =
qij;tp
qii;tqjj;t
; i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j: (4.4)
where the conditional covariance qij;t between the standardized residuals i;t =
"i;tp
hii;t
and j;t =
"j;tp
hjj;t
can be expressed in a mean reverting process given by:
qij;t = ij(1    ) + i;t 1j;t 1 + qij;t 1; i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j: (4.5)
with  +  < 1 and ;  > 0 and ij is the unconditional correlation between "1t and
"2t The mean of qij;t is ij and the variance is unity.
Engle and Sheppard (2001) and Engle (2002) state that the DCC model was de-
signed to allow for two-stage estimation, where in the rst stage univariate GARCH
models are estimated for each innovations series and, in the second stage, the stan-
dardized innovations are used to estimate the parameters of the dynamic correlation
model.
We repeat the same procedure for the CDS and Bond (ASP and Bond) markets
and form pairs to estimate the DCCs between the CDS and Bond innovations (ASP
and Bond innovations) for each rm.
In order to study the internal integration, for instance using the CDS market, we
employ the CDS innovations for a given name and the average innovations of the rest
of the rms to form pairs of residuals and then, we estimate a bivariate DCC-GARCH
model for each pair. We use the same procedure to estimate DCCs with ASP innovations
and also with Bond innovations.
When the credit spreads innovations are highly correlated, they will tend to move
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together on the up side or on the down side. Conversely, when the innovations are lowly
correlated, they will often diverge. The higher the correlation, the larger the credit
spread innovations co-movement within or between markets and the greater the market
integration. As the nancial crisis has had a signicant impact on the credit markets, we
wish to establish whether the correlations between them have changed over the sample
period, suggesting increasing or decreasing nancial integration.
4.3 Data
Our database contains daily data on Eurobonds and ASPs denominated in Euros
and issued by non-nancial companies that are collected from Reuters and on CDSs
also denominated in Euros and issued by the same non-nancial companies that are
obtained from GFI.
GFI data contain single-name CDSs market prices for 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 years matu-
rities. These prices correspond to actual trades, or rm bids and o¤ers where capital is
actually committed and so they are not consensus or indications. For some companies
and for some maturities, especially two and four years, the data availability is scarce
and in these cases we employ mid-price quotes from a credit curve also reported by GFI
to ll the missing data.
For each bond there is information on both bid and ask prices, the swap spread, the
asset swap spread, the sector of the entity and its geographical location, the currency,
the seniority, the rating history (Fitch, S&P and Moodys ratings), the issuance date
and the amount issued, the coupon and coupon dates and the maturity. We use bonds
whose maturity at the investment dates is lower than ve years. Several bonds issued
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by the same company may be used whenever they satisfy all the required criteria. The
reason is that although CDS spread quotes are referred to the issuer and not to an
individual bond, asset swap spreads are quoted for individual bonds. Due to liquidity
considerations, bonds with time to maturity equal to or less than twelve months in
the date corresponding to their last observation are excluded. Moreover, our sample
contains xed-rate senior unsecured Euro denominated bonds whose issued quantity
exceeds 300 million Euros to avoid the selection of bonds with a small volume and a
reduced liquidity. Due to liquidity restrictions, investments are restricted to periods
when there are 5-year CDS data on either actual trades or bids and o¤ers where capital
is committed.
The data spans from November 1st, 2005 to 9th September 2008. The sample
consists of 38 non-nancial companies and 50 ASPs and bonds.6
Table 1 presents information about all issuers, asset swaps, bonds and CDSs. Ac-
cording to Panel B we observe a great deal of variation both in the amount issued and
in the sample size. The last column shows how far bonds are from par. Panel C includes
CDS, asset swap and bond spread descriptive statistics. On average, CDS spread seems
to be more volatile than the ASP and bond spreads.
6Our initial sample was 285 corporate bond issuers. We found a total of 116 Euro denominated bonds
that mature before February 2012 but only 67 of them include enough information on 5-year bid/ask
CDS spreads, asset swap spreads and Fenics Curve. Of these, two bonds have been discarded because
the issued amount does not exceed 300 millions of Euros, another four bonds were discarded because
they were not investment grade bonds throughout the whole sample period. Another four bonds were
discarded because their asset swap spreads were persistently negative and, nally, seven bonds were
discarded because prices were too far from par.
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This table reports several descriptive statistics and includes different panels.
provides descriptive statistics for bonds. Panel C includes descriptive statistics
Issuer Rating Sector
Akzo Nobel A- Chemicals
BMW A+ Automobile
Bouygues BBB+ Construction
British AM Tob. BBB+ Beverages & Tobacco
Carrefour A Food & Drug Retailers
Casino G. P. BBB- Food & Drug Retailers
Compass Group BBB+ Support Services
Edison BBB+ Public Utilities
Enel A- Public Utilities
Energias de Portugal A- Electricity
E.ON A+ Utilities
France Telecom A- Fixed-Line Telecommunication Svs.
Iberdrola A Petrol and Power
Kingfisher BBB- General Retailers
Koninklijke KPN BBB+ Telecommunication Services
Louis Vuitton BBB+ Other Textiles and Leather Goods
PPR BBB- Retailers - Multi Department
Renault BBB+ Automobiles
Repsol YPF BBB+ Petrol and Power
Reuters A- Publishing
Saint Gobain BBB+ Building and Construction Materials
Scania A- Machinery and Engineering
Siemens A+ Industrial
Sodexho BBB+ Business Support Services
Stora Enso BBB- Forest Product & Paper
Technip BBB Oil - Services
Telecom Italia BBB Public Utilities
Telefonica BBB+ Technology and Telecommunications
Telekom Austria BBB+ Machinery, Transport and Technology
Tesco A- Food & Drug Retailers
Thales A- Defence
Thyssenkrupp BBB Industrial
Union Fenosa A- Petrol and Power
Vinci BBB+ Other Construction
Vivendi BBB Subscription Entertainment Networks
Vodafone A- Wireless Telecomunications Svs.
Volkswagen A- Automobile
Volvo A- Machinery & Engineering
Panel A
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
(in basis points) for the ASP spread; the bond spread and the CDS spread.
Panel A describes the rating and sector of the CDS and bond issuer. Panel B
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Amount issued
(millions of euros) Mean Max Min
Akzo I 750 545 4.250 99.35 101.36 96.56
Akzo II 1,000 674 5.625 102.63 106.95 100.22
BMW 750 617 3.875 98.26 100.02 96.00
Bouygues I 750 645 4.625 100.31 104.04 97.04
Bouyges II 1,000 674 5.875 103.11 107.98 100.28
British AM Tob. I 1,700 692 4.875 101.14 104.58 99.60
British AM Tob. II 1,000 571 4.375 98.66 101.07 95.17
Carrefour I 1,100 554 4.375 99.69 101.96 96.94
Carrefour II 1,000 672 6.125 105.40 111.76 101.09
Casino G. P. I 400 544 4.750 98.93 101.36 95.34
Casino G. P. II 500 677 5.250 101.45 103.98 98.42
Compass Group 300 672 6.000 103.17 106.59 100.60
Edison Spa 700 699 5.125 102.25 106.90 98.71
Enel 750 587 4.125 99.01 101.03 96.75
Energia de Portugal I 1,000 682 6.400 105.05 111.13 100.96
Energia de Portugal II 747 617 5.875 104.82 108.90 100.07
E.ON 4,250 657 5.750 103.23 108.34 100.25
France Telecom 2,500 679 7.000 106.44 112.71 101.82
Iberdrola I 750 674 4.375 100.09 103.68 97.34
Iberdrola II 600 665 4.500 100.65 103.65 99.34
Kingfisher 500 648 4.500 98.24 102.31 91.44
Koninklijke KPN 1,425 545 4.500 98.39 100.55 95.42
Louis Vuitton I 600 556 4.625 100.14 102.43 97.28
Louis Vuitton II 750 702 5.000 101.94 106.32 98.89
PPR 800 547 5.250 101.53 104.58 97.48
Renault 1,000 545 6.125 103.52 106.70 100.83
Repsol YPF 1,175 673 6.000 104.20 109.67 99.96
Reuters 500 683 4.625 100.78 105.38 97.40
Saint Gobain I 1,000 665 4.750 100.86 104.10 98.96
Saint Gobain II 1,100 581 4.250 98.10 100.61 94.17
Saint Gobain III 1,000 653 5.000 101.30 105.27 98.33
Scania 600 652 3.625 96.96 99.98 94.61
Siemens 2,000 577 5.750 104.52 108.22 100.37
Sodexho 1,000 664 5.875 102.83 107.15 100.14
Stora Enso 500 675 3.250 95.61 97.74 92.38
Technip 650 582 4.625 99.61 102.54 95.36
Telecom Italia I 750 678 4.500 99.12 108.60 94.66
Telecom Italia II 2,000 612 7.250 108.02 113.22 102.24
Telefonica 2,250 666 3.750 97.00 99.34 94.67
Telekom Austria 500 681 3.375 97.37 99.15 96.27
Tesco I 750 660 4.750 101.42 105.95 98.75
Tesco II 500 631 3.875 98.20 100.15 95.70
Thales 500 539 4.375 99.35 101.76 96.10
Thyssenkrupp 750 610 5.000 101.22 103.06 98.07
Union Fenosa 500 687 5.000 101.90 107.03 98.28
Vinci 1,025 661 5.875 103.21 108.21 100.08
Vivendi 630 600 3.625 97.45 100.45 94.83
Vodafone 1,900 648 5.125 100.05 102.48 98.90
Volkswagen 1,000 581 4.125 98.35 100.33 95.61
Volvo 300 685 5.375 102.61 107.76 99.56
Average 990.04 633.68 4.94 100.95 104.58 97.78
Panel B
Issuer Observations Coupon (%) Price
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Issuer Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
Akzo I 30.74 13.57 82.09 13.58 21.20 0.70 51.90 10.43 22.20 0.30 54.90 10.63
Akzo II 17.44 6.35 50.05 10.51 15.49 -12.70 49.40 10.87 15.01 -14.30 46.40 11.04
BMW 28.40 6.61 116.66 24.19 17.36 1.30 55.09 10.88 18.50 2.20 58.60 10.86
Bouygues I 33.81 12.00 129.35 21.92 36.39 9.40 79.65 17.40 37.85 11.80 83.50 17.53
Bouygues II 30.73 11.92 119.90 19.61 20.63 0.56 56.97 11.20 20.35 -1.80 94.00 10.86
British AM Tob. I 22.97 6.04 54.00 13.25 22.95 0.25 60.12 11.43 23.66 0.20 77.00 12.02
British AM Tob. II 34.78 13.12 136.64 21.11 52.30 16.90 138.07 29.46 54.70 20.00 144.90 30.34
Carrefour I 23.46 9.43 66.62 11.16 21.46 3.98 50.92 8.30 22.55 0.30 53.70 8.37
Carrefour II 18.43 6.80 52.73 9.41 13.93 0.20 49.36 10.50 13.88 0.40 48.50 9.84
Casino I 70.04 31.03 172.11 31.97 79.54 33.70 163.90 30.89 82.73 36.90 172.10 31.91
Casino II 57.81 22.31 140.94 29.40 61.60 15.72 126.10 26.29 62.60 16.70 128.20 26.02
Compass Group 26.96 9.44 83.29 15.81 32.41 0.70 104.50 18.25 34.04 0.20 103.60 18.28
Edison Spa 23.64 6.51 62.42 11.50 31.26 10.20 59.83 10.47 32.09 3.20 81.60 14.97
Enel 38.89 7.97 144.44 31.67 17.90 -9.00 62.80 10.35 18.89 -4.30 64.20 10.47
Energia de Portugal I 20.10 5.27 64.08 13.46 14.69 -33.18 55.31 14.59 14.13 -40.80 50.60 13.92
Energia de Portugal II 24.40 6.81 71.25 14.61 28.31 0.32 66.19 17.05 28.77 0.80 67.70 16.72
E.ON 18.20 4.98 68.90 13.56 14.91 0.30 54.77 10.30 14.70 0.60 51.10 8.89
France Telecom 29.36 7.64 89.00 18.02 26.74 0.81 68.30 13.85 25.86 1.60 64.70 12.18
Iberdrola I 30.73 6.82 125.48 23.13 22.86 0.91 57.80 10.37 23.89 0.80 58.70 10.05
Iberdrola II 24.76 5.99 106.92 21.06 9.81 0.50 37.09 7.09 9.59 0.60 33.10 9.61
Kingfisher 99.64 31.55 438.26 89.68 110.45 29.10 377.00 103.71 117.27 31.70 407.50 112.10
Koninklijke KPN 56.39 25.16 159.51 23.96 68.86 29.50 173.13 28.29 71.87 33.30 180.40 29.28
Louis Vuitton I 31.20 9.09 110.42 18.20 31.85 10.30 65.21 13.11 33.00 11.10 67.20 13.04
Louis Vuitton II 25.27 5.86 85.36 13.85 26.36 1.74 67.37 10.98 26.71 0.20 66.20 10.39
PPR 64.08 24.73 233.49 44.39 69.38 34.77 187.50 38.00 70.99 36.10 193.50 39.11
Renault 25.24 5.05 95.85 19.94 26.24 5.00 73.80 13.00 25.56 3.30 71.20 11.89
Repsol YPF 31.42 9.69 99.91 17.92 37.74 8.37 98.80 19.30 37.67 9.20 93.10 18.29
Reuters 18.78 9.06 35.72 5.72 28.25 0.67 66.40 10.54 29.27 1.40 66.90 10.33
Saint Gobain I 40.57 10.13 184.47 39.38 25.70 0.33 68.10 13.30 26.02 0.70 67.50 12.64
Saint Gobain II 60.46 15.93 220.00 51.61 58.75 16.90 181.60 35.57 61.70 19.90 192.90 36.81
Saint Gobain III 47.46 11.65 199.16 44.62 42.10 9.60 123.10 23.54 42.82 11.80 124.90 22.80
Scania 37.65 10.24 119.40 21.78 37.06 8.60 81.29 18.87 39.38 10.20 86.90 19.32
Siemens 28.80 9.34 96.52 21.05 22.90 1.66 58.94 14.60 23.52 1.40 60.60 14.42
Sodexho 14.38 4.32 41.93 9.69 26.85 3.39 73.08 13.85 26.45 0.20 69.90 12.20
Stora Enso 84.78 20.37 339.33 87.13 77.72 21.30 276.70 58.21 82.91 24.60 298.00 61.41
Technip 33.37 14.80 83.60 15.76 52.75 18.80 143.34 30.83 54.91 21.10 149.10 31.93
Telecom Italia I 62.34 23.01 205.15 35.48 66.94 20.90 238.20 36.77 68.90 24.00 256.40 38.71
Telecom Italia II 66.30 24.40 212.75 38.90 74.66 22.00 252.27 47.02 73.79 23.70 258.70 47.34
Telefonica 46.56 16.46 153.25 25.46 50.08 17.70 118.12 21.70 52.98 20.20 126.00 22.39
Telekom Austria 29.81 9.66 67.53 14.63 35.19 3.75 87.74 17.46 36.63 5.50 93.10 16.92
Tesco I 15.28 4.06 43.58 9.76 16.36 1.50 66.20 9.29 16.61 0.80 63.40 8.47
Tesco II 18.28 5.00 55.74 11.64 20.65 0.63 55.00 10.49 21.81 0.50 52.90 10.30
Thales 24.63 9.27 82.04 15.53 19.85 1.89 74.88 17.97 31.20 3.70 79.80 18.26
Thyssenkrupp 53.64 17.12 160.77 31.24 43.08 0.20 96.05 19.81 44.36 0.10 95.50 20.28
Union Fenosa 25.26 7.29 58.21 12.16 32.43 6.30 84.39 15.92 33.32 5.60 85.70 15.71
Vinci 34.56 12.26 124.42 24.39 30.66 6.61 76.00 15.39 30.50 4.50 104.70 14.95
Vivendi 43.13 15.74 113.02 21.71 54.18 21.14 127.50 30.43 56.96 22.50 130.30 31.40
Vodafone 25.74 10.90 68.50 15.09 18.44 0.40 56.84 11.00 18.61 0.10 56.00 10.31
Volkswagen 44.61 10.82 170.39 34.28 35.74 6.97 83.20 17.31 37.49 7.50 86.80 17.58
Volvo 28.65 9.73 90.95 15.64 29.38 4.54 69.32 14.73 29.43 6.00 68.40 13.46
Average 36.48 11.87 121.72 23.99 36.65 7.12 100.98 20.42 37.97 7.53 105.81 20.73
Panel C
CDS Premium (basis points) Asset Swap Spread (b.p.) Bond Spread (b.p.)
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4.4 Results
The average R2 obtained in the estimations of equation (4.1) for the CDS, Bond
and ASP spreads percentage changes are: 11% (CDS), 12% (Bond) and 13% (ASP).
It suggests that credit spread changes are largely driven by innovations and to a much
lesser extent by changes in fundamentals. Figure 2 reports the 30-day moving average
of the average intramarket DCCs over time for CDS, ASP and bond innovations. The
DCCs shown are the average of the fty individual DCCs obtained for each rm/bond in
the sample. The average DCCs in CDSs innovations before the crisis are lower than after
(0.4850 vs. 0.5544) being the opposite for ASPs (0.4114 vs. 0.2640) and Bonds (0.4087
vs. 0.2733). In the pre-crisis period internal integration tends to be slightly higher in
the CDS market than in the two other markets which had similar levels on internal
market integration. However during the crisis internal integration increased even more
in the CDS market but decreased substantially in ASP and Bonds markets.78 One
reason justifying the increase in internal CDS market integration in the crisis period is
the concentration of some players in the CDS market. The extinctionof a portion of
individuals operating in various markets jointly with the heterogeneity and the disperse
distribution of the remaining market players in ASP and Bond markets could be the
causes behind the trend towards fragmentation observed in these markets.
7 In order to calculate the average DCCs before and during the crisis we rst estimate the breakpoints
for each series of DCCs for the CDSs, ASPs and bondsinnovations by means of the algorithm described
in Bai and Perron (2003) for simultaneous estimation of multiple breakpoints. See also Zeileis et al.
(2003). We nd that the breakpoint for the DCCs series of CDSs (ASPs and Bonds) is the 25th July
2007 (12th June 2007 and 13th July 2007, respectively). We consider the dates after the minimum
of the three previous dates (12th June 2007) as the crisis period and split the sample period in two
subsamples at this point.
8The individual DCCs for these three combinations of innovations are available upon request. We
also calculate the average correlations between credit spreads and nd the same behaviour as in the
DCC correlations between innovations. The average correlation between CDS spreads before the crisis
are lower than after (0.84 vs. 0.90) and the opposite is true for ASP spreads (0.84 vs. 0.73) and Bond
spreads (0.83 vs. 0.72).
150
CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECT OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE
INTEGRATION OF THE EUROPEAN CORPORATE CREDIT MARKETS
This figure reports the 30-day moving average of DCCs for Bond, ASP and CDS innovations. The DCCs for the
Bond (ASP and CDS) innovations are obtained by averaging over the 50 firms the DCCs obtained between each
individual issuer's Bond (ASP and CDS) innovations and the overall Bond (ASP and CDS) innovations.
Figure 2: DCCs for bond, ASP and CDS innovations
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Figure 3 reports the 30-day moving average of the average inter-market (external)
DCCs. In the pre-crisis period the external integration between ASP and Bonds is high
(average 0.64) and increases slightly (average 0.67) during the crisis.9 On the other
hand the external integration of CDS and ASP (Bonds) shows a more complex pattern.
Before the crisis the degree of external integration of CDS/ASP and CDS/Bond was
similar. There is noticeable fall, coinciding with the beginning of the subprime crisis, in
the degree of external integration both of CDS/ASP and CDS/Bond. At some points in
2007 the coe¢ cients are even negative reaching a minimum of -0.045 in mid-november
2007. After that point there is a very volatile period with ups and downs and negative
9The average correlation between ASP and Bond spreads during the crisis is slightly higher than
before the crisis (0.98 vs. 0.97).
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values near the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The average DCCs between ASP and
CDS (Bond and CDS) before and during the crisis are 0.0203 and 0.0059 (0.0247 and
-0.0023), respectively.10 The overall impression is that the CDS market had, at the most
acute crisis moments, a noticeable decrease in its external integration and then a very
volatile behaviour ensued.11 Reasons justifying the high volatility in external CDS-ASP
and CDS-Bond market integration in the crisis period are related with the diminishing
number of participants in that market as discussed before and also to the drastic change
in liquidity in the CDS market (see Panels A and B of Figure 1). The European Central
Bank report (2009) states that part of the break between the CDS and the cash bond
market in the subprime crisis has resulted from the role that counterparty risk plays in
pricing of CDSs and the role that funding risk plays in the pricing of cash bonds.
10The individual DCCs for these two combinations of innovations are available upon request. The
average correlations between credit spreads are also calculated and reect the same behaviour as the
DCCs between innovations. The average correlation between ASP and CDS spreads before the crisis
are higher than after it (0.79 vs. 0.52) and the same is true for the correlations between Bond and CDS
spreads (0.78 vs. 0.52).
11The CDSs crisis-related decrease in external integration, as measured by the DCCs, can be caused
by decreases in covariance and/or increases in each markets volatility. We nd that the major source
of change are the covariance that change sign (from positive to negative) during the most acute crisis
period.
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This figure reports the 30-day moving average of DCCs between ASP and CDS innovations, Bond and CDS
innovations, and ASP and bond innovations. The DCCs between the ASP and CDS (between the Bond and CDS
and between the ASP and Bond) innovations are obtained by averaging over the 50 issuers, the DCCs obtained
between each issuer's ASP and CDS (Bond and CDS, and ASP and Bond) innovations. The average DCCs
between ASP and CDS innovations and between Bond and CDS innovations are labeled in the left axis while the
average DCCs between ASP and bond innovations are labeled in the right axis.
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
27
/02
/20
06
27
/04
/20
06
27
/06
/20
06
27
/08
/20
06
27
/10
/20
06
27
/12
/20
06
27
/02
/20
07
27
/04
/20
07
27
/06
/20
07
27
/08
/20
07
27
/10
/20
07
27
/12
/20
07
27
/02
/20
08
27
/04
/20
08
27
/06
/20
08
27
/08
/20
08
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
ASP - CDS
Bond - CDS
ASP - Bond
Figure 3: DCCs for ASP-CDS, Bond-CDS and ASP-Bond innovations
We now analyze the determinants of the DCCs, or in other words, the determinants
of the internal and external market integration or co-movement among credit markets.
For this aim, we group the panels by bond/rm in such a way that we have, at most, fty
groups which form a global unbalanced panel and estimate the e¤ect of the potential
determinants by means of an OLS regression with correlated panels corrected standard
errors (PCSEs) and which are robust to heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous corre-
lation across panels.12 We employ the Fishers transformation for the DCCs to ensure
that they are dened in the range of all real numbers:
12Each element in the covariance matrix of the disturbances is computed with all available observations
that are common to the two panels contributing to the covariance, thus if an observation has missing
data, we do not exclude the rest of observations for that time period when estimating the covariance
matrix.
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D^CC =
1
2
log

1 +DCC
1 DCC

(4.6)
Then, we regress the daily D^CCs obtained for each of the 50 cases on three groups
of potential determinants of these DCCs:13
Liquidity : We employ illiquidity measures in bond and CDS markets by means of
the bid-ask spread. As we do not have any illiquidity measure for the ASPs, we proxy it
by means of the bid-ask spread of the underlying bond in the ASP.14 When we analyze
the internal integration, we employ the illiquidity measure in the corresponding market
as an explanatory variable or a potential determinant of the DCCs pattern. When
we study the external integration, we employ a relative illiquidity measure which is
obtained by dividing the bid-ask spreads of the two markets. In the special case of
external integration between ASP and Bond markets we employ the illiquidity measure
(bid-ask) in the bond market.
Company information: We summarize the company information by means of the
rating. As the rms that form the sample are investment grade and their ratings are
between the interval with the lower limit in BBB- and the upper limit in A+, we assign
values from 1 to 6 such that the value 1 is assigned to the lower rating and the value 6
is assigned to rating A+.
Market Risk factor : We measure the risk that a¤ects the European rms that form
the sample by means of the logarithm of the implied volatility index for the German
13We have tested for potential problems of multicollinearity and nd that the maximum correlation
between the explanatory variables is close to 0.3 for the correlation between the measure of bond or CDS
illiquidity and the logarithm of the VDAX index. The table of correlations is available upon request.
14The ASP consists of a corporate bond and an IRS but the IRS is a very liquid instrument and thus,
we focus on the importance of the bond illiquidity measure.
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Futures and Options Exchange (VDAX) which is based on DAX index options.15 More-
over, and to test the possible impact of punctual inuential events during the crisis,
we use a dummy variable equal to one the day before the inuential event, the day
corresponding to the inuential event and the day after it.16
Table 2 reports the results for the determinants of the external integration between
the ASP and CDS markets, between the bond and CDS markets, and between the ASP
and bond markets. Column (1) shows the results obtained using the DCCs between
the ASPs and CDSs innovations as the dependent variable while Columns (2) reports
the results for the regression where the dependent variable is the DCCs between the
Bonds and CDSs innovations. In both columns, we nd that as the CDS/Bond rela-
tive illiquidity measure increases, the external integration or co-movement between the
CDS/ASP and CDS/Bond markets decreases. Or in other words, as the CDS market
becomes more illiquid relative to the Bond market, the DCCs between the ASP and CDS
innovations and between the Bond and CDS innovations decrease. Thus, the relative
illiquidity measure could explain the change in the trend of DCCs that occur coinciding
with the beginning of the crisis. The reason is that the liquidity in the CDS market
relative to the ASP/Bond market has decreased during the crisis as can be observed
in Panel B of Figure 1.17 Although all the rms that form the sample are investment
grade, we nd that the DCCs are lower for the rms with a high rating. With respect to
the market risk factors, we nd that the higher the market risk, the lower is the external
15We employ the VDAX Index instead of the VIX Index to capture the risk that a¤ects the European
rms because the correlation between the Eurostoxx 50 and the VDAX is higher in absolute terms
(j 0:32j) than the correlation between Eurostoxx 50 and the VIX (j 0:15j).
16A list of the inuential events is in Appendix B.
17 In Chapter 3, we nd that the ASP/Bond market reveals credit risk more e¢ ciently than the CDS
market during the crisis.
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integration. This is consistent with Figure 3. Of course, risk has increased considerably
during the subprime crisis and as occurs with the bond illiquidity, these signs could also
reect the change of trend of DCCs in Figure 3 around the summer of 2007. Finally,
in Column (3) we report the results for the regression where the dependent variable is
the DCCs between the ASPs and Bonds innovations. The bond illiquidity measure has
a positive and signicant e¤ect on the dependent variable. It seems that, on average,
both markets are more integrated in periods of low liquidity as the current nancial
crisis. We nd that the market risk factors (VDAX Index and dummy for inuential
events) have a positive and signicant e¤ect on the DCCs. The coe¢ cient of the rms
credit quality has the same sign that in Columns (1) and (2) although it has a higher
and more signicant e¤ect.
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This table reports the determinants of the shock transmission process between credit markets. Column (1)
shows the results obtained after using the Fisher's transformed DCCs between the ASPs and CDSs daily
innovations as the dependent variable. Column (2) reports the results for the regression where the dependent
variable is the Fisher's transformed DCCs between the bonds and CDSs daily innovations. Column (3) shows
the results obtained after using the Fisher's transformed DCCs between the ASPs and bonds daily innovations
as the dependent variable. We group the panels by bond/firm in such a way that we have, at most, 50 groups
which form a global unbalanced panel. We estimate the coefficients of the determinants of the shock trans-
mission process by means of an OLS regression with correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
and robust to heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels. The results presented in
each column, (1), (2) and (3), correspond to the estimated coefficient (first sub-column) and the t-statistic
(second subcolumn).
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
CDS/Bond relative illiquidity measure -0.1351 -3.46 -0.1773 -4.06
Bond illiquidity (bid-ask) 0.6437 23.50
Company rating -0.0078 -22.30 -0.0077 -24.30 -0.0549 -49.37
Dummy for influential events -0.0127 -8.59 -0.0168 -9.13 0.0240 2.35
VDAX Index (in logs) -0.0201 -7.59 -0.0396 -12.26 0.0485 2.69
Constant 0.1036 13.26 0.1579 16.90 0.7810 15.26
R-squared 0.025 0.035 0.078
Observations 23614 23614 28366
Number of groups 50 50 50
Obs. per group                Minimum 189 189 414
Average 472 472 567
Maximum 587 587 605
Wald chi2 (10 df) 710.99 1028.75 2995.53
Prob. > chi2 0 0 0
Condition Index 7.11 7.11 7.85
(2) (3)
Table 2: Determinants of the Financial Integration Process between ASPs and CDSs,
 between bonds and CDSs and between ASPs and bonds
(1)
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Table 3 reports the results for the determinants of the internal integration in the
CDS, ASP and Bond markets. Column (1) shows the results for the CDS market
while Columns (2) and (3) report the results for the ASP and Bond markets, respec-
tively. These columns conrm the di¤erent behavior of the CDS market compared to
ASPs/bonds markets during the illiquid scenario that we are analyzing. The integration
within the CDS market increases with the illiquidity in the CDS market. Nevertheless,
the integration within both Bond and ASP markets is negatively related to the illiquid-
ity in the Bond market. The company rating also presents a di¤erent inuence. A low
rating increases (decreases) the DCCs in the CDS market (ASP or bond market). The
coe¢ cients on the dummy for inuential events and the VDAX Index present di¤erent
signs for the CDS on the one hand, and the ASP and Bond spreads on the other. It
suggest that the market risk levels inherent to the subprime crisis have the expected
e¤ect on CDS markets, an increase in the shocks correlation, and also on ASP and bond
markets, a decrease in the shocks correlation.
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This table shows the determinants of the shock transmission process between credit markets. Column (1) shows
the results obtained after using the Fisher's transformed DCCs between the CDSs daily innovations themselves
as the dependent variable, while Columns (2) and (3) report the results for the regressions where the dependent
variables are the Fisher's transformed DCCs between ASP daily innovations themselves and bond daily innova-
tions themselves, respectively. We group the panels by bond/firm such that we have, at most, fifty groups which
form a global unbalanced panel. We estimate the coefficients of the determinants of the shock transmission pro-
cess by means of an OLS regression with correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels. The results presented in each column, (1),
(2) and (3), correspond to the estimated coefficient (first sub-column) and the t-statistic  (second subcolumn).
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
CDS illiquidity (bid-ask) 0.2645 7.34
Bond illiquidity (bid-ask) -0.2091 -16.69 -0.1083 -5.34
Company rating -0.0121 -15.69 0.0378 62.39 0.0232 32.40
Dummy for influential events 0.0225 3.43 -0.0545 -7.87 -0.0450 -3.79
VDAX Index (in logs) 0.1721 14.73 -0.2598 -21.25 -0.3232 -15.79
Constant 0.1161 3.52 1.0425 29.93 1.2715 21.78
R-squared 0.103 0.245 0.130
Observations 23650 28366 28366
Number of groups 50 50 50
Obs. per group                      Minimum 189 414 414
Average 473 567 567
Maximum 587 605 605
Wald chi2 (10 df) 744.18 5050.33 1477.44
Prob. > chi2 0 0 0
Condition Index 8.00 7.85 7.85
(3)(1)
Table 3: Determinants of the Financial Integration Process between CDSs,
 ASPs and bonds innovations themselves
(2)
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4.5 Robustness Tests
We repeat the analysis of the DCCs determinants under other regression models.
First, we estimate the e¤ect of the potential determinants by means of an OLS regression
with bond/ASP xed e¤ects. Of course, the rating variable cannot be used in this
regression as it is constant for each bond/ASP along time. The results are consistent
with the ones reported in Tables 2 and 3. Second, we estimate the e¤ect of the potential
determinants by means of a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels, corrected
standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation
across panels and serial autocorrelation within panels. The correlation within panels is
treated as a rst-order autocorrelation AR(1) and the coe¢ cient of this process common
to all the panels. The data for some bonds/ASPs/CDSs form an unbalanced panel with
missing observations not only at the beginning of the series but also in the middle of
the series. Thus, we substitute the missing observations by interpolating linearly the
corresponding variable such that at the end we only have missing values at the beginning
of the series and there are no missing values once we include the rst realization of the
series. We nd that the results are consistent with respect to the ones reported in Tables
2 and 3.
We employ the VDAX Index in our analysis instead of the VIX Index to capture
the risk that a¤ects the European rms because the correlation between the Eurostoxx
50 and the VDAX is higher in absolute terms (j   0:32j) than the correlation between
Eurostoxx 50 and the VIX (j   0:15j). However, we repeat the analysis using the VIX
and a systemic risk measure [Interbank Rate (BBA LIBOR) minus Interest Rate Swaps
(Overnight Swap)] to proxy the risk factor and results do not change signicantly with
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respect to the ones obtained when we use the VDAX Index. Finally, besides the CDS
and bond bid-ask spreads we employ two additional liquidity proxies. We use the CDS
notional amount outstanding (in USD trillion) and the value of bond trading (in USD
trillion). Both series are shown in Figure 1. These variables have semi-annual frequency.
We obtain similar results to the ones reported in Tables 2 and 3.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper uses the information on credit risk for fty rms using the prices in
CDS, ASP and Bonds from November 1st, 2005 to 9th September 2008 to study the
markets internal and external integration. To do this, we rst compute the innovations
using a non-linear equation derived from a Merton-based structural model of credit
risk and then we estimate a DCC-GARCH model and evaluate its results. We nd
that credit spread changes are largely driven by rm-specic innovations and to a much
lesser extent by changes in fundamentals. Internal market integration increases during
the crisis for CDSs but decreases for Bonds and ASPs. External market integration
decreases during the crisis between the CDS and the other two markets. The degree
of internal and external integration is signicantly a¤ected by liquidity and global risk
factors.
The results provide a number of insights into the important issue of the relative
reliability of market-based credit risk measures. In particular we nd that the CDS
market tends to follow its own way to a considerable extent in times of nancial distress.
These results have a number of important economic implications. For example, they
suggest that a substantial portion of the changes in corporate credit risk is not related
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with changes in economic fundamentals and may not be diversiable. This has clear
implications for portfolio choice and the cost of corporate debt capital. Furthermore
and given the fact of the relatively low liquidity of CDS market in comparison with
Bonds and ASP, our results cast some doubts on the representativeness of market prices
quoted in the CDS market.
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TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
RISK FREE RATE
5.1 Introduction
We present a tentative estimate of a new nancial variable: the common risk
free rate of interest for the European Monetary Union (EMU) members. We show
how to estimate it for a given set of countries and discuss its uses for monetary policy
management and its implication for nancial marketsintegration. The results suggest
that this common rate, in all cases, could imply savings in borrowing costs for all the
countries involved.
The possibility of a common European bond has attracted the interest of the nan-
cial press and is receiving increased attention from policy makers.1 There are potential
wider benets for the Eurozone as well as specic benets for market agents such as
issuers, dealers, and investors. A large common bond issue could have benets even for
countries with low credit risk (Germany, France), as it could rival Americans treasuries
market for liquidity. Moreover a single issuer would make EMU bonds more attractive
to investors in large foreign-exchange reserves (China, Japan) and enhance the euros
standing as a reserve currency, as well as lowering borrowing costs for all countries that
took part in it.2 On the other hand, some arguments against it have been raised focu-
1EPDA(2008,2009).
2Additional technical advantages such as minimizing the possibilities of squeezesare discussed in
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sing on the possible increase in moral hazard as well as the technical and institutional
di¢ culties of managing a common bond issuance. However, as far as we know, there is
no published quantication of a common risk free rate, nor a detailed comparison with
other possible alternatives is available. This chapter addresses both questions.
A common risk free rate could be used as a benchmark for measuring the benets
from nancial market integration in the EMU. We conjecture and provide some evidence
that our estimate of this rate would be close to what a common EMU-based single bond
would yield for a specied maturity. We can then compare actual rates o¤ered by the
di¤erent EMU countries with sovereign bonds with this common rate. This allows us to
compute the savings in terms of nancing costs per year for the di¤erent EMU members.
Given the common risk free rate measure we conjecture, our results suggest that there
would be savings in borrowing costs for all EMU countries involved. Of course, there
are many institutional design features that must be resolved (seniority, amount relative
to total debt issues, guarantee fund, etc.) before such a common bond can be launched.
But our paper provides a rst insight into one central issue, namely, what should be
the required compensation a given country X should pay to the actual issuer (lets
assume that the issuer is the ECB or other EMU-wide agency) to be allowed to share a
given issue of EMU-based single bonds. We argue that this compensation should be the
Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread on Xs sovereign bonds. The benets for country X
in using the common bond (instead of the sovereign bond) will be the enhanced rating
and liquidity the common bond would provide plus additional premiums for country
Xs macro fundamentals.
Pagano and Von Thadden (2004).
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Motivated by a simple theoretical portfolio selection model, we rst analyze the
determinants of EMU sovereign yield spreads and nd signicant e¤ects of the credit
quality, macro, correlation, and liquidity variables. Robustness tests with di¤erent data
frequencies, benchmarks, liquidity and risk variables, cross section regressions, balanced
panels and maturities conrm the initial results.
We dene the Hedged Yieldof the sovereign debt of a country as the di¤erence of
actual yield and the corresponding CDS spread. Based on these hedged yields we build
one estimate of the common risk free rate and show that this common rate would imply
savings in borrowing costs for all the countries involved.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews some current
literature on the subject; Section 2 introduces a theoretical model that allows us to
determine the main components of the sovereign bond yields. Section 3 describes the
data. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and presents some robustness tests.
Section 5 introduces the construction of the common risk free rate. Section 6 discusses
some policy implications and Section 7 o¤ers some concluding remarks and proposes
future lines of research.
5.2 Related Literature on EMU Sovereign Bond spreads
Since the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU henceforth) the
topic of the determinants of the sovereign bondsyield spreads within the EMU has
been the subject of intense and increasing research. Researchers have tried to nd
out which are the factors that explain the di¤erences between sovereign yields in the
EMU countries, but so far no clear consensus has emerged. Codogno, Favero and Misale
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(2003) nd that for most EMU countries only international risk factors have explanatory
power while liquidity factors play a smaller role. Amira (2004) nds that sovereign
yields increase with maturity, issue size and gross fees and decrease with credit rating.
Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2004) report that EMU government bond spreads are
related to common factors whereas they do not nd evidence for a signicant impact
of macroeconomic or liquidity related variables. Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht
(2006) report that global risk factors as well as idiosyncratic macroeconomic factors
a¤ect yield spreads, whereas liquidity plays a marginal role. Gomez-Puig (2008) nds
that idiosyncratic factors (credit risk and liquidity) mostly drive yield di¤erentials but
systemic risk factors play only a marginal role. Favero, Pagano and Von Thadden (2008)
nd that one aggregate risk factor is consistently priced, that liquidity di¤erentials are
priced for a subset of countries, and that the interaction of liquidity di¤erentials with
the risk factor is consistently priced. In all these papers the benchmark for comparing
the yield spreads is based on the German 10-year bund or German zero coupon curves.
Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009), however, use as benchmark the Euro-swap curve
and show that the bulk of yield spread is explained by di¤erences in credit quality
as measured by the CDS, whereas liquidity plays a nontrivial role especially for low
credit risk countries and in times of high market uncertainty. In summary, most papers
suggest that credit quality-related factors, common business cycle factors (international
or EMU), and, to a lower extent, liquidity-related factors are critical drivers of sovereign
yield di¤erentials.
The selection of the appropriate benchmark reference, however, has not received
extensive attention in the literature. The most common view associates the benchmark
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bond with the lowest yield. If that were all that mattered for benchmark status, then the
German market would provide, on average, the benchmark at all maturities. Analysts
who take this view accept that the appropriate criterion for benchmark status is that
this is the security against which others are priced, and they simply assume that the
security with lowest yield takes that role. A plausible alternative, however, is to interpret
benchmark to mean the most liquid security, which is therefore most capable of providing
a reference point for the market. But the Italian market, not the German, is easily the
most liquid for short-dated bonds;3 and perhaps the French is most liquid at medium
maturities.4 Dunne, Moore and Portes (2002) consider in detail the meaning of the term
benchmarkbond. They investigate two possible criteria, using Granger-causality and
cointegration tests. They nd rather di¤erent results with the two methods, reecting
their di¤erent temporal focus. But with neither of them do they nd the unambiguous
benchmark status for German securities that would come from a simple focus on the
securities with the lowest yield at a given maturity. They suggest looking for benchmark
portfolios rather than a single benchmark security. This may be particularly appropriate
in this partially integrated market and it is the approach we take in this paper. We
take the benchmark to be a weighted average of the total gross debt at nominal value
issued by the general governments of the di¤erent EMU members.
3Most of the trading for 10-year German bonds occurs on the futures market; this market is then
more liquid and deeper than the cash market.
4Favero, et al. (2008) set the French bond as the benchmark for the ve-year maturity. This choice
is supported by the evidence in Dunne, Moore and Portes (2002) and by the fact that traders view the
French bond as the most liquid for that maturity.
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5.3 Theoretical Model
The model we use to motivate the explanatory variables employed in the empi-
rical part of the paper is an extension of the portfolio model of bond yield di¤erentials
developed in Bernoth et al (2006). Consider a domestic (benchmark) investor allocating
a fraction t (t ) of his real wealth wt (wt ) to a domestic D (benchmark F) security
and a fraction 1   t (1   t ) to a benchmark (domestic) security. Assume that both
the domestic and benchmark securities are subject to default risk. The default process
is assumed to follow a correlated bivariate Bernoulli process (xt; xt ), with domestic
(benchmark) default probability 1   Pt (1   P t ). In the event of default the investor
receives a fraction  t (t ) of his gross domestic (benchmark) payment,  t 2 [0; 1 + r)
(t 2 [0; 1 + r)) where r (r) is the interest rate on the domestic (benchmark) bond.
There are proportional transaction costs lt (lt ) decreasing with domestic (benchmark)
market liquidity. To simplify the presentation the coe¢ cient of risk aversion  is assumed
to be the same for both investors. Let St be the total supply of bond issued by the
domestic government and assuming that the market clears, market equilibrium requires
that:
St = btwt + btwt (5.1)
where the rst term in the right hand side denotes the optimal amount of domestic
bonds held by the domestic investor and the second term denotes the optimal amount of
domestic bonds held by the benchmark investor. Assuming that the investors maximize
a one period mean-variance utility function it is possible to solve for the interest rate
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di¤erential between the two economies (details of the model can be found in Appendix
C.1):
rt   rt = (lt   lt ) + St

2
V ar [(1 + rt    t)xt   (1 + rt   t )xt ] 
 
2
(wt + w

t )
h
(1 + rt   t )2 P t (1  P t )
i
+
+

2
(wt + w

t ) [(1 + rt    t) (1 + rt   t )Cov(xt; xt )] +
+ (1 + rt    t) (1  Pt)  (1 + rt   t ) (1  P t ) (5.2)
Dening
k = (1 + rt    t)
k = (1 + rt   t )
The model can then be written:
rt   rt = kE [1  xt]  kE [1  xt ] + (lt   lt ) +
+A1StV ar [kxt   kxt ] +A2
 
kkCov [xt; xt ]  (k)2V ar [xt ]

(5.3)
where
A1 =

2
A2 = A1 [wt + w

t ]
Equation (5:3) decomposes the yield spread into four components. The rst two
terms are the default risk premium which is related with individual (country-specic)
default probabilities. The higher is the domestic (benchmark) country-specic default
probability the higher (lower) is the spread. Also, the riskier the domestic bond is in
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comparison with the benchmark, the greater will be the premium. Overall the e¤ect
of increases in the default risk premium will tend to increase yield spreads.5 The third
term on the right hand side is the liquidity premium. The less liquid the domestic bond
is in comparison with the benchmarkliquidity, the greater will be this premium. The
fourth term depends on the total debt St (which we later proxy with macro factors like
budget and trade balances), the volatility of the di¤erences in the default processes,
and their interaction. The last term in the equation is a measure of covariance risk in
excess of the volatility of the benchmarks default risk.
To test this model empirically we need to specify proxies for the components in
equation (5:3). We use the CDS spreads as a proxy of the default risk premium as
suggested in Beber et al. (2009).6 As a measure of liquidity we use the bonds daily
turnover volume; the di¤erence between the domestic and benchmark economy serves to
estimate the liquidity premium.7 We also include two macro measures directly related
with the total supply of bond issued by the domestic government and the health of the
trade sector: total debt over GDP and net trade balance over GDP, both of them in
deviations from the benchmark. Also, we use the interaction between the total debt
over GDP and the volatility of the di¤erences between the domestic and benchmark
yields as a measure of both the total supply of debt and its relative risk.8 Since the
5 In the domestic (benchmark) cases the default risk premium decreases (increases) with an increase
in the recovery rates in case of default  t (t ).
6To deal with possible endogeneity problems we use the one day-lagged CDS spread.
7We realize that there is no generally held denition of liquidity. Many other measures have been
suggested in the literature. In fact there is a close relationship between many of the measures and actual
transactions costs, and the assumption that liquidity proxies measure liquidity seems to be granted, see
Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2008). Moreover, volume and other liquidity measures are usually
employed in policy analysis, see European Central Bank (2009). In Section 4.2.4 we perform some
robustness tests with respect to di¤erent specications of the liquidity variable.
8The volatility of the di¤erences between the domestic and benchmark yields accounts for the dif-
ferences in the default processes.
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overall investors risk attitude is not observable we proxy the global risk aversion with
the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index VIX.9 Finally, the correlation
between the domestic bond yield and the benchmark bond yield is used as a proxy for
country-specic covariance risk.10
Recent work by Favero et al. (2009) and Berber et al. (2009) suggests that liquidity
factors tend to be more important in uncertain times and that liquidity and credit risk
potentially interact. We include in the regressions a proxy for that interaction variable
between liquidity and credit risk using the product of liquidity times CDS spread to
incorporate the e¤ect of time-varying uncertainty.11 This interaction also allows us
to capture the di¤erential e¤ects across countries of ight-to-safety and/or ight-to-
liquidity. We also include a crisis dummy variable to take into account possible changes
in the intercept before and during crisis.
5.4 Data
The data consists of daily sovereign yields with maturities of 3, 5, 7, and 10 years
for eleven EMU countries from January, 1 2004 to February 27, 2009. From August 9,
2007 to February 27, 2009, the period during the ongoing nancial crisis, a crisis dummy
is added to some of the estimations. Appendix C.2 provides additional details about the
9The VIX is often used as a proxy for investors attitude toward risk and appears to explain move-
ments of the bond spreads in recent years, see Hartelius et al. (2008) and Pan and Singleton (2007).
10This approximation is consistent with assuming that the volatility of both rates are similar and then
the last term in (3) reduces to [(k=k)Corr(x; x)  1] and the expected sign for our proxy is positive.
11The liquidity measure employed to construct the interaction term is the Bid-Ask spread to make
sure that both credit and liquidity variables move in the same direction. Thus, the higher the illiquidity
or the credit risk, the higher is the interaction term. We also employ this liquidity measure to avoid
multicollinearity problems. These problems are derived from the use of the turnover volume variable to
control for interaction e¤ects given that the correlation between the CDS spread lagged one period and
the interaction term obtained from the turnover volume and the CDS spread lagged one period is 0.9.
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denition, sources, and timing of the data used in the study.12 Table 1 reports the total
gross government debt outstanding at the end of the year for the eleven EMU members
for the period 2003-2008. Summarizing the most salient features in Table 1, the three
largest EMU bond issuers are Germany (25%), Italy (25%) and France (21%) and the
smallest are Austria (2.7%), Portugal (1.6%) and Ireland (1.1%).
This table reports the total gross government debt outstanding at the end of the year for eleven EMU members
for the period 2003-2008 in billions (milliards) of Euros. It also reports the proportion of the total debt outstanding
by each of the EMU members.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria:         Amount outs. 150.7 155.8 159.5 161 176.4 193.2
                    % of the total 2.78% 2.75% 2.75% 2.73% 2.76% 2.77%
Belgium:       Amount outs. 273.2 278.6 279.7 281.2 308.7 325.7
                    % of the total 5.04% 4.91% 4.82% 4.77% 4.83% 4.68%
Finland:        Amount outs. 67.24 65.05 65.54 63.03 62.14 71.61
                    % of the total 1.24% 1.15% 1.13% 1.07% 0.97% 1.03%
France:        Amount outs. 1076.9 1145.4 1149.9 1208.8 1327.1 1531.6
                    % of the total 19.87% 20.20% 19.83% 20.50% 20.78% 21.99%
Germany:     Amount outs. 1451.1 1521.9 1569 1576.6 1641.8 1752.7
                   % of the total 26.77% 26.83% 27.05% 26.74% 25.71% 25.17%
Greece:       Amount outs. 183.2 195.3 204.4 216.4 237.2 254.1
                  % of the total 3.38% 3.44% 3.52% 3.67% 3.71% 3.65%
Ireland:        Amount outs. 43.9 44.6 44.2 47.6 80.3 102.1
                  % of the total 0.81% 0.79% 0.76% 0.81% 1.26% 1.47%
Italy:            Amount outs. 1444.6 1512.8 1582 1599 1663.6 1732.1
                  % of the total 26.65% 26.67% 27.28% 27.12% 26.05% 24.87%
Netherlands:  Amount outs. 257.6 266.1 255.9 258.8 346.2 332.2
                   % of the total 4.75% 4.69% 4.41% 4.39% 5.42% 4.77%
Portugal:      Amount outs. 84 94.8 100.5 103.7 110.4 123.4
                   % of the total 1.55% 1.67% 1.73% 1.76% 1.73% 1.77%
Spain:          Amount outs. 388.4 391 389.4 380.7 432.5 545.4
                   % of the total 7.16% 6.89% 6.71% 6.46% 6.77% 7.83%
Total:           Amount outs. 5420.84 5671.35 5800.04 5896.83 6386.34 6964.11
                   % of the total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Ameco Database. Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission.
Table 1: General Government Gross Debt
In all cases the yields increase and the volatilities decrease with maturity. In ge-
neral, average trading volume decreased during the crisis13 suggesting that transaction
costs increased across the board in the crisis period as well as CDS spreads and yield
volatilities.14 There is also evidence of an overall worsening of the trade balance across
12Detailed descriptive statistics for all the variables and countries are available on request. We report
some of the important descriptive statistics below.
13There are slight increases in Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands.
14 It is interesting to note that some countries viewed by the market as having very little average
sovereign risk (CDS spread around 2 basis points) before the crisis, like Germany, Austria, Belgium,
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countries after the crisis started15 as well as a decrease of the ratio of debt to GDP.16
For the 3, 5, 7, and 10 year sovereign yields the lowest averages are 3.30, 3.51, 3.70
and 3.91 respectively for Germany; the highest averages are 3.56, 3.82, 4.02, and 4.28 for
Greece. Both the standard deviations and the minimum and maximum values indicate
that there can be signicant time-series variation in the sovereign yields. For example,
3-year yield for Italy ranges from 2.29 to 5.02 during the sample period.
Average daily trading volume (in millions of Euros) also presents wide variation
ranging from the high volumes for Germany (16,813) and Italy (11,772) to the low
volumes for Finland (239) and Ireland (130).
Average CDS rates vary substantially across countries. The lowest average in the
whole sample is 8.41 basis points for Germany; the highest average is 40.25 basis points
for Greece.17 The macro factors also vary widely across countries. For instance the
country with highest average Debt/GDP ratio is Italy (104%) and the lowest Ireland
(27%) and the country with worse average trade balance is Greece (-6.5%) and the
best one is Ireland (+5.6%). Regarding the average interaction debt factor, which
measures not only the total debt outstanding but also its risk with respect to the
benchmark, varies between 10 for Greece and 2 for Ireland, increasing markedly once
the crisis starts to 16 and 4 respectively.18 With respect to the liquidity/credit risk
interaction factor, it varies between 0.1 basis points for Germany and 2.9 basis points for
France, or The Netherlands, were penalized in di¤erent ways once the crisis unfolds, being Germany (16
b.p.) and France (20 b.p.) viewed as the safest, then The Netherlands (25 b.p.) and nally Belgium
(33 b.p.) and Austria (37 b.p.). However all countries experienced, in specic days, very high CDS
premium, for instance Germany (91.8 b.p.), France (96 b.p.) or Austria (272 b.p.).
15The only exception being Italy whose (negative) external balance does not change.
16Portugal is the only exception with a ratio of 63% after the crisis in comparison with 61% before it.
17Both the standard deviations and the minimum and maximum values indicate that there can also
be signicant time-series variation in the sovereign CDS premium. For example, the cost of credit
protection for Ireland ranges from 2.80 to 395.80 basis points during the sample period.
18Similar increases are also observed in all other countries.
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Greece, increasing substantially during the crisis to 0.4 and 7.9 basis points, respectively.
The low magnitude associated to the liquidity/credit risk interaction is due to the low
magnitude of the bid-ask spread (i.e.: the average bid-ask spread is 6.7 basis points
for Greece). Finally, the average correlation between the domestic 10-year government
yield and the benchmark is highest for Germany (0.98) and lowest for Austria (0.87)
decreasing in all countries during the crisis period, with France being the highest (0.96)
and Greece the lowest (0.76). This decrease in the correlations could reect a decrease
in the degree of integration in the sovereign bond market of the EMU area in time
periods of nancial distress.19
5.5 Empirical Results
Having established the factors to be used as explanatory variables for the so-
vereign yields spreads (as suggested by the theoretical model), we now turn our attention
to examine the economic and statistical signicance of the variables in explaining both
the cross-section as well as the time series of yields spreads. We group the data by
country (11 countries) and maturity (3, 5, 7 and 10 years) totaling 44 groups which
form an unbalanced panel.20
Average correlations among dependent and explanatory variables are presented in
Table 2.21 As expected, sovereign yields spreads are positively related to CDSs lagged
by one day. This is consistent with our theoretical models prediction that increases
19Analyses of nancial integration in the Euro Area sovereign bond market can be found in Adam
et al. (2002), Adjaouté and Danthine (2003) Baele et al. (2004) and Schulz and Wol¤ (2008) among
others. They conclude that despite the great convergence between yields, yield di¤erentials have not
disappeared completely under EMU and so, European sovereign bonds are still not perfect substitutes.
20The panel is unbalanced because we do not have information on some variables from the beginning
of the sample. However, there are no missing values once we include the rst realization of the series.
21All the variables, with the exception of the measure of global risk, the correlation between the do-
mestic Government and benchmark yields, and the crisis dummy are in deviations from the benchmark.
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in default risk premiums are associated with increases in yield spreads. The negative
correlation between yield spreads and the liquidity variable is in agreement with the
theoretical prediction that the less liquid the domestic bond market is in comparison
with the benchmarkliquidity, the greater will be the yield spread. The positive corre-
lations for the Debt/GDP, Interaction variable and global risk suggest that as they each
increase, sovereign yield spreads increase. The high and positive correlation between
the liquidity/credit risk interaction variable and the sovereign yield spread suggests that
there is an additional interactive e¤ect in addition to the individual e¤ect of these two
variables. The negative correlation for the Trade balance variable suggests that trade
decit increase government yield spreads. Overall, the signs are in agreement with the
ones suggested by the theoretical model. Our main objective, however, is to examine
the joint e¤ect of these explanatory variables on the yield spreads.
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5.5.1 Unbalanced Panel Regression
We regress the di¤erence between the sovereign yield in EMU country i and the
benchmark portfolio yield onto di¤erences in country is credit quality, liquidity and
macro measures from their respective cross-sectional weighted averages (or benchmark
values) and onto global risk and interaction measures. We employ a Prais-Winsten
regression with correlated panels, corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to
heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels and serial autocorrelation
within panels. The correlation within panels is treated as a rst-order autocorrelation
AR(1) and the coe¢ cient of this process common22 to all the panels.23 Our panel
regression model is described by the equation:
ri;t  ri;t = +
KX
k=1
k (Xk;i;t  Xk;BNCH;t)+
MX
j=1
jDj;t+Yi;t+ Zt+ Ci;t+'Hi;t+ "i;t
(5.4)
where the dependent variable is the spread between the government bonds yield of
country i, ri;t at four di¤erent maturities (3,5,7,and 10 years) and the benchmark yield
ri;t, at the same maturities. The benchmark yields are obtained as the weighted ave-
rage of the Government yields of the EMU countries in the sample for the corresponding
maturity (3, 5, 7, and 10 years). The weights are proportional to the portion of debt
outstanding by each country with respect to the total amount outstanding by all these
countries and change annually.24 The Xk;i;t are credit risk, liquidity and macro ex-
planatory variables (CDSt 1, Volume, Total debt/GDP, Net Trade Balance/GDP) and
22Better t, as measured by the Schwarz Information Criteria, is obtained using an AR(1) autocor-
relation structure common to all panels instead of a panel-specic AR(1) autocorrelation structure.
23Each element in the covariance matrix of the disturbances is computed with all available observations
that are common to the two panels contributing to the covariance.
24To gain a better perspective of the dependent variable, it is worth mentioning that its maximum
(minimum) average value is equal to 21.5 (-8.9) basis points for Greece (Germany).
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Xk;BNCH;t are their respective weighted averages over the eleven countries, obtained
using the same procedure employed to build the benchmark yield.25 Notice that we
specify the credit, liquidity and macro variables as di¤erences from their cross-sectional
weighted averages (or benchmark value). This approach stresses the fact that credit
risk; liquidity and macro variables are relative concepts. The Dj;t are dummy variables
to take into account the maturity e¤ect in bond yields (3,5, and 7 years) as well as the
crisis dummy that is equal to zero before August 9, 2007 and one afterwards. The Yi;t is
the interaction term of total debt/GDP of country i times the volatility of the di¤erence
between domestic yield and benchmark yield. The Zt is the global risk factor measured
as the log of the VIX index and Ci;t is the correlation between the country i yield (for
its corresponding maturity) and the benchmarks yield. Finally, Hi;t is the di¤erence (in
percentage) between two interaction terms referred to the country i and the benchmark,
respectively. The rst interaction term is referred to the country i and represents the
product of a liquidity premium or trading costs, which are measured by means of the
bid-ask spread, and the CDS spread lagged one day while the second interaction term
represents the benchmark equivalent measure.
The results of the panel regressions are reported in Table 3. Column 1 gives the re-
sults without the crisis dummy, and Column 2 with the crisis dummy. The explanatory
power of the regressions, reected in their adjusted R2, is 19:9% and 19:4%, respec-
tively. Consistent with intuition as well as with our theoretical model and the previous
literature, the CDS lagged one period has a strong positive impact on sovereign yield
spread which indicates that a lower credit quality increases the yield spread. The li-
25Notice that the CDS variable is di¤erent for di¤erent maturities, whereas the other variables are
the same for all maturities.
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quidity di¤erential is also signicant. The negative coe¢ cient suggests that higher than
average liquidity is associated with lower yield spreads. The two macro factors (relative
to GDP) and the global risk factor have also a positive and signicant impact in the
sovereign yield spread. The e¤ect of the term measuring the interaction of total debt
relative to GDP and the standard deviation of the domestic yield minus the benchmark
yield is positive and signicant. Recall that this variable measures both the total supply
of debt and its relative risk against the benchmark. Therefore the economic meaning
of this variable is that, for a given debt level, an increase in the volatility of the di¤e-
rence of the domestic yield and benchmark yield increases yield spreads. The more the
two rates grow apart the higher the e¤ect on yield spreads. This could be the case in
a situation where a given countrys spreads tends to diverge from the benchmark be-
havior and then the market penalizes this divergence demanding higher yield spreads.
If two countries present the same divergence from the benchmark yield behavior, the
penalization is higher for the country with the higher level of debt relative to GDP. The
correlation between the domestic bond yield and the benchmark bond yield has positive
e¤ect as expected (see footnote 10).
The crisis dummy is positive and signicant as well as the liquidity/credit risk in-
teraction variable. This result suggests that there is a constant deviation between the
domestic and benchmark yields which increases during the crisis. Moreover, the signi-
cant e¤ect of the liquidity/credit risk interaction variable is consistent with the idea
that liquidity factors tend to be more important in uncertain times and that liquidity
and credit risk interact. Finally the maturity dummy variables coe¢ cients reect the
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decreasing premium for longer maturities.26 Overall, these results provide strong sup-
port for the theoretical model and for all the proxy explanatory variables chosen. The
inclusion of the crisis dummy, though signicantly positive, does not a¤ect materially
the size and signicance of the other explanatory variables.
26We repeated the regression in Table 3 using weights proportional to the debt outstanding by each
EMU member in the Prais-Winsten regression and results do not change signicantly. These results are
available upon request.
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This table reports the results of the unbalanced panel regressions. The dependent variable is the deviations between
the Government yields and the Benchmark yields which are obtained as the weighted average of the Governments
yields of the different European Monetary Union countries in the sample. The weights are proportional to the portion
of debt outstanding by each of the EMU countries with respect to the total amount outstanding by all these countries.
Our database is formed by eleven EMU countries and spans from January 2004 to February 2009. All the variables
(dependent and explanatory) except the measure of global risk, the measure of correlation between the domestic
Government and benchmark yields and the crisis dummy are presented in deviations from the value of the same
variable for the benchmark. We group the panels by country and maturity (3, 5, 7 and 10 years) such that we have,
at most, 44 groups which form an overall unbalanced panel. We estimate the coefficients of the determinants of
deviations between yields by means of a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels corrected standard errors
(PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels and serial autocorrelation
within panels. The correlation within panels is treated as a first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and the coefficient of this
process common to all the panels. Each element in the covariance matrix of the disturbances is computed with all
available observations that are common to the two panels contributing to the covariance. Column (1) reports the
results which are obtained without using the crisis dummy as an explanatory variable and Column (2) reports the
results using the crisis dummy as explanatory variable. The results presented correspond to the estimated coeffi-
cient and the t-statistic  (between brackets).
(1) (2)
CDS(-1) 0.522 0.519
(34.68) (34.19)
Log (Total bond daily turnover volume) -0.011 -0.011
(-5.85) (-5.92)
Total debt issued divided by GDP 0.144 0.148
(12.11) (12.29)
Interaction of total debt divided by GDP and the standard deviation of 1.234 1.187
    the domestic yield minus the benchmark yield (12.60) (11.88)
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP -49.049 -48.639
(-6.39) (-6.27)
Global risk measure: log(VIX index) 0.013 0.011
(4.80) (3.63)
Correlation between domestic Government yield and EMU benchmark 0.076 0.073
   Government Yield (4.51) (4.28)
Interaction of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS(-1) 0.165 0.161
(2.57) (2.50)
Dummy for the 3-year yield 0.013 0.013
(3.98) (3.93)
Dummy for the 5-year yield 0.012 0.012
(4.27) (4.22)
Dummy for the 7-year yield 0.005 0.005
(2.21) (2.16)
Crisis dummy 0.011
(2.58)
Constant -0.135 -0.127
(-7.29) (-6.75)
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.900 0.901
R-squared 0.199 0.194
Observations 47904 47904
Number of groups 44 44
Observations per group                                                        Minimum 202 202
Average 1089 1089
Maximum 1294 1294
Wald chi2 (10 df) 2835.130 2791.910
Prob. > chi2 0 0
Condition Index 20.190 27.160
Table 3: Determinants of the deviations between the Government Yield and the Benchmark Yield
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Since there is a potential endogeneity between a countrys sovereign yields and its
CDS rates, in the panel regression results reported in Table 3 we have used a one period
(day) lag in the CDS explanatory variable. This is a standard procedure to deal with
potential endogeneity. To further address this issue, we have run an identical panel
regression but omitting the deviation of the domestic CDS spread from the benchmark
and the deviation of the domestic interaction between the CDS and bid-ask spreads from
the benchmark corresponding interaction. These results are reported in Table 4 without
and with the crisis dummy (Column 1 and Column 2, respectively). As can be seen from
this table the results are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 3, conrming the
signicance of the other explanatory variables and suggesting that endogeneity is not a
serious issue in our case. As expected, the explanatory power of the panel regressions is
lower given that we are omitting two powerful explanatory variables: the CDS spread
lagged one period and the interaction liquidity/credit risk.
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This table reports the results of the unbalanced panel regression excluding the CDS variable, that is, the variables
employed in this table are the same as in Table 3 with the exception of the deviation of the domestic CDS spread
from the benchmark and the deviation of the domestic interaction between the CDS and bid-ask spreads from the
benchmark corresponding interaction which are now excluded. All the variables (dependent and explanatory) except
the measure of global risk, the measure of correlation between the domestic Government and benchmark yields and
the crisis dummy are presented in deviations from the value of the same variable for the benchmark. We group the
panels by country and maturity (3, 5, 7 and 10 years) such that we have, at most, 44 groups which form an overall
unbalanced panel. We estimate the coefficients of the determinants of deviations between yields by means of a Prais-
Winsten regression with correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity, con-
temporaneous correlation across panels and serial autocorrelation within panels. The correlation within panels is trea-
ted as a first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and the coefficient of this process common to all the panels. Each element
in the covariance matrix of the disturbances is computed with all available observations that are common to the two pa-
nels contributing to the covariance. Column (1) reports the results obtained excluding the CDS(-1) variable, the interac-
tion of liquidity and CDS(-1) variable and the crisis dummy. Column (2) reports the results obtained excluding both the
CDS(-1) and the interaction of liquidity and CDS(-1) variables. The results presented correspond to the estimated
coefficient and the t-statistic  (between brackets).
(1) (2)
Log (Total bond daily turnover volume) -0.014 -0.015
(-4.53) (-4.64)
Total debt issued divided by GDP 0.221 0.228
(8.89) (9.16)
Interaction of total debt divided by GDP and the standard deviation of the 0.882 0.839
    domestic yield minus the benchmark yield (8.10) (7.69)
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP -42.481 -41.766
(-3.36) (-3.31)
Global risk measure: log(VIX index) 0.014 0.012
(4.79) (3.89)
Correlation between domestic Government yield and EMU benchmark 0.032 0.030
   Government Yield (1.78) (1.65)
Dummy for the 3-year yield 0.014 0.014
(2.07) (2.07)
Dummy for the 5-year yield 0.013 0.013
(2.41) (2.40)
Dummy for the 7-year yield 0.006 0.006
(1.31) (1.30)
Crisis dummy 0.028
(5.08)
Constant -0.074 -0.073
(-3.55) (-3.53)
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.952 0.952
R-squared 0.014 0.015
Observations 47904 47904
Number of groups 44 44
Observations per group                                                            Minimum 202 202
Average 1089 1089
Maximum 1294 1294
Wald chi2 (10 df) 245.420 281.150
Prob. > chi2 0 0
Condition Index 20.840 28.160
Table 4: Determinants of the deviations between the Government Yield
and the Benchmark Yield without including CDSs
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Finally, we analyze the e¤ect of the cross-sectional dispersion between countries in
the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. For this aim, we rst calculate the
standard deviation of each explanatory variable across countries at each date t. Then,
we compute the average of these standard deviations for all dates and nally multiply
this average by the corresponding coe¢ cient (see Table 3). In Table 5 we report the
results of this sensitivity analysis of the determinants of the yield spreads. Specically,
we report the magnitude of the change, in basis points, of the dependent variable given
a change equal to the average of the standard deviations across countries of a given
explanatory variable over all dates.27 We focus on the cross-sectional dimension of the
panel and employ the time-series dimension to calculate the average e¤ect across time.28
This allows us to evaluate how the di¤erent macro or risk factors of the countries under
study a¤ect the yield spreads.
The largest e¤ect on yield spreads is caused by deviations between the countries
CDSs spreads (4.78 b.p.). The variable with the second strongest e¤ect is the total debt
issued relative to GDP. The average change in the dependent variable is 3.57 b.p. The
next most inuential variables are liquidity and the net trade balance over GDP, albeit
with lower order of magnitude, whereas the other variables have lower e¤ects. Note that
the sensitivities are practically una¤ected by the inclusion of the crisis dummy.
27The standard deviation of the following variables: CDS spread (lagged one day); interaction of total
debt divided by GDP and the standard deviation of the di¤erence between domestic and benchmark
yields; correlation between domestic Government yield and benchmark yield; and liquidity/credit risk
interaction variable are calculated for the ve years maturity.
28We repeat the sensitivity analysis focused on the time-series dimension of the panel. By means of
this analysis, we estimate the change in the dependent variable after a change of one standard deviation
in a given explanatory variable across time and countries. Results are in line with the ones in Table
5 but are not reported in this paper given that our aim is to focus on how the di¤erences between
countries a¤ect the deviations in the yield spreads and so, we focus in the cross-section dimension.
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This table provides the sensitivity analysis of the determinants of the deviations between the Govern-
ment yields and the Benchmark yields. All the variables (dependent and explanatory) excepting the
correlation between the domestic and benchmark yields are presented in deviations from the value of
the variable for the benchmark. Column (1) reports the results which are obtained without using the
crisis dummy as an explanatory variable and Column (2) reports the results using the crisis dummy
as explanatory variable. Each column reports the response, in basis points, of the dependent variable
(deviation of the domestic Government yield from the benchmark yield) to a change equal to the
average of the standard deviations of a given explanatory variable across countries over all dates.
For this aim, we first calculate the standard deviation of each explanatory variable across countries
at each date t . Then, we compute the average of these standard deviations for all the dates t  and
finally, we multiply this average by the corresponding coefficient (see Table 3). The standard deviation
of variables: CDS spread (lagged one period); interaction of total debt divided by GDP and yield S.D.;
correlation between Gov. yield and benchmark yield; and interaction of liquidity and CDS spread
(lagged one period) are presented for a maturity of five years.
(1) (2)
CDS (lagged one period) spread 4.78 4.75
Total bond daily turnover volume -1.70 -1.74
Total debt issued divided by GDP 3.57 3.67
Interation of total debt divided by GDP and the yield S.D. 1.27 1.22
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP -1.74 -1.72
Correlation between Gov. yield and benchmark yield 0.45 0.43
Interaction of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS(-1) 0.18 0.17
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis of the Determinants of the deviations between
the Government Yield and the Benchmark Yield
5.5.2 Robustness Tests
In this section, we report the results of several checks on the basic results. The
robustness tests consider cross-section regressions, changes in the benchmark, using
balance panel regressions and alternative liquidity measures, employing alternative data
frequencies and analysing maturity by maturity. In all cases the results are robust to
the alternative specications.
5.5.2.1 Cross Section Regressions
As a rst robustness test we run a cross-section regression every day and then
we test for the signicance of the time series of coe¢ cients, see Fama and Macbeth
(1973). Equation (5.5) details our cross-section regression model:
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ri;t   ri;t = t +
KX
k=1
k;t (Xk;i;t  Xk;BNCH;t) +
MX
j=1
j;tDj;t + tYi;t + 'tHi;t + "i;t
i = 1; :::; 44 t = 1; :::; 1294 (5.5)
where the dependent variable is the spread between the government bonds yield of coun-
try i (i=1,. . . ,11) ri;t at four di¤erent maturities (3,5,7,and 10 years) and the benchmark
yield ri;t, at the same maturities. The benchmark yields are obtained as the weighted
average of the Government yields of the EMU countries in the sample for the cor-
responding maturity (3, 5, 7, and 10 years). The weights are proportional to the portion
of debt outstanding by each country with respect to the total amount outstanding by
all these countries. The Xk;i;t are credit risk, liquidity and macro explanatory variables
(CDSt 1, Volume, Total debt/GDP, Trade Balance/GDP) and Xk;BNCH;t are their
respective weighted averages over the eleven countries. Notice that we specify the credit,
liquidity and macro variables as di¤erences from their cross-sectional weighted averages.
This approach stresses that credit risk, liquidity, and macro stance are relative concepts.
The Dj;t are dummy variables to take into account the maturity e¤ect in bond yields (3,
5, and 7 years). The Yi;t is the interaction term of total debt relative to GDP times the
volatility of the di¤erence between domestic yield and benchmark yield.29 Finally, Hi;t
is the di¤erence (in percentage) between two interaction terms referred to the country i
and the benchmark respectively. The rst interaction term is referred to the country i
and represents the product of a liquidity premium or trading costs, which are measured
29Note that in equation (5.5) we do not employ the VIX index, the crisis dummy and the correlation
between the domestic and the benchmark yields. The reason is because both the VIX index and the
crisis dummy are the same for all the countries and maturities. We exclude the correlation variable
because it causes multicollinearity problems.
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by means of the bid-ask spread, and the CDS spread lagged one day while the second
interaction term represents the benchmark equivalent measure.
In order to estimate the cross-sectional e¤ects of the above variables, we run a cross-
sectional regression by OLS for every date in the sample (1294 in total) and compute
the average coe¢ cient for the whole sample. Petersen (2009) states that the Fama-
MacBeth standard errors are biased in exactly the same way as the OLS estimates and
the magnitude of the bias is a function of the serial correlation of both the independent
variable and the residual within a cluster and the number of time periods per rm
(or cluster). Thus, we must adjust the standard errors for the autocorrelation of the
estimated slope coe¢ cients.30 We employ the Fama-MacBeth methodology with Newey-
West standard errors.31
The results of the cross section regressions are reported in Table 6. Column 1 gives
the estimated coe¢ cients, Column 2 the corrected t-statistics, Column 3 the proportion
of coe¢ cients with the right sign, Column 4 the change in the dependent variable given
a change of one standard deviation in the explanatory variable and the last Column
the explained variance by each explanatory variable (in percentage). The average R2
of the cross-sectional regression is 73%. The magnitude of the regression coe¢ cient
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the CDS above the weighted average
is associated with an average increase in the sovereign yield spread of 6.8 b.p.32 This
30As Petersen (2009) states, when there is only a time e¤ect, the correlation of the estimated slope
coe¢ cients across years is zero and the standard errors estimated by the Fama-MacBeth are unbiased.
31 In order to nd an unbiased t-statistic, we regress the estimated coe¢ cients on a constant using
the Newey-West adjustment to control for serial correlation. This methodology is also employed in
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007).
32To gain a better understanding of the e¤ects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable,
it is worth noting that the maximum (minimum) average value by country for the deviation between the
Government yield and the benchmark yield is equal to 21.5 (-8.9) basis points for Greece (Germany).
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is the most economically signicant e¤ect found for the explanatory variables. The two
macro factors (relative to GDP) have a signicant impact in the sovereign yield spread.
One standard deviation increase in the total debt and the net trade balance, both above
the weighted average, is associated with an average increase in the sovereign yield spread
of 1.8 b.p. and a decrease of 1.6 b.p. respectively.
The e¤ect of the term measuring the interaction of total debt and the standard
deviation of the domestic yield minus the benchmark yield is positive and signicant.
One standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with an average increase
in the sovereign yield spread of 1.7 b.p.
With respect to the liquidity di¤erential variable the negative coe¢ cient suggests
that higher than weighted average liquidity is associated with lower yield spreads. The
economic impact of the liquidity di¤erential is the lowest of all the explanatory va-
riables in the analysis. One standard deviation increase in liquidity above the average
is associated with an average change in the sovereign yield spread of -1.1 basis points.
The liquidity/credit risk interaction factor is signicant but its e¤ect is only of 0.5
b.p. Finally the dummy variables coe¢ cients reect the decreasing premium for longer
maturities.
Overall the results of the cross sectional regressions are consistent with the ones
given by the unbalanced panel regression reported in Section 4.1 indicating that the
main results of the analysis are robust to di¤erent specications of the regressions. The
sensitivity analysis results for the cross-sectional regression are also similar to those
reported in Table 5 for the panel regressions.
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5.5.2.2 Changing the Benchmark
We next address the issue of how robust are our results to the choice of bench-
mark. In particular, as is common in the literature, we use the German bond as a
benchmark.
Table 7 presents the results of estimating the panel regression equation (5.4) using
two di¤erent benchmarks. Besides the benchmark used in this study, which is obtained
from the relative weights calculated from the total debt outstanding by each country
over the total amount in the EMU, we present the results obtained using the German
bond as the benchmark. As can be seen from Table 7, our main results are not very
sensitive to the choice of benchmark.33
33As a potential benchmark we have also analyzed the Euro Swap rate. In fact, Beber, Brandt and
Kavajecz (2009) use the Euro swap curve. When we use the Euro Swap rate as the benchmark and,
contrary to our base case, the interaction between the debt and the standard deviation of the di¤erence
between the domestic and benchmark yields is not signicant. Also the coe¢ cient of the crisis dummy is
now negative. Therefore, during the crisis, the Euro Swap rate was on average higher than the sovereign
yields and this fact casts doubts on its adequacy as a benchmark.
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This table reports the results of the unbalanced panel regressions using an alternative benchmark: the German bond
yield. All the variables (dependent and explanatory) except the measure of global risk, the measure of correlation
between the domestic Government and benchmark yields and the crisis dummy are presented in deviations from
the value of the variable for the benchmark. We group the panels by country and maturity (3, 5, 7 and 10 years)
such that we have, at most, 44 groups which form an overall unbalanced panel. We estimate the coefficients of
the determinants of deviations between yields by means of a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels
and serial autocorrelation within panels. The correlation within panels is treated as a first-order autocorrelation
AR(1) and the coefficient of this process common to all the panels. Each element in the covariance matrix of
the disturbances is computed with all available observations that are common to the two panels contributing to
the covariance. Column (1) reports the results for the benchmark employed in Table 3 and it is equivalent to the
second column of that table. The results in Column (2) are obtained by using the values of Germany as the bench-
mark. The results presented correspond to the estimated coefficient and the t-statistic  (between brackets).
(1) (2)
CDS(-1) 0.519 0.439
(34.19) (22.31)
Log (Total bond daily turnover volume) -0.011 -0.004
(-5.92) (-1.36)
Total debt issued divided by GDP 0.148 0.099
(12.29) (4.37)
Interaction of total debt divided by GDP and the standard de- 1.187 0.011
    viation of the domestic yield minus the benchmark yield (11.88) (8.61)
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP -48.639 -40.154
(-6.27) (-3.26)
Global risk measure: log(VIX index) 0.011 0.034
(3.63) (3.78)
Correlation between domestic Government yield and EMU 0.073 0.025
   benchmark Government Yield (4.28) (1.07)
Interaction of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS(-1) 0.161 0.358
(2.50) (4.68)
Crisis dummy 0.013 0.120
(3.93) (7.70)
Dummy for the 3-year yield 0.012 -0.026
(4.22) (-2.33)
Dummy for the 5-year yield 0.005 -0.009
(2.16) (-1.24)
Dummy for the 7-year yield 0.011 -0.006
(2.58) (-1.08)
Constant -0.127 -0.052
(-6.75) (-1.46)
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.901 0.943
R-squared 0.194 0.107
Observations 47904 47904
Number of groups 44 44
Observations per group                                         Minimum 202 202
Average 1089 1089
Maximum 1294 1294
Wald chi2 (10 df) 2791.910 1344.340
Table 7: Determinants of the deviations between the Government Yield and
 the Benchmark Yield for different benchmarks
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5.5.2.3 Balanced Panel
To be able to use as much of the data as possible and deal with missing ob-
servations the panel regressions estimated in this paper have been unbalanced. In this
section we look at the robustness of our results to the use of a balanced panel.
Table 8 presents the results of tting equation (5.4) to a balanced panel data formed
by ten of the eleven countries, and ranging from March 2006 to February 2009.34 The
estimation is done by means of Generalized Least Squares (GLS). The GLS procedure
allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-
sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Even though the data used
in this regression is somewhat di¤erent, the results obtained are similar to those obtained
for the unbalanced panel. In fact, the magnitude and signicance of the explanatory
variables provides stronger support for the specication used.
34We exclude Finland and the observations before the 27th of March, 2006 in order to have a balanced
panel. The reason is that for some countries, the CDSs series present missing values before that date.
In the case of Finland there are only 202 observations on CDSs.
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This table reports the results of the balanced panel regressions. The data includes only ten of the eleven EMU coun-
tries and spans the period from March 2006 to February 2009. In order to have a balanced panel, Finland and the
observations before the 27th of March are excluded. All the variables (dependent and explanatory) except the mea-
sure of global risk, the measure of correlation between the domestic Government and benchmark yields and the
crisis dummy are presented in deviations from the value of the variable for the benchmark. We group the panels by
country and maturity (3, 5, 7, and 10 years) such that we have, at most 40 groups which form a balanced panel. The
estimation is done using Generalized Least Squares. The GLS procedure that we employ allows estimation in the
presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across pa-
nels. Column (1) reports the results for the whole sample without using the crisis dummy as an explanatory variable
and Column (2) reports the results using the crisis dummy as explanatory variable. The results presented correspond
to the estimated coefficient and the t-statistic (between brackets).
(1) (2)
CDS(-1) 0.416 0.416
(40.12) (40.03)
Log (Total bond daily turnover volume) -0.013 -0.013
(-8.00) (-8.07)
Total debt issued divided by GDP 0.207 0.208
(20.46) (20.50)
Interaction of total debt divided by GDP and the standard deviation of 0.245 0.235
    the domestic yield minus the benchmark yield (13.40) (12.94)
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP -38.713 -38.536
(-6.44) (-6.39)
Global risk measure: log(VIX index) 0.006 0.005
(7.06) (5.22)
Correlation between domestic Government yield and EMU benchmark 0.011 0.010
   Government Yield (3.83) (3.70)
Interaction of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS(-1) 0.258 0.246
(5.78) (5.48)
Dummy for the 3-year yield 0.003 0.003
(6.90) (6.98)
Dummy for the 5-year yield 0.004 0.004
(11.99) (12.05)
Dummy for the 7-year yield 0.001 0.000
(2.66) (2.58)
Crisis dummy 0.006
(3.96)
Constant -0.033 -0.032
(-8.33) (-7.90)
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.896 0.897
Log likelihood 105576 105600
Observations 35040 35040
Number of groups 40.00 40
Time periods 876.00 876
Wald chi2 (10 df) 4343.320 4359.290
Prob. > chi2 0 0
Condition Index 19.260 26.380
Table 8: Determinants of the deviations between the Government Yield
and the Benchmark Yield using a balanced panel
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5.5.2.4 Liquidity and risk measures
We also analyze the robustness of our results to alternative specications of the
liquidity measure. Table 9 presents the results of tting model (4) to the full sample
using three alternative liquidity measures: total daily turnover volume, bid-ask spreads
and average daily turnover volume.35 In all cases the liquidity coe¢ cients have the
expected signs and they are signicant. The results for the other variables do not change
materially. As the volume and the bid-ask spread are di¤erent liquidity measures and
they a¤ect yields in the opposite direction, the coe¢ cientsorder of magnitude cannot be
directly compared. However, looking at a standardized measure such as the t-statistic
we observe that all the liquidity measures have a similar e¤ect. Note that in the Column
(2) the interaction of the liquidity and the CDS spread is not signicant given that the
individual e¤ect of the liquidity variable (bid-ask spread) seems to be more important
than the interaction term. This fact gives support to our approach of using a specic
liquidity variable (turnover volume) and an interaction variable (liquidity-risk) dened
from the bid-ask spread.
35This average volume is calculated as the ratio between the total daily turnover volume and the
number of bonds issued by the corresponding country.
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This table reports the results of the unbalanced panel regression using alternative liquidity measures. Column (1)
reports the results obtained using as liquidity proxy the total daily turnover volume, Column (2) reports the results
obtained using the bid-ask spread (b.p.) as the liquidity measure and Column (3) shows the results obtained
using as a proxy for liquidity the average daily turnover volume. This average volume is calculated as the ratio
between the total daily turnover volume and the number of bonds issued by the corresponding country. The results
presented correspond to the estimated coefficient and the t-statistic (between brackets). We estimate the coef-
ficients of the determinants of deviations between yields by means of a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated
panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across
panels and serial autocorrelation within panels. The correlation within panels is treated as a first-order autocor-
relation AR(1) and the coefficient of this process common to all the panels. Each element in the covariance ma-
trix of the disturbances is computed with all available observations that are common to the two panels contributing
to the covariance.
(1) (2) (3)
CDS(-1) 0.519 0.537 0.519
(34.19) (35.21) (34.09)
Liquidity -0.011 0.256 -0.012
(-5.92) (3.60) (-4.77)
Total debt issued divided by GDP 0.148 0.099 0.135
(12.29) (8.85) (11.38)
Interaction of total debt divided by GDP and the standard de- 1.187 1.236 1.176
    viation of the domestic yield minus the benchmark yield (11.88) (12.36) (11.77)
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP -48.639 -51.846 -49.791
(-6.27) (-6.79) (-6.37)
Global risk measure: log(VIX index) 0.011 0.010 0.011
(3.63) (3.39) (3.63)
Correlation between domestic Government yield and EMU 0.073 0.073 0.070
   benchmark Government Yield (4.28) (4.31) (4.14)
Interaction of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS(-1) 0.161 0.047 0.162
(2.50) (0.64) (2.52)
Dummy for the 3-year yield 0.013 0.014 0.013
(3.93) (4.00) (3.90)
Dummy for the 5-year yield 0.012 0.012 0.012
(4.22) (4.30) (4.19)
Dummy for the 7-year yield 0.005 0.005 0.005
(2.16) (2.25) (2.16)
Crisis dummy 0.011 0.007 0.011
(2.58) (1.74) (2.60)
Constant -0.127 -0.116 -0.121
(-6.75) (-6.22) (-6.44)
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.901 0.899 0.902
R-squared 0.194 0.199 0.191
Observations 47904 47904 47904
Number of groups 44 44 44
Observations per group                                         Minimum 202 202 202
Average 1089 1089 1089
Maximum 1294 1294 1294
Wald chi2 (10 df) 2791.910 2834.750 2729.960
Prob. > chi2 0 0 0
Condition Index 27.16 26.32 27.07
Table 9: Determinants of the deviations between the Government Yield
and the Benchmark Yield using different liquidity measures
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As the liquidity proxies change with maturity and given that what matters to in-
vestors is the liquidity of a particular segment of the yield curve and not the overall
liquidity of the sovereign bond market, we repeat the analysis using alternative liquidity
measures with the corresponding maturity (3, 5, 7 or 10 years). The results obtained
under this modication are shown in Table 10 and they do not change with respect to
Table 9.
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This table reports the results of the unbalanced panel regression using alternative liquidity measures with the
corresponding maturity (3, 5, 7 or 10 years). This table is similar to Table 10 but the liquidity variables are
defined for different maturities. Column (1) reports the results which are obtained using as liquidity proxy
the total daily turnover volume, Column (2) reports the results  which are obtained using the bid-ask spread as
the liquidity measure and Column (3) shows the results obtained using as a proxy for liquidity the average
daily turnover volume. This average volume is calculated as the ratio between the total daily turnover volume
and the number of bonds issued by the corresponding country. The results presented correspond to the esti-
mated coefficient and the t-statistic  (between brackets). We estimate the coefficients of the determinants of
deviations between yields by means of a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels corrected standard
errors (PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels and serial auto-
correlation within panels. The correlation within panels is treated as a first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and
the coefficient of this process common to all the panels. Each element in the covariance matrix of the distur-
bances is computed with all available observations that are common to the two panels contributing to the
covariance.
(1) (2) (3)
CDS(-1) 0.530 0.533 0.530
(35.38) (31.76) (35.32)
Liquidity -0.007 0.089 -0.007
(-5.65) (4.59) (-4.87)
Total debt issued divided by GDP 0.137 0.108 0.128
(11.84) (9.51) (11.23)
Interaction of total debt divided by GDP and the standard de- 1.220 1.235 1.217
    viation of the domestic yield minus the benchmark yield (11.62) (11.75) (11.59)
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP -53.750 -56.165 -55.223
(-6.63) (-6.92) (-6.79)
Global risk measure: log(VIX index) 0.011 0.010 0.011
(3.61) (3.36) (3.59)
Correlation between domestic Government yield and EMU 0.083 0.083 0.082
   benchmark Government Yield (4.52) (4.52) (4.45)
Interaction of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS(-1) 0.093 0.117 0.092
(5.21) (1.64) (5.19)
Dummy for the 3-year yield 0.013 0.013 0.012
(3.42) (3.67) (3.23)
Dummy for the 5-year yield 0.010 0.013 0.009
(3.77) (4.85) (3.26)
Dummy for the 7-year yield 0.003 0.006 0.002
(1.40) (2.75) (0.77)
Crisis dummy 0.009 0.007 0.009
(2.18) (1.69) (2.13)
Constant -0.130 -0.124 -0.126
(-6.56) (-6.25) (-6.31)
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.901 0.901 0.901
R-squared 0.193 0.193 0.191
Observations 45256 45055 45248
Number of groups 44 43 44
Observations per group                                         Minimum 202 202 202
Average 1029 1048 1028
Maximum 1294 1294 1294
Wald chi2 (10 df) 2546.960 2499.170 2516.500
Prob. > chi2 0 0 0
Condition Index 19.83 26.50 26.93
Table 10: Determinants of the deviations between the Government Yield and the Benchmark
Yield using different liquidity measures with the corresponding maturity
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A similar concern can be applied to the use of the CDS spread. The price of risk
changes with maturity and what matters to investors is the price of the risk for the
maturity they are willing to hedge and not only the 5-year maturity. For this reason,
we repeat the analysis using both the CDS lagged one period and the interaction of the
liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS lagged one period variables with the corresponding
maturity (3, 5, 7 or 10 years). As one can observe in Table 11 we obtain similar results
as in Table 3.
We report and comment the main results of the paper based on Table 3 given
that using the CDS spread lagged one period for the 5-year maturity and the liquidity
measure for the overall maturities, we have a higher number of observations and we can
homogenize the risk and liquidity e¤ects.
Finally, besides the logarithm of the VIX Index we try di¤erent proxies for the global
risk factor due to the great variety of variables that have been traditionally employed to
proxy this factor. For instance, we employ: logarithm of the VDAX Index, square of the
MSCI returns, iTraxx Europe (European CDS Index), di¤erence between 10-year AAA
US corporate yield and 10-year US Government bonds yield, di¤erence between 10-year
BBB US corporate yield and 10-year US Government bonds yield, di¤erence between
10-year BBB US corporate yield and 10-year AAA US corporate yield. We nd that
their e¤ects are positive in all cases and the standardizations of the coe¢ cients from the
t-statistics are very similar among them. Moreover, the coe¢ cients of the remaining
variables remain unchanged.36
36These results are available upon request.
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This table reports the results of the unbalanced panel regression using the CDS(-1) and the Interaction
of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS(-1) variables with the corresponding maturity (3, 5, 7 or 10 years).
This table is similar to Table 3 but the CDS(-1) and the Interaction of liquidity and CDS(-1) variables are
defined for the different CDS maturities. Column (1) reports the results which are obtained using the
crisis dummy as explanatory variable. Column (2) reports the results without using the crisis dummy as
an explanatory variable. The results presented correspond to the estimated coefficient and the t-statistic
(between brackets). We estimate the coefficients of the determinants of deviations between yields by
means of a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and
robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels and serial autocorrelation
within panels. The correlation within panels is treated as a first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and the
coefficient of this process common to all the panels. Each element in the covariance matrix of the
disturbances is computed with all available observations that are common to the two panels contribu-
ting to the covariance.
(1) (2)
CDS(-1) 0.209 0.210
(26.16) (26.20)
Liquidity -0.019 -0.019
(-9.34) (-9.25)
Total debt issued divided by GDP 0.192 0.189
(16.51) (16.30)
Interaction of total debt divided by GDP and the standard de- 1.754 1.786
    viation of the domestic yield minus the benchmark yield (17.25) (17.91)
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP -50.754 -51.035
(-6.85) (-6.89)
Global risk measure: log(VIX index) 0.011 0.014
(3.37) (4.59)
Correlation between domestic Government yield and EMU 0.066 0.068
   benchmark Government Yield (3.63) (3.77)
Interaction of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS(-1) 0.954 0.958
(16.10) (16.19)
Dummy for the 3-year yield 0.010 0.010
(3.04) (3.04)
Dummy for the 5-year yield 0.009 0.009
(3.41) (3.33)
Dummy for the 7-year yield 0.005 0.005
(2.23) (2.25)
Crisis dummy 0.009
(2.13)
Constant -0.133 -0.140
(-6.69) (-7.19)
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.884 0.884
R-squared 0 0
Observations 44055 44055
Number of groups 44 44
Observations per group                                            Minimum 202 202
Average 1001 1001
Maximum 1293 1293
Wald chi2 (10 df) 2801.440 2763.790
Prob. > chi2 0 0
Condition Index 26.68 19.87
Table 11: Determinants of the deviations between the Government Yield
and the Benchmark Yield using the CDSs with the corresponding maturity
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5.5.2.5 Data frequency
Some macro series (Gross Debt outstanding) have annual frequency; other se-
ries (GDP) have quarterly frequency while others (Net Trade Balance) have monthly
frequency. In fact these are the data frequencies employed in Curto et al. (2008) or
Codogno et al. (2003) among others. As an additional robustness test we analyze the
regression in equation (5.4) using data with a monthly and quarterly frequency. In both
cases the number of observations decreases substantially with respect to the case where
we use daily frequency. However, results are in line with the ones obtained using a daily
data and are available on request. Overall the above outcomes suggest that our main
ndings are not sensitive to the datas time frequency.37
5.5.2.6 Maturity Analysis
The e¤ect of credit or macro risk is likely to have a di¤erential e¤ect on bonds
with a di¤erent maturity. In equations (5.4) and (5.5) we only incorporate a level e¤ect
by means of the dummies for the di¤erent maturities. As an additional robustness test,
we include the e¤ect of the di¤erent maturities by regressing the yield spread on the
explanatory variables for individual maturities. Results are shown in Table 12.
We observe that the macro variables (total debt divided by GDP and net trade
balance divided by GDP) have a stronger e¤ect on the longer maturities. The liquidity,
the interaction liquidity/risk, the interaction of the debt and the standard deviation
37Gomez-Puig (2007) transforms the macro variables employed in her analysis into variables with a
daily frequency. For this transformation, she extrapolates the corresponding variable assuming a daily
constant rate of increase. We nd that the results obtained after extrapolating the macro variables,
assuming a constant rate of increase between two di¤erent values of the corresponding variable, are
equivalent to the ones obtained in Table 3. These results and the ones commented in Subsection 4.2.5
are available upon request.
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of the di¤erence between the domestic and benchmark yields as well as the correlation
between the domestic and benchmark yields have a stronger e¤ect on the shorter matu-
rities. The e¤ect of the crisis dummy is only signicant for the 7 and 10 year maturities.
Finally, the domestic (CDS lagged one period) and the global risk factors do not follow
a clear pattern along the di¤erent maturities but they seem to have a more signicant
e¤ect on the 5 and 7 year maturities. The interaction liquidity/risk is signicant for all
the maturities but the 7-year maturity. Overall, however, these results are in line with
the results presented in Table 3.
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This table reports the results of the unbalanced panel regressions. The dependent variable is the deviations between
the Government yields and the Benchmark yields which are obtained as the weighted average of the Governments
yields of the different European Monetary Union countries in the sample. The weights are proportional to the portion
of debt outstanding by each of the EMU countries with respect to the total amount outstanding by all these countries.
Our database is formed by eleven EMU countries and spans from January 2004 to February 2009. All the variables
(dependent and explanatory) except the measure of global risk, the measure of correlation between the domestic
Government and benchmark yields and the crisis dummy are presented in deviations from the value of the same
variable for the benchmark. We group the panels by country such that we have, at most, 11 groups for each maturity
which form an overall unbalanced panel. We estimate the coefficients of the determinants of deviations between yields
by means of a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to
heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels and serial autocorrelation within panels. The correla-
tion within panels is treated as a first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and the coefficient of this process common to all
the panels. Each element in the covariance matrix of the disturbances is computed with all available observations
that are common to the two panels contributing to the covariance. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report the results for
the 3, 5, 7 and 10 years maturities, respectively. The results presented correspond to the estimated coefficient and
the t-statistic  (between brackets).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDS(-1) 0.479 0.541 0.585 0.497
(19.13) (28.87) (38.08) (30.51)
Log (Total bond daily turnover volume) -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010
(-4.79) (-5.06) (-4.91) (-4.46)
Total debt issued divided by GDP 0.082 0.117 0.166 0.223
(5.30) (7.90) (13.05) (13.38)
Interaction of total debt divided by GDP and the standard de- 1.717 1.310 1.097 0.688
    viation of the domestic yield minus the benchmark yield (10.99) (10.24) (9.20) (5.41)
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP -31.024 -34.535 -40.182 -86.617
(-2.83) (-3.59) (-5.10) (-9.34)
Global risk measure: log(VIX index) 0.008 0.012 0.014 0.009
(1.79) (3.19) (3.90) (2.55)
Correlation between domestic Government yield and EMU 0.119 0.121 0.082 -0.017
   benchmark Government Yield (3.90) (4.88) (3.86) (-0.79)
Interaction of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS(-1) 0.268 0.198 -0.026 0.189
(2.51) (2.51) (-0.38) (2.69)
Crisis dummy -0.009 0.009 0.015 0.024
(-1.46) (1.64) (3.12) (4.84)
Constant -0.157 -0.168 -0.135 -0.027
(-4.95) (-6.30) (-5.83) (-1.18)
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.893 0.904 0.894 0.901
R-squared 0.163 0.208 0.272 0.205
Observations 11976 11976 11976 11976
Number of groups 11 11 11 11
Observations per group                                        Minimum 202 202 202 202
Average 1089 1089 1089 1089
Maximum 1294 1294 1294 1294
Wald chi2 (10 df) 1754.280 2039.130 2910.910 2487.630
Prob. > chi2 0 0 0 0
Condition Index 24.510 25.790 25.940 25.370
Table 12: Determinants of the deviations between the Government Yield
and the Benchmark Yield by maturity
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5.6 Computing Common Risk Free Rates
The results in the previous section motivate the following question. What should
be the yield of a common eurozone bond, free, at least to some extent, from the e¤ect of
the risk factors (credit, liquidity, macro, correlation) that inuence the yield of individual
sovereign bonds? The existence of a common European bond would imply the existence
of a common European interest rate.38 In this section, we attempt to provide a measure
for this rate and discuss the hypothetical benets that it would yield. A common risk
free rate could produce benets for every EMU country because of the enhanced rating
and liquidity of the common bond and from the reduction of the e¤ects associated with
macro fundamentals.
It seems reasonable to suggest that to be allowed to prot from the reduction
in borrowing costs this common rate would provide, each EMU country interested in
participating in an issue of common bonds should compensate the bond issuer for the
specic countrys credit risk. As a starting point for this analysis we suggest that the
CDSs on its sovereign bonds is the best proxy publicly available to measure the country
risk and so, the CDS spreads represent the compensation that a given country should
pay in order to be allowed to participate in the issuance of common bonds. In what
follows we refer to the Hedged Yieldof the sovereign debt of a country as the di¤erence
of actual yield and the corresponding CDS spread.
Our proposed measure, which we call Common Risk-Free Rate (CRFR), is the
Hedged Yield free of liquidity, correlation and macro risk e¤ects.39 The reasons why
38As Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) remark, the most vivid illustration of the shortcomings of the
Government bond market is the absence of a single established reference yield curve for the new currency.
39The impact of these e¤ects is estimated by means of a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated
panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation
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we think CRFR would be free to a considerable extent of those e¤ects are as follows.
Regarding liquidity our model implies that CRFR will not be a¤ected by individual
bonds liquidity variables. One can argue that a specic liquidity factor related with the
common bond may appear in due course but our view is that this variable will have small
e¤ects. Liquidity is valuable for market participants, and especially in times of market
stress, the most liquid bonds have tended to command a considerable price premium.
Previous studies of liquidity and liquidity premia in government bond markets, based
mainly on data from the U.S. Treasury market and also from European sovereign bonds
such as ECB (2010), have identied pronounced liquidity di¤erences across government
securities, being the benchmark bonds (and we assume that the common bond will have
a fair chance to be the benchmark) the most favoured. Regarding the net trade balance
over GDP, it should be remembered that about 70% of the total trade of EMU countries
is within the European Union and therefore the aggregate value of this variable (due to
o¤setting positions) is bound to be small. Finally, and with respect to total debt over
GDP, our model implies that CRFR will not be a¤ected by individual bonds total debt.
It can be argued that the aggregate debt ratio of the EMU countries could have some
e¤ect on CRFR.40 We test this possibility below and the variable is not signicant.
The CRFR is computed using the following steps:
a) We run the following Prais-Winsten regression:
across panels and serial autocorrelation.
40Given the evidence in Krishnamurthy, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2007), we should expect that when
the stock of total debt over GDP is low, the marginal convenience valuation of sovereign debt is high.
Investors bid up the price of Treasuries relative to other securities, such as corporate bonds, causing the
yield on Treasuries to fall further below corporate bond rate. The opposite applies when the stock of
debt is high.
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j=1
jDj;t+Yi;t+Zt+ Ci;t+"i;t i = 1; :::; 44 (5.6)
where the dependent variable is the Hedged Yield of country i (i = 1; : : : ; 11) at four
di¤erent maturities (3, 5, 7 and 10 years). TheXk;i;t are liquidity and macro explanatory
variables (Volume, Total debt/GDP, Trade Balance/GDP) of country i. The Dj;t are
dummy variables to take into account the maturity e¤ect in bond yields (3,5, and 7
years) and the crisis dummy. The Yi;t is the interaction term of total debt relative
to GDP times the volatility of the di¤erence between domestic yield and benchmark
yield. The Zt is the global risk factor measured as the logarithm of VIX. The Ci;t is
the correlation between the country i yield (for its corresponding maturity) and the
benchmarks yield.
This regression is similar to the one in equation (5:4) with the exception that the
dependent variable is the hedged yield and the liquidity and macro variables are not
deviations from the benchmark. Table C1 in Appendix C.3 contains the results for the
estimation of equation (5:6).
b) We dene the Common Risk Free Rate (CRFR) at time t for the corresponding
maturity according to:
CRFRt = b+ bj + bZt + b"t j = 1; 2; 3; 4: (5.7)
where the parameter b is the estimated constant, bj is the estimate of the dummy
parameters for the maturities of 3, 5 and 7 years and for the crisis dummy, respectively,
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b is the estimate of the logarithm of VIX parameter, and b"t is the average cross-sectional
residual among the eleven EMU countries at time t. The parameter b gives the average
common hedged risk free rate without the e¤ect of the other variables, bj gives the term
structure and the changes in the intercept before and during crisis, b gives the global
risk e¤ect and b"t gives the time series variation in interest rates. The benets for a given
country in using the common bond will be the enhanced rating and liquidity the common
bond would provide plus additional premiums for countrys macro fundamentals. On
the other hand the common risk free rate is not unfettered of the inuence of the crisis
and global risk factors inuence. Additionally, we test whether total EMU debt over
GDP has any explanatory power for CRFR and the regression coe¢ cient is small and
not signicant.
As the measure proposed here comes from an estimated model, (equation (5.6)
above) the estimate is vulnerable to sampling and model specication error. To address
this point we construct 95% condence bands around the estimates using 95% upper
and lower limits of the estimated parameters (i.e 2.5% in each direction).
In Figure 1 we show the estimated 5-year common risk free rate in the EMU area
(CRFR) and the condence bands around the CRFR. The CRFR average value is
3.13% while the average values for the upper and the lower bands are 3.74% and 2.53%,
respectively.
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5.7 Policy Implications: Savings in Borrowing Costs
The measure previously dened can be used to estimate the possible savings in
borrowing costs from the issuance of common bonds in the EMU. The procedure could
work as follows. We obtain these savings for a given country and maturity every day
by subtracting from the corresponding yield the CDS spread and the estimate of the
common risk free rate for 3-year, 5-year, 7-year, and 10-year maturities. The results
are reported in Panel A on Table 13. In Panel B we report the average annual savings
using the information on all EMU countries Euro-denominated sovereign bonds issued
during the sample period (2004  2009) and with a maturity equal or lower than 11
years at the issuance date.41 These average annual savings are computed as the bonds
coupon minus the CRFR minus the corresponding CDS spread for every bond in our
sample. The CRFR and CDS are the ones observed at the moment of bonds issuance.
Note that the savings reported in both panels are largely similar. The average savings
in borrowing costs are positive irrespective of the country and maturity. According to
Panel A, the country that, on average, gets the biggest decrease in nancing costs is
Finland while Ireland is the one getting the smallest decrease.4243 Finland does not
appear in Panel B due to the lack of observations to calculate the savings. In Panel B,
41We have estimated the Common Risk Free Rate for the 3, 5, 7 and 10 years maturities. Thus, in
the cases in which we have a bond with a time-to-maturity di¤erent to the estimated CRFR maturi-
ties, we employ a Piecewise Cubic Hermite Interpolation Polynomial (PCHIP) algorithm to obtain the
corresponding term. The same procedure is used whenever we do not have information on a CDS with
a given maturity.
42For some maturities, the savings for Finland are higher than for Greece. However, we have only
202 observations for Finland in comparison with the almost 900 observations for Greece.
43The low decrease in nancing costs for Ireland can be explained from the denition of the cost of
nancing. This cost is dened from (i) the CDS spread to be paid to participate in the issuance of
common bonds and (ii) the common risk free rate. Thus, the di¤erence between the hedge yield (Yield
CDS) and the CRFR represents the savings in terms of borrowing costs. However, the lowest hedge
yield is the one corresponding to Ireland due to the high CDS spread and to the fact that the Irish yield
is not so high relative to other countriesyields.
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the country that, on average, gets the biggest decrease in nancing costs is Portugal
while Ireland is, again, the one getting the smallest decrease. Countries above (below)
the average in Panel A are Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Portugal (Austria, Germany,
Ireland, Spain, and Netherlands) whereas France and Italy are close to the average.
These results are tentative and subject to measurement error (see Figure 1), but they
give some idea about the possible savings involved in a common bond. As an additional
test, we also compute the CRFR adding the (non-signicant) e¤ect of the total EMU
debt over GDP to the ones reported in equation (5.7). The CRFR increases on average
by 8.6 b.p. and the average total saving are 24.7. Again, average savings are positive
for all countries.
Adjaouté and Danthine (2003) argue that a unied market is Pareto superior to
a fragmented market given that yields will be lower in the former. As Adjaouté and
Danthine (2003) point out, the pricing di¤erences between yields reect a failure of
integration and imply costs to the euro-area Treasuries. They estimate that at the debt
levels in the euro area in 2000 the annual cost may be as high as e5 billion which
could be saved with a common bond.44 They consider that the integration could occur
simply by the establishment of a centralized agency in charge of issuing debt on behalf
of the euro areas governments.45 However, they do not give additional details about
how to achieve this integration and how to estimate the common rates derived from
44Adjaouté and Danthine (2003) estimate this amount by multiplying the outstanding debt of the
Euro area minus Germany in 2000 (2,470 billion) by the average di¤erence of the yields with respect to
German yield which is employed as the benchmark (20 basis points).
45Such a proposal was made in 1999 with a view of harmonizing the maturity structures, delivering a
true and single benchmark curve and helping reduce the cost that some member states have to pay to
primary dealers in order to promote their debt outside the country (Favero et al., 2000). Adjaouté and
Danthine (2003) proposal was met with considerable skepticism, because such a set-up implies some
collective responsibility for national debts, which runs contrary to the Maastricht Treaty but they also
argue that the debate on the establishment of a multilateral agency should be reopened.
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the centralized debt issuance. According to our estimations of the common risk free
rate, the average savings could be higher than in Adjaouté and Danthine (2003). Our
estimations suggest that the average annual savings for the EMU in the period that
spans from September 2005 to February 2009 might be around e19.52 billion with
the Common Risk Free Rate.46 Moreover, the average annual savings for the EMU
obtained from the Euro-denominated sovereign bonds issued during the sample period
(2004 2009) and with a maturity equal or lower than 11 years at the issuance date
are roughly e1.1 billion. As Favero and Von Thadden (2004) state, the possibility of
joint bond issuance by euro-area countries has been repeatedly considered because of its
ability to exploit fully the liquidity benets, among others, of a unied market. They
also suggest that this scheme has been discarded because it would generate an implicit
debt guarantee by some countries in favour of others. Our tentative evidence, based on
hedged yields, suggests that a common bond market with a common yield would reap
liquidity benets for all countries involved.
An additional question is how the system could work in practice. We suggest that
an EMU-wide agency (ECB for instance) issues the bonds and distributes the money to
participant countries. Participant members would pay to the agency their CDS spreads,
common bonds coupons and repay the principal at maturity. Additionally they would
post the corresponding amount on sovereign euro bonds as guaranty,47 possibly subject
46The annual average savings are obtained by multiplying the annual average debt outstanding in
the EMU during the period 2003-2008 by the average annual prots in terms of yields for the period
2004-2009 (see Panel A of Table 6). The average yield value is obtained as the average of the four
di¤erent maturities.
47 It may be argued that the common euro bond would be subject to currency risk because, if the ECB
is in charge, and given that it cannot tax participant countries, then the ECB may need to print Euros
to pay the debt. Therefore our CRFR measure would be a downward biased measure of the truerisk
free rate. However to quantify this specic e¤ect is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future
research.
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to margin calls to minimize moral hazard.
5.8 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we study the determinants of EMU sovereign bonds yields and
then present an estimation of the hypothetical risk free rate that a common bond would
yield. To model the determinants of yield spreads we rst propose a theoretical portfolio
selection model to motivate the variable selection. Then for the period 2004 to 2009 we
t an unbalanced panel model, using as a benchmark a weighted average of the total
gross debt issued by the governments of the di¤erent EMU members. We nd that credit
quality, macro, correlation, and liquidity variables have a signicant e¤ects on EMU
sovereign yield spreads. Robustness tests with di¤erent data frequency, benchmarks,
liquidity and risk variables, cross section regressions, balanced panel and maturities
analyses conrm the initial results.
Motivated by these results we try to answer the following question: What should be
the yield of a common eurozone bond, free, at least to some extent, from the e¤ect of the
risk factors (credit, liquidity, macro, correlation) that inuence the yield of individual
sovereign bonds? We present an estimation of this hypothetical common risk free rate
and show that average savings in borrowing costs for all EMU countries are positive
irrespective of the maturity of the common risk free rate measure employed.
We realize that there are many complex institutional design features that must be
resolved before an actual common bond issue for the eurozone could be a reality, but
our paper provides a rst insight into one central issue. Namely, what should be the
required compensation a given country should pay to the formal issuer to be allowed to
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share a given issue of EMU-based single bonds. We argue that this compensation should
be the CDS spread on a given country sovereign bonds. The benets for a given country
in using the common bond (instead of the sovereign) will be the enhanced rating and
liquidity the common bond would provide plus additional premiums for country macro
fundamentals.
Our results may be interpreted as tentative evidence in favour of the hypothesis that
a common bond and a common risk free rate in the EMU could produce substantial
savings in borrowing costs for all the countries involved. Looking forward, we expect
more conclusive evidence on other common risk free rate measures as well as in other
market segments. The procedures of this paper can also be applied to other sovereign
bonds and common currency areas as well as rates on state bonds for states in the USA
or other federal states.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND LINES
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In this thesis, I study the interaction of Credit Derivatives and Fixed Income Markets
from three di¤erent perspectives: arbitrage (Chapter 2), price discovery (Chapter 3)
and nancial integration (Chapter 4). Moreover, I also focus on the European Monetary
Union (EMU) sovereign bond market and analyze the potential arrival of a common risk
free rate for the EMU and the advantages derived from it (Chapter 5).
Our main conclusions are as follows:
a) First, using a new statistical arbitrage test we nd evidence in favour of the
hypothesis that before the crisis some persistent mispricings can be found in the
corporate credit derivatives markets. This result puts into question the e¢ ciency
of these markets. However once the crisis started, noticeable deviations from the
parity relation appeared although the increase in funding costs makes the apparent
arbitrage opportunities non protable.
b) Second, using a novel approach combining theoretical models and sophisticated
econometric specications, we nd that the price discovery process in these credit
markets is very sensitive to the appearance of the subprime crisis. Before the
crisis the CDS market leads both Bond and ASP markets. During crisis the ASP
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market leads both CDS and Bond markets.
c) Third, using rigorous empirical analysis, we nd that the internal market inte-
gration increases during the crisis for CDSs but decreases for Bonds and ASPs.
External market integration decreases during the crisis between the CDS and the
other two markets. This is consistent with results in a) and b) above in the sense
that during the crisis period the CDS market tends to become detached from the
other two markets. These facts cast serious doubts on the reliability of the price
signals coming from the corporate CDS market in crisis time periods.
d) Fourth, we estimate the yield of a hypothetical common Euro zone bond, free, at
least to some extent, from the e¤ect of the risk factors (credit, liquidity, macro,
correlation) that inuence the yield of individual sovereign bonds. We show that
average savings in borrowing costs for all EMU countries are positive irrespective
of the maturity of the common risk free rate measure employed. Our contributions
are both on the theoretical and empirical streams of the nancial literature.
Lines for further research can be summarized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we expect more denite evidence on other arbitrage strategies as well
as in other market segments. The new test and the procedure (long positions only)
of this paper can also be applied to other nancial markets. In future research, we
also expect to test the e¤ect of the new rules for standardization in the CDS market.
These rules were introduced in the form of the Standardized North American Contract
(SNAC).
There are two open questions in Chapter 3 that will be treated in further research.
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The rst question is based on how the fact that information on a given single name CDS
is mainly revealed by speculators could a¤ect to other nancial instruments (stocks or
options) of the same underlying rm. The second question is related with the demand
elasticitys estimation for the di¤erent market participants that we consider in our model
and its sensitivity to the arrival of the subprime crisis.
In Chapter 4, we expect more denite evidence on the nancial integrations process
and on the e¤ect of the nancial crisis and the market playerscharacteristics regarding
other market segments. Moreover, we pretend to extend this analysis to study not
only the degree of market integration but also the contagion e¤ect among these credit
markets and also among additional nancial markets.
In Chapter 5, we expect more conclusive evidence on other common risk free rate
measures as well as in other market segments. The procedures of this paper can also be
applied to other sovereign bonds and common currency areas as well as rates on state
bonds for states in the USA or other federal states.
Summing up, the analysis of the potential interactions among credit markets in any
of the four perspectives treated in this thesis is a topic of salient relevance. Additional
research on these topics is need before proceeding to develop and regulate these markets.
The subprime crisis o¤ers and interesting scenario to test the robustness of the di¤erent
alternatives which may be considered for this purpose. An e¤ective and fair regulation
on credit markets seems of special relevance given that as Greenspan states Credit
default swaps are becoming the most important instrument Ive seen in decades.1 This
1Speaking at the Bond Market Association, in New York, New York, May 18, 2006, quoted in Caroline
Salas, Derivatives, Not Bonds, Show What Pimco, TIAA-CREF Really Think, Bloomberg.com (May
31, 2006).
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regulation will determine if this importance has a positive e¤ect or a negative e¤ect, as
it was observed in the current crisis, on nancial stability.
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APPENDICES
7.1 Appendix A.1 (Chapter 3)
In order to obtain an expression for the credit spreads we substitute the expressions
(3.14) into the equations (3.10) and (3.11) and obtain the following equation:
0BB@ sAt_
st
1CCA = H3B
2664 (NBOTH +NCDS)
 (NBOTH +NASP )
3775+Q
0BB@ sAt 1_
st 1
1CCA+
0BB@ uASPt
uCDSt
1CCA (A1.1)
where ut =

uASPt u
CDS
t

is a vector white noise with E(ut) = 0 and V ar(ut) =

 > 0: In ut we include both the common components and the participantsnoises.1
The model in equation (3.15) can be changed into a VECM model by subtracting vector
of prices (sAt ;
_
st)
0 from both sides:
0BB@ sAt

_
st
1CCA = H3B
2664 (NBOTH +NCDS)
 (NBOTH +NASP )
3775+(Q I)
0BB@ sAt 1_
st 1
1CCA+
0BB@ uASPt
uCDSt
1CCA (A1.2)
with
Q  I = 1
B
2664  H(NBOTH +NCDS) H2(NBOTH +NCDS)
H(NBOTH +NASP )  H2(NBOTH +NASP )
3775 (A1.3)
1We do not report the whole expression of ut in order to save space and also, because of the assump-
tions on residuals they are not going to appear in our analysis.
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The previous expression can be transformed into the following nal expression
(equation (3.15)):
0BB@ sAt

_
st
1CCA = HB
2664  (NBOTH +NCDS)
(NBOTH +NASP )
3775 (1; 2; 3)
0BBBBBB@
sAt 1
_
st 1
1
1CCCCCCA+
0BB@ uASPt
uCDSt
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(A1.4)
7.2 Appendix A.2 (Chapter 3)
In this paper we adopt GGs methodology and thus, their permanent-transitory
(PT) component decomposition to measure market contribution to price discovery. GG
PT decomposition has the following form:
Xt = A1ft +A2zt (A2.1)
where ft is the permanent component, zt is the transitory component, and A1 and A2
are loading matrices. The components ft and zt are linear combinations of Xt such that
ft  I(1), zt  I(0), zt does not Granger cause ft in the long run and:
ft = 
0Xt (A2.2.a)
A1 = ?(
0
??)
 1 and  = (0??)
 10? (A2.2.b)
where ? and ? are 2 1 vectors such that 0? = 0 and 0? = 0 or equivalently:
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1;? =
H
B
(NBOTH +NASP ) (A2.3.a)
2;? =
H
B
(NBOTH +NCDS) (A2.3.b)
while ? = (2; 1): Taking all these things together we have that:
0 =
2664
(NBOTH+NASP )
2(NBOTH+NASP )+(NBOTH+NCDS)
;
; (NBOTH+NCDS)2(NBOTH+NASP )+(NBOTH+NCDS)
3775 (A2.4)
and the permanent component ft is dened as:
NBOTH +NASP
2(NBOTH +NASP ) + (NBOTH +NCDS)
sAt +
+
NBOTH +NCDS
2(NBOTH +NASP ) + (NBOTH +NCDS)
_
st (A2.5)
where the factor that multiplies sAt represents the price discovery measure attributed to
the ASP (PD1) and the factor that multiplies
_
st represents the price discovery measure
attributed to the CDS (PD2). The ratio  in equation (A2.4) that is obtained from
the orthogonal vector to ; which is denoted as ? (see equations (A2.3.a and A2.3.b));
can be understood as the relative number of market participants in a given market with
respect to the other.
The percentage of price discovery attributable to ASP and CDS markets can also
be dened as:
PD1
PD1 + PD2
= GG1 and
PD2
PD1 + PD2
= GG2 (A2.6)
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where GG1 and GG2 represent the GG price discovery metrics for the ASP and the
CDS markets, respectively.
These metrics can be dened equivalently as:
GG1 =
2
 1 + 2 and GG2 =
 1
 1 + 2 (A2.7)
After substituting we obtain:
GG1 =
NBOTH +NASP
2NBOTH +NASP +NCDS
and GG2 =
NBOTH +NCDS
2NBOTH +NASP +NCDS
(A2.8)
In order to be consistent with our model we investigate price discovery based on the
metrics that when transformed into relative terms are equivalent to the GG approachs
metrics of equation (A2.6). If 2 = 1 and agents operate only in one market (NBOTH =
0), both PD1 and PD2 measures for the permanent component are the same as the ones
introduced in GS (1983) and after employed in FFG.2 In previous papers where price
discovery is analyzed for credit derivatives markets we nd that there are two important
facts that have been ignored, (i) the fact that 2 can be di¤erent from 1:
3 Thus, a
cointegrating vector between credit spreads di¤erent from (1; 1) can be theoretically
supported by our price discovery model given that the standard requirement that 2 = 1
may be very restrictive. And (ii), a signicant amount of market participants in these
credit markets, at least in periods with a su¢ cient degree of liquidity, are represented
2Under these assumptions our permanent component could be dened as:
NASP
NASP+NCDS
sAt +
NCDS
NASP+NCDS
_
st
3According to our data and to Table III in Blanco et al. (2005), Table 5 in Ammer and Cai (2007),
Table 7 in Cossin and Lu (2005) and Table G1-A in Coudert and Gex (2008), it can be observed that
in a vast majority of cases 2 6= 1, which invalidates the metrics of price discovery in all the analyses
where it is assumed and imposed that 2 = 1:
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by NBOTH . To the best of our knowledge both facts have been not taken into account
in the extant literature.
7.3 Appendix B (Chapter 4)
This is the list of the concrete inuential events during the crisis that we consider
to construct the corresponding dummy variable:
June 20: Bear Stearns hedge funds involved in securities backed by subprime loans
near shutting down.
August 1: Bear Stearns was hit by a legal claim stemming from the meltdown of
two of its hedge funds, sending its shares, already under pressure from woes at a third
fund, to a 19-month low.
August 6: American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation (AHMI) les Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy. Two days before AHMI had laid o¤ nearly ninety percent of its 7,000
employees. A German government-led bailout of IKB Deutsche Industriebank results in
state-owned KfW assuming up to e1 billion in expected possible losses. Bear Stearns
res their co-president, Warren Spector. National City Home Equity, a unit of National
City of Cleveland, stopped taking applications for new home-equity loans and lines of
credit.
August 7: Numerous quantitative long/short equity hedge funds suddenly begin
experiencing unprecedented losses as a result of what is believed to be liquidations by
some managers eager to access cash during the liquidity crisis.
August 8: Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation announces it will discontinue
its purchase of Radian Group after su¤ering a billion-dollar loss of its investment in
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Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization.
August 9: French investment bank BNP Paribas suspends three investment funds
that invested in subprime mortgage debt, due to a complete evaporation of liquidity
in the market.
August 10: HomeBanc les for Chapter 11. Stock market downturn.
August 14: Sentinel Management Group suspends redemptions for investors and
sells o¤ $312 million worth of assets; three days later Sentinel les for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. US and European stock indices continue to fall.
August 15: The stock of Countrywide Financial falls around 13% on the New
York Stock Exchange after Countrywide says foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies
have risen to their highest levels since early 2002.
August 16: Countrywide Financial Corporation narrowly avoids bankruptcy by
taking out an emergency loan of $11 billion from a group of banks.
August23: First Magnus Financial les for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
August 26: Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), the German public sector
bank, agrees to buy Sachsen Landesbank for e250 million. Sachsen LB is the second
German bank that needed to be bailed out.
August 31: Ameriquest, once the largest subprime lender in the U.S., goes out of
business.
September 5: Stock market downturn due to the bad US economic data in USA.
September 11: Victoria Mortgages which has a portfolio of 440 million Euros
declares that they have insu¢ cient funds.
September 13: The Bank of England extends emergency funding to Northern
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Rock. The move came after investors withdrew support of Northern Rock amid worries
that the institution could face short term di¢ culties in raising the needed capital in the
wholesale market.
September 17: Stock market downturn
September 21: Bear Stearns announces a 61% drop in earnings from the same
quarter in 2006.
September 29: A¤ected by the spiraling mortgage and credit crises, Internet
banking pioneer NetBank goes bankrupt.
October 1: the Swiss bank UBS announces that it lost US$690 million in the third
quarter. Citigroup announces a 60% drop in earnings from the same quarter last year.
October 5: Merrill Lynch announces a US$5.5 billion loss as a consequence of the
subprime crisis, which is revised to $8.4 billion.
October 24: The sum of US$5.5 billion loss announced by Merril Lynch on October
5 is revised to $8.4 billion, a sum that credit rating rm Standard & Poors called
startling.
October 30: Merrill Lynch (ML) CEO, Stan ONeal, resigns after an announce-
ment that ML would write down around $7.9 billion ($3.4 billion more than ML had
predicted just three weeks earlier) debt.
November 4: Citigroup CEO, Chuck Prince, resigns after an announcement that
Citigroup may have to write down up to $11 billion in bad debt.
November 21: Freddie Mac announces a $2 billion loss in mortgage defaults and
credit losses. Shares in Freddie Mac dropped 28.7% and Fannie Mae dropped 24.8%
upon the announcement.
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November 23: Two French banks pledge $1.5 billion to bailout French bond
insurer CIFG.
December 5: Fannie Mae faces capital problems because of the deteriorating US
housing market.
December 19: Morgan Stanley announces $9.4 billion in write downs from sub-
prime losses.
December 20: Bear Stearns reports its rst quarterly loss in its 84-year history
of $854 million.
January 15: Stock market downturn.
January 21: Stock market downturn.
February 28: AIG announces a $5.2 billion loss for the fourth quarter of 2007, the
second consecutive quarter of losses. The largest portion of losses came from AIG write-
downs of $11.12 billion (pretax) concerning their revaluation of a large credit default
swap portfolio.
March 3: UKs largest bank, HSBC, reports a $17.2 billion loss on write downs of
its US mortgage portfolio.
March 10: Rumors start to appear on Wall Street that Bear Stearns could have
liquidity problems. Investors believe rumors as nancial stocks drop in value.
March 16: Bear Stearns is acquired for $2 a share by JPMorgan Chase in a re
sale avoiding bankruptcy. The deal is backed by the Federal Reserve, providing up to
$30B to cover possible Bear Stearn losses.
March 17: Stock market downturn.
April 1: UBS announces it will write down $19 billion in the rst quarter on its
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US holdings.
April 8: The International Monetary Fund new estimate on credit crunch losses
is projected upwards to $945 billion.
April 17: Merrill Lynch reveals rst quarter losses of $1.96 billion and plans to
cut 4,000 jobs worldwide.
April 18: Citigroup reports a $5.11 billion loss in the rst quarter of 2008 o¤ of a
$12 billion write down on subprime mortgage loans and other risky assets. The largest
US bank also announced it would cut 9,000 more jobs.
May 9: AIG reports 1st quarter earnings results as a net loss of $7.81 billion. One
of the principle factors of this loss was a 1st quarter write down of $9.11 billion on the
revaluation of their credit default swap portfolio.
July 8: Shares in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac plunged around 20% as investors
sell o¤ their shares.
July 11: Indymac Bank, a subsidiary of Independent National Mortgage Corpo-
ration (Indymac), is placed into the receivership of the FDIC by the O¢ ce of Thrift
Supervision. It was the fourth-largest bank failure in United States history, and the
second-largest failure of a regulated thrift.
July 13: Investor speculation on the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae bailout worsen
the situation.
July 17: Major banks and nancial institutions had borrowed and invested heavily
in mortgage backed securities and reported losses of approximately $435 billion.
July 31: Deutsche Bank reveals more write downs bringing the total so far to $7.8
billion for this year. Without guring in the write downs, Deutsche corporate banking
225
CHAPTER 7. APPENDICES
and securities division would have an income 16% less than the second quarter of last
year.
August 7: AIG shares drop 19.1%, its biggest daily drop in 39 years, after an-
nouncement of a higher than expected $5.4 billion loss for the second quarter. This loss
was blamed on AIGs exposure to large subprime write downs.
7.4 Appendix C.1 (Chapter 5)
We consider a domestic (benchmark) investor allocating a fraction t (t ) of
his real wealth wt (wt ) to a domestic D (benchmark, F) security and a fraction 1   t
(1   t ) to a benchmark (domestic) security. We assume that both the domestic and
benchmark securities are subject to default risk. The default process is assumed to follow
a correlated bivariate Bernoulli process (xt; xt ), with domestic (benchmark) default
probability 1   Pt (1   P t ). In the event of default the investor receives a fraction  t
(t ) of his gross domestic (benchmark) payment,  t 2 [0; 1 + r) (t 2 [0; 1 + r)) where
r (r) is the interest rate on the domestic (benchmark) bond. There are proportional
transaction costs lt (lt ) decreasing with domestic (benchmark) market liquidity. The
coe¢ cient of risk aversion  is the same for both investors. The utility function of
both the domestic and foreign investors depends positively on the expected real wealth,
and negatively on its variance . The domestic investor maximizes the following mean-
variance utility function:
Et [wt+1]  
2
V art [wt+1] (C.1)
where according to the previous notation, the expected wealth and variance of wealth
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are, respectively:
Et [wt+1] = (1 + rt) twtPt +  ttwt(1  Pt)  twtlt +
+(1 + rt ) (1  t)wtP t + t (1  t)wt(1  P t )  (1  t)wtlt
(C.2)
V art [wt+1] = (1 + rt    t)2 2tw2tPt(1  Pt) + (1 + rt   t )2 (1  t)2w2tP t (1  P t ) +
+2w2t t(1  t) (1 + rt    t) (1 + rt   t )Cov(xt; xt )
The domestic investor maximizes his corresponding utility function to obtain the
optimal fraction of his wealth to allocate to the domestic bond, bt:
bt = (1 + rt)Pt +  t(1  Pt)  lt   (1 + rt )P t   t (1  P t ) + lt+
wt
h
(1 + rt    t)2 Pt(1  Pt) + (1 + rt   t )2 P t (1  P t ) 
(C.3)
+wt (1 + r

t   t )2 P t (1  P t )  wt (1 + rt    t) (1 + rt   t )Cov(xt; xt )
 2 (1 + rt    t) (1 + rt   t )Cov(xt; xt )]
The foreign investor maximizes his corresponding mean-variance utility function:
Et

wt+1
  
2
V art

wt+1

(C.4)
The foreign investors expected wealth and variance of wealth are the following:
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Et

wt+1

= (1 + rt) 

tw

tPt +  t

tw

t (1  Pt)  twt lt +
+(1 + rt ) (1  t )wtP t + t (1  t )wt (1  P t )  (1  t )wt lt
(C.5)
V art

wt+1

= (1 + rt    t)2 2t w2t Pt(1  Pt) + (1 + rt   t )2 (1  t )2w2t P t (1  P t ) +
+2w2t 

t (1  t ) (1 + rt    t) (1 + rt   t )Cov(xt; xt )
The foreign investor maximizes his utility function to obtain the optimal fraction
of his wealth to allocate to the domestic bond, bt :
bt = (1 + rt)Pt +  t(1  Pt)  lt   (1 + rt )P t   t (1  P t ) + lt+
wt
h
(1 + rt    t)2 Pt(1  Pt) + (1 + rt   t )2 P t (1  P t ) 
(C.6)
+wt (1 + rt   t )2 P t (1  P t )  wt (1 + rt    t) (1 + rt   t )Cov(xt; xt )
 2 (1 + rt    t) (1 + rt   t )Cov(xt; xt )]
After imposing market clearing equation (5.1) and rearranging terms we get the
nal expression:
rt   rt = (lt   lt ) + St

2
V ar [(1 + rt    t)xt   (1 + rt   t )xt ] 
 
2
(wt + w

t )
h
(1 + rt   t )2 P t (1  P t )
i
+
+

2
(wt + w

t ) [(1 + rt    t) (1 + rt   t )Cov(xt; xt )] +
+ (1 + rt    t) (1  Pt)  (1 + rt   t ) (1  P t ) (C.7)
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7.5 Appendix C.2 (Chapter 5)
This appendix provides additional details about the denition, sources, and
timing of the data used in the study:4
1. Sovereign Yields Spreads. 3, 5, 7 and 10 years daily sovereign yields are obtained
from Datastream. These yields are computed using on the run(benchmark) 3, 5, 7
and 10-year bonds at every moment of time. The dependent variable in equation (5.4)
is dened as the di¤erence between the domestic sovereign yield and the benchmark
yield. The benchmark yield is dened as the weighted average of the EMU Government
yields. The weights are proportional to the portion of debt outstanding by each of the
EMU countries with respect to the total amount outstanding in the EMU. The general
governments gross debt data employed to form the weights are reported in Table 1 and
are obtained from the AMECO database.
2. Liquidity (total bond daily turnover volume). Liquidity is proxied by the total
daily turnover volume reported in Datastream. The total turnover volume is obtained
as the sum of the turnover volumes of all the sovereign bonds issued by a given country.
This volume is reported in terms of monthly information on the average daily turnover
volume per bond during a given month by Datastream. The turnover volume for the
total number of bonds issued by a given Government derives from trades entered into
TRAX. In equation (5.4), we employ the deviation of the logarithm of the domestic
total bond daily turnover volume, in million of Euros, from the log of the benchmark
total bond daily turnover volume, in million of Euros. We also employ the average
4For yearly, quarterly and monthly data we use end of previous year (quarter or month) data. For
instance, in the case of the Debt/GDP variable which has yearly frequency, we use the value at the end
of 2004 for the whole year 2005. Thus, we are assuming that investors at any time in 2005 know the
value of Debt/GDP variable at the end of 2004 but do not know its 2005 end-of-year value.
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daily turnover volume which is calculated as the ratio between the total daily turnover
volume and the number of bonds issued by the corresponding country.
3. CDS. The daily CDS spreads in the study are obtained from the Datastream system.
These CDS spreads are midmarket indicative prices for three, ve, seven and ten year
CDS contracts. In all cases, the CDS contract references the sovereign (as opposed to a
central bank or some other entity). For all countries CDSs are Euro-denominated. CDSs
quotes are given in basis points. In equation (5.4) the explanatory variable referent to
CDSs is obtained as the di¤erence between the domestic and benchmark (weighted
average) CDS spreads lagged one day, in percentages.
4. Debt/GDP. This variable is the ratio between the general Government gross debt
at nominal value and the GDP, obtained from Ecowin. As the frequency of the gross
debt is annual, the frequency of this ratio is also annual. In equation (5.4), we employ
the di¤erence between the domestic and benchmark Debt/GDP ratios as explanatory
variable.
5. Interact.(Debt). This variable is an interaction term representing the product
of Debt/GDP and the monthly standard deviation of the domestic yield minus the
benchmark yield. This variable has monthly frequency.
6. Trade Balance/GDP. This variable is the ratio between the net trade balances
at the end of every month divided by the GDP. The net trade balance data as well
as GDP data are obtained from Ecowin. The frequency of this ratio is monthly. The
explanatory variable of equation (5.4) is obtained as the deviation of the domestic Trade
Balance/GDP ratio from the benchmark equivalent ratio.
7. VIX (Global risk). This variable represents the overall global risk and it is proxied
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by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) (it is a measure of the
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options). VIX is obtained from the Reuters system.
We take the logarithm of VIX when we employ it as an explanatory variable. VIX has
daily frequency.
8. Corr (domestic, benchmark). This variable is the monthly correlation between
the domestic Government bond yield and the EMU benchmark bond yield. This corre-
lation is calculated for the 3, 5, 7 and 10 years maturities. The frequency of this variable
is monthly.
9. Yield CDS. This variable is the di¤erence between the Government yield minus
the CDS spread for the same maturity (3, 5, 7 and 10 years). This variable is employed
as the dependent variable in equation (5.6) and has daily frequency.
10. Crisis dummy. This variable is a dummy variable which is equal to zero before
August 9, 2007 and one afterwards.
11. Interaction of liquidity (bid-ask spread) and CDS lagged one period. This
variable represents the di¤erence (in percentage) between two interaction terms referred
to the domestic country and the benchmark, respectively. The rst interaction term is
referred to the domestic country and represents the product of a liquidity premium
or trading costs, which are measured by means of the bid-ask spread (in percentage)
for the overall maturities, and the CDS spread (in percentage) for the 5-year maturity
lagged one day while the second interaction term represents the benchmark equivalent
measure. The daily bid-ask spreads are obtained from the Bloomberg system.
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7.6 Appendix C.3 (Chapter 5)
In this appendix we show the results for the estimation of the determinants of
the Government hedge yield.
The table reports the results of the unbalanced panel regressions where the dependent variable is the
country hedged yield. All the variables (dependent and explanatory) except the measure of global risk,
the crisis dummy and the measure of correlation between the domestic Government and benchmark
yields are presented in deviations from the value of the variable for the benchmark. We group the panels
by country and maturity (3, 5, 7 and 10 years) such that we have, at most, 44 groups which form a
global unbalanced panel. We estimate the coefficients of the determinants of deviations between yields
by means of a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and
robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels and serial autocorrelation
within panels. The correlation within panels is treated as a first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and the coef-
ficient of this process common to all the panels. Each element in the covariance matrix of the distur-
bances is computed with all available observations that are common to the two panels contributing to
the covariance. Column (1) reports the results which are obtained without using the interaction of
liquidity and CDS(-1) and the crisis dummy as explanatory variables and Column (2) reports the results
without using the interaction of liquidity and CDS(-1) as explanatory variable but using the crisis dummy.
The results presented correspond to the estimated coefficient and the t-statistic  (between brackets).
Log (Total bond daily turnover volume) 0.005 0.004
(0.54) (0.44)
Total debt issued divided by GDP 0.009 0.004
(2.48) (2.40)
Interaction of total debt divided by GDP and the standard deviation of 0.0002 0.0001
    the domestic yield minus the benchmark yield (0.11) (0.05)
Net Trade Balance divided by GDP 0.114 0.130
(0.39) (0.45)
Global risk measure: log(VIX index) -0.087 -0.089
(-4.99) (-5.00)
Correlation between domestic Government yield and EMU benchmark -0.004  -0.11x10-3
   Government Yield (-0.17) (-0.00)
Dummy for the 3-year yield -0.731 -0.603
(-4.76) (-7.70)
Dummy for the 5-year yield -0.457 -0.408
(-3.26) (-6.35)
Dummy for the 7-year yield -0.242 -0.210
(-2.66) (-4.86)
Crisis dummy -0.044
(-1.14)
Constant 3.266 3.676
(9.99) (20.19)
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.993 0.991
R-squared 0.038 0.066
Observations 44062 44062
Number of groups 44 44
Observations per group                                                      Minimum 202 202
Average 1001 1001
Maximum 1294 1294
Wald chi2 (10 df) 53.300 90.060
Prob. > chi2 0 0
Condition Index 22.220 24.580
Table C1: Determinants of the Government Hedge Yield
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